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Now the sons of-bitches are killing us back home.
—Army combat medic at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam,
reacting to ihe Newsweek report of the killings of war
protesters at Kent State University, his alma mater,
1970.
I put in Jor three tours o f duly. /,was in a position to keep
people alive. I had influence over an entire province. I put my
men to work helping with the harvest. They put up buildings.
Once the NVA understood what I was doing,they eased up. I'm
talking to you about a de facto bxice, you understand. The war
stopped in most o f the province. It’s the kind o f history that
doesn’t get recorded. Few people even know that it happened,
and no one will ever admit that it happened.
— U.S. Army Colonel, in a university library, 1974.
We learned how to cheat on the numbers. We worked with the
computers that were used to call in artillery shells and we
cheated. And we were good! We put those shells where they
couldn’t hurt anybody. Some people probably got killed, but
not as many, and not in the villes.
—Vietnam veteran, on a train between San Francisco
and Salt Inke City, 1974.

Anecdotal data. A combat medic weeps for the Kent Slate war
dead, a career officer speaks proudly of soldiers who avoided battle, a son
of a pioneer Mormon family takes patriotic pride in misguided missiles.
The Vietnam war’s ideological contradictions produced experiences
which were so fractured and seemingly disconnected from the on-going
story of America that Peter Ehrenhaus suggests it was “the first
postmodern war.” 1 And so perhaps Rick Berg expects too much when he
complains that cultural forms have failed to adequately represent the
war’s meaning:2 perhaps our culture is simply unable to process the
debris of ideological crisis. Still, some of us who survived the Vietnam
war both at home and abroad have some reason to hope that a broader
range of interpretations might one day unfold in American films,
television series, and novels and— most importantly— in the public
rituals central to our national political life. And that hope guides the
writers whose essays are presented in this special issue of Vietnam
Generation.
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have astonished my students and angered some of my fellow
veterans by pointing out that many American soldiers opposed the
Vietnam war and took action to limit U.S. military effectiveness. This
action included the refusal of orders, the assassination o f officers, the
distribution of antiwar propaganda, union-like organizing, desertion,
sabotage and a general noncompliance with military objectives. By
1970, American political and military leaders could not longer depend on
U.S. troops to perform their mission in Vietnam. There developed an
amorphous, often uncoordinated “GI Resistance,” reflecting a broad
ideological spectrum and including soldiers who took action individually
or in groups. This important component of our national experience in
Vietnam is part of the war’s submerged history. It is not well documented.
And it is subject to revisionist interpretations which identify television
news coverage of the war, civilian antiwar activists, or some other factor
as the “cause” of “morale problems” among the troops. To identify the
GI Resistance as a significant component of the Vietnam war experience
is to risk the incredulity of the young, the charge of host ility from certain
veterans' groups, and the accusation of partisanship from revisionist
academics. The hegemonic process whereby a discredited political elite
re-establishes its ideological dominance has resulted in the positioning
of the Vietnam veteran as a sign of consensus; discussions of antiwar
soldiers go against the grain, because such discussions threaten the
positioning of the Vietnam veteran as a sign— a witness— of ideological
crisis.3
This special issue of Vietnam Generation is intended to provoke
debate and to encourage continued scholarly examination of the GI
Resistance. Many of the contributors conceptualize this special issue as
an attempt to bring the GI Resistance from the margins, to position it as
a major topic within the ongoing struggle over the war’s meaning.'1
Additionally, some of us conceptualize this effort in explicitly ideological
terms. We are laying claim to aspects of the lived social experience of the
Vietnam war, and we mean to help set the circumstances in which the
Vietnam veteran can expand his or her range of postwar interpretations
and subjectivity. The importance of this objective requires some
explanation of the Vietnam veteran’s developing role as a sign within the
ideological struggle over the war’s meaning.
David Rabe’s 1972 play. Sticks and Bones, predicted the immediate
postwar fate of the Vietnam veteran.5 Adapting the conventions of the
television situation comedy, Rabe located the w ar’s ideological crisis
within the family relationships of Ozzie, Harriet, David and Rick,
characters borrowed from the radio and TV series, The Adventures of
Ozzie and Harriet. Older brother David returns from Vietnam, and his
war stories shatter the family’s complacency. David challenges the
family’s unthinking commitment to anticommunism and racism. Harriet
vomits when she learns about his Vietnamese lover, whom Ozzie calls
"some yellow fucking whore.” David is the quintessential pain-in-fheass, and he identifies the contradictions of American policy in Vietnam.
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Body bags pile up on the living room floor. Unable to withstand his
stories and unwilling to accept the ghost of his Vietnamese lover, his
family conspires to kill David or, rather, they convince him to commit
suicide. Ever the good natured younger brother, Rick asks, “Do you want
to use m y razor, Dave?”
But, as Ozzie says, David “only nearly dies,” and the play’s final
scene reduces his presence to an extreme close-up of his face, projected
on a color slide. Identified as “somebody sick,” the projected image
signifies both David’s removal from discourse and the veteran’s
decontextualized maladjustment. The Vietnam veteran “dies” in the
sense that he no longer speaks. His lived experience of ideological crisis
is muted. David’s troublesome memories become products of his own
psychosis, disconnected from any sociological or political realities.
Rabe’s play was considered “controversial” in the early 1970s,
and CBS postponed the broadcast of a television adaptation when the
original air-date coincided with the return of American POWs from
Hanoi. At the same time, CBS and other television networks felt free
enough to represent Vietnam veterans as psychopathic murderers and
witless victims in prime-time adventure dramas of the period.6 The war’s
ideological crisis made the veteran a volatile sign, ju st as Rabe’s play
predicted, and cultural forms operated to constrain this sign as best they
could. The veteran emerged as the product of an elaborate therapeutic
discipline, composed of strategies which played out in a variety of
communication channels, ranging from the political speech to prim e
time television. These strategies produced the veteran’s immediate
socio-political niche: inexplicably troubled, haunted by a war we will
never understand and— above all— in need of periodic therapy or sedation
to keep him from doing violence. Under these conditions of ideological
containment, antiwar soldiers were easily positioned as merely one
component in a population of crazies. They, like David Rabe’s protagonist,
were removed from discourse in a period labeled by New York Times
reporter Fox Butterfield as our “trance of collective amnesia.”
The rituals associated with the introduction of the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial provided the veteran an opportunity to again speak.
The Memorial returned Rabe’s protagonist to discourse, and other
cultural forms soon positioned him as the object of political rehabilitation.
Belated homecoming parades (reenactments o f V-J Day), films, television
crime-adventure series, and political speeches signaled a new
respectability for the Vietnam veteran. No longer the psychotic or victim,
he emerged as a World W ar Two poser, a sign of heroic commitment to
fundamental principles. The veteran’s new respectability demonstrates
the process of hegemony, the process whereby an ideological bloc
establishes a dominant position within an array o f social institutions.7
Here is the Vietnam veteran’s newly attained niche: while others
(namely, reporters, civilian antiwar activists and weak-kneed politicians)
lost faith in American principles (specifically, anticommunism), the
Vietnam veteran remained doggedly committed to the war effort; he is
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now the warrior hero betrayed by the nation which sent him to ligh t. This
posit ion is closely aligned with what historian Jeffrey Kimball identifies
as the “stab-in-the-back” explanation of the U.S. policy failure in
Vietnam .8
The Vietnam veteran’s repositioning suggests the therapeutic
nature of hegemony. The veteran’s rehabilitation is dependent upon his
or her compliance with the role of ideological cert ainty. Vietnam vet erans
who resist this role risk an even more marginal position: embittered
nonconformist, ungrateful for the nation’s belated respect, wallowing in
self-pity, looking for a handout, probably still crazy. Given the appeal of
the veteran’s rehabilitated position, a sensible question emerges: Why
should Vietnam veterans not accept the role which society now offers?
1believe that this role helps facilitate an Am erican foreign policy
which assures the continued suffering of the people of Indochina.
Fifteen years after the fall of the Saigon government, Am erican policy in
the region remains “shaped... not by objective reality but by policymakers’
dislike for Vietnam, the only country ever to defeat the United States.”9
As a sign of ideological certainty, the veteran helps maintain the
politically potent delusions which brought so much pain to the Vietnamese
and American people. Surely, a deeper historical analysis of the GI
Resistance would not in itself encourage a more rational American policy
in Indochina, but such an expanded analysis would contribute to a
broader understanding of the war’s ideological crisis and make it easier
to set aside the legacy of animosity which exacerbates the grave
problems of Viet nam. Laos and Cambodia. Anothergeneration iscorning
of age in Indochina, and Vietnam veterans can take no pride in the
knowledge that our generation is handing-off the wages of our war to the
young.
This special issue on the GI Resistance begins with Jam es R.
Hayes’ overview, written from a sociological perspective which many
antiwar veterans may dispute. Hayes identifies several failings of the
movement. Barbara L. Tischler provides a wide ranging historical
overview which draws upon GI underground newspapers as primary
documents. David Cortright, author of Soldiers in Revolt, discusses the
activities of black soldiers in the GI antiwar movement. Gerry Nicosia’s
essay on the Presidio m utiny (perhaps one of the most significant events
in the history of the GI movement) is taken from a work-in-progress. The
oral histories and photographs o f antiwar veterans are excerpted from
a forthcoming collection compiled by Bill Short and Willa Seidenberg.
Poet and essayist W.D. Ehrhart provides some reflections which may
encourage future debate in this journal. A valuable bibliography,
compiled by Skip Delano, cites several sources of additional information
on the GI resistance. Larry Rottmann’s poem, “Lieutenant Hatfield,”
suggests the ideological crisis which many Americans experienced
during the Vietnam war.
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The generation which defines itself largely by the experience of
the Vietnam war seems to be always counting its losses. Here, we
identify with a recent one, with the hope that he will signify the others.
Michael Patrick Madden was an assault helicopter pilot who took part in
the invasion of Cambodia. He also Hew defensive missions for aircraft
which spread Agent Orange on Vietnam. ‘T h e stuff came in through our
vents,” he told me. He died from cancer last December. Madden was
highly decorated, and the Central Intelligence Agency courted him for
postwar work in Central America. Instead, he adapted the warrior spirit
to graduate work and earned a doctoral degree from the University of
Iowa. He became fascinated by the communication strategies which
praised the Vietnam veteran as a warrior hero, a role he regarded with
alarm.
He spent his last months working on an oral history, a
comparative analysis of American veterans o f the Vietnam war and
Soviet veterans of the Afghanistan war. He brought veterans of both wars
to his classes at the University of Puget Sound in Tacoma, Washington.
Madden feared that the Vietnam war might eventually be used to justify
some future American aggression, a fear shared by many Vietnam
veterans, and this is the reason we dedicate this special issue of Vietnam
Generation to his memory.

' Peter Ehrenhaus, “Shooting the War: Vietnam Images by Army
Photographer Ken Pollard,” a paper presented at the meeting of the
Western States Communication Association, Sacramento, CA (Feb
1990).
2 Rick Berg, “Losing Vietnam: Covering the War in an Age ofTechnology,”
Cultural Critique 3(1986): 46-78.
3 Harry W. Haines, “They Were Called and They Went: The Political
Rehabilitation o f the Vietnam Veteran,” in L. Dittmar and G. Michaud,
eds., From Hanoi to Hollywood: H ie Vietnam War in American Film (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press) 1990.
4 The le ss o n s o f the Vietnam War, a modular textbook produced by t he
Center for Social Studies Education (Pittsburgh, PA) makes reference to
GI opposition to the war. V eiy few of the standard histories of the
Vietnam war mention the GI Resistance.
f> David Rabe, Sticks and Bones (New York: Samuel French) 1972.
6 Berg: 101.
7 A. Gramsci; Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith, eds. and trans.. Selections from
the Pi'ison Notebooks (New York: International) 1971.
8 Jeffrey Kimball, T h e Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam
W ar,” Aim ed Forces and Society 14 (1988).
9 John M cAuliff and M aiy Byrne McDonnell, “Ending the Cambodian
Stalemate," World Policy Journal 7(1989): 99.
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The signing o f the Indochina peace agreements in early 1973
officially ended American participation in the Vietnam conflict. Military
officials would probably be the first to admit that they, more than any
other group in society, experienced the first sigh of relief. Throughout
most of the war, the military was subjected to invectives emanating from
a war-weary civilian sector, as well as disgruntled, ant iwar, anti-military
GIs. While civil-military relations have a well-documented tradition of
animosity, organized protest within the ranks is without parallel in
Am erican military history.1 For military traditionalists, the presence of
a small but vocal minority of soldiers raising the old ideal o f a “democratic
military” produced some acute anxiety. Contrary to its functionalist
image of human nature and dissent , the military was forced to come to
grips with the reality that internal discontent ran deeper than the mere
disaffections of a few disruptive, “bad” individuals.2
This essay describes and analyzes the effort by a minority of GIs
to create an antiwar, anti-military movement within the Vietnam-era
military. An attenuated chronology of the movement is presented along
with an analysis of what appeared to be the major causal variables in its
genesis and development.

ThE MiliTARy FiqhTS I t s e U
Beginning in the latter part of the 1960s, an unprecedented
movement of soldier dissent gathered momentum. Originating primarily
as an antiwar movement, it escalated to a point where it was a force
waging a battle against military authority and legitimacy.
While
desertion. AWOLs, drug use, and even fraggings have long plagued the
United Stales military, organized resistance appears to be a uniquely
Vietnam-era phenomenon. The social movement characteristics exhibited
by the movement (e.g., a sense of group identity and solidarity, consciously
articulated ideologies, movement organizations) distinguished it from
other more spontaneous and transitory uprisings such as the “Back
Home M ovement” in the aftermath of World W ar II. Adjustment
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responses such as drug use and various types of withdrawal reactions
such as desertion and AW OL will not be discussed in the context ol this
art icle; the degree to which these various forms of dissent are politically
motivated is open to debate.3
Although there was one well publicized instance o f an officers’
organization—The Concerned Officers Movement (COM), and antiwar
group that disassociated itself from the more radical GI groups— and a
lesser-known and smaller group—The Concerned Graduates of the
Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies, headquartered in San Francisco
and largely limited to ex-officers in that area— the GI movement was for
the most part comprised of lower-ranking enlisted personnel (“enlisted"
referring to st at us and not to mode of entiy into the service), predominant ly
Arm y but cutting across all branches of the armed services. Short of
revolutionary in outlook and ideology, the movement aimed primarily at
institutional structural reform. There was no accurate measure of the
numerical strength of the movement, and the estimates vary according
to source— the military appears to underestimate while movement
sympathizers tend to exaggerated It is safe to say, however, that the
movement represented only a small fraction of GIs.

TH e E a r I y Y e a r s
Like other movements of the period, the GI movement emerged
in a rather piecemeal and disorderly fashion. Movements tend to emerge
as rather amorphous, poorly organized, and fonnless entities, develop in
periods of cultural drift, and the early action tends to be individualistic
in nature and lackinggroup consciousness. The GI movement witnessed
its beginning in a series of individual acts of resistance against the war.
These initial exemplary acts occurred during a period (1965-1967) in
which the Vietnam conflict and American military involvement in it were
becoming increasingly important concerns for both the civilian and
military sectors.
One of the first publicized incidents of resistance occurred in
November of 1965 when Lt. Henry H. Howe, Jr. participated in an
antiwar demonstration in El Paso, Texas. How was court-martialed and
charged with disrespectful utterances toward public officials for carrying
a sign which read: “End Johnson’s Fascist Aggression in Vietnam ,” and
“Let's Have More Than a Choice Between Petty Ignorant Fascists in
1968." In December, 1965, Howe was convicted and sentenced to two
years hard labor (later reduced to one) and dishonorably discharged.
Howe’s conviction raised the ire of some because the military presented
no clear evidence that Howe’s conduct threatened military discipline and
order, particularly in light of the fact that he was off-duty as well as out
of uniform.
The most celebrated case of GI antiwar resistance during 1966
took place on June 30, when three enlisted men at Fort Hood refused
shipment to Vietnam on the grounds that it was an immoral war. The
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refusal by Pvt. Dennis Mora, Pfc. Jam es Johnson, and Pvt. David Samas
was the first case of overt resistance against shipment to the war zone.
All were given dishonorable discharges and forfeiture of all pay; Samas
and Johnson were sentenced to five years at hard labor, Mora to three.
The case of the “Fort Hood Three” gained broader significance when a
number o f civilian activists became involved in it in an effort to make it
a cause celebre. Although most civilian activists still viewed the GI with
some disdain, a few were beginning to realize that the GI could be a
potential ally in the antiwar struggle.
Perhaps the most significant and important individual act of
antiwar resistance in the entire 1965-1967 period was the case of Capt.
Howard Levy. Levy, a dennatologist, refused to train Green Beret medics
for duty in Vietnam, citing the commission of war crimes by the special
forces as one reason. Levy was accused not only of disobeying an order,
but also of attempting to “crush the spirit” of enlisted men with his
continued criticism of the war. On June 3, 1967, Levy was sentenced to
three years hard labor and dismissed from the service. The Levy case
received nationwide attention and the military had created a martyr.
Less than two months after Levy’s conviction, two black marines, Pfc.
George Daniels and Cpl. William Harvey, were arrested for taking part
in a barracks discussion where they argued that blacks should not take
part in the Vietnam war. They were convicted; Daniels was sentenced
to ten years hard labor and Harvey to six. Their conviction and
subsequent sentencing not only raised more questions about extreme
military oppression but was also attacked as racist. Another case o f
officer resistance to the war also took place in 1967 when Air Force Capt.
Dale Noyd was convicted and imprisoned for refusing to train pilots for
Vietnam.
The above examples constitute only a select number of antiwar
acts that occurred in 1965-1967. The formative years o f the movement
were typified by a number of different individuals engaging in similar
behaviors, but acting independently o f each other with no real
communication existing among them. The early resisters played a key
role by drawing attention to the possibility of political dissent in the
military, and, perhaps more importantly, by using the war issue as a
vehicle, they brought to the surface the larger issue constitutional rights
for military personnel, particularly enlisted persons. They did, however,
suffer a heavy toll for their actions as prison sentences and dishonorable
discharges constituted the backbone of the military defense.

H ie Biq Y ea r : 1968
'fhe individual acts of confrontation which characterized the
1965-1967 years continued throughout the duration of the war. Beginning
in 1968. the frequency of individual acts of resistance declined, and
dissent of a collective nature look precedence. It was also in 1968 that
some of the defining traits of a social movement were first discernible.
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What had been uncoordinated and disconnected acts of resistance
began to coalesce around an organizational framework. The organizational
network was decentralized (in that no central decision-making
headquarters existed) and segmented (in the sense that a number of
groups arose and operated essentially independent of each other, linked
only by a common mission and communications network. Consciousness
of membership and joint interact ion were created by the establishment
of the G1 underground press— The Bond, FFA, Vietnam GI, The Ally— and
coffeehouses— Mad Anthony’s and the UFO. Movement cells, such as
the American Servicemen’s Union (ASU) and theFTA, developed programs
and ideologies. The ASU and FTAwere followed in 1969 by the GIs United
Against the W ar in Vietnam (GIs— United), and the Movement for a
Democratic Military (MDM). In May of 1969, the GI Alliance was
constituted in Washington to serve as an umbrella organization with the
intention of coordinating the actions of the various movement cells.
While the specific ideological positions of the GI groups varied, their
goals overlapped considerably and called for such things as an end to
racism in the military, collective bargaining, federal minimum wage
standards, and, most importantly, full constitutional rights for all
enlisted people.5
1968 proved to be a banner year for the GI movement in a variety
of ways. Collective resistance against the war came to the forefront and
manifested itself in a variety of styles. In addition to the war-related
protest, stockade rebellions added a new dimension to GI resistance.
A new strain of antiwar resistance originated in 1968 as a
number of military personnel across the country took sanctuary in
various churches and universities. In July, nine GIs representing all
four sendees chained themselves together inside a San Francisco church
and held a 48-hour vigil in protest of the war. Arm y Pfc. Michael Locianto
was arrested in August after he had taken sanctuary in a Greenwich
Village church following his refusal lo g o to Vietnam. Also protesting the
war. Marine Cpl. Paul Olimpieri took sanctuaiy in the Harvard Divinity
School in the fall of 1968. In November, Army Pvt. John Michael
O’Connor was arrested by milit ary police after he had taken refuge in the
Student Union at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
approximately 1,000 MIT students fried to shield O’Connor from the
police in that instance. On November 8th, Arm y Pvt. William Brakefield
and Airman David Copp were arrested after they had sought sanctuaiy
on the campus of New York City College. The use of sanctuaries—
particularly churches—by antiwar GIs was increasingly facilitated as
more and more clergy adopted an antiwar stance.
There was a dramatic growth in the number of GIs part icipat ing
in antiwar demonstrations and teach-ins in 1968. The most significant
participation occurred on October 12 when GI and civilian antiwar
marches were held in Los Angeles, Atlanta, Washington DC, New York,
and Chicago. The Veterans Stars and Stripes f o r Peace reported that an
estimated 200 GIs led the march in Chicago. Approxim ately 700 GIs took
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part in the October 12 march in San Francisco. At Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, 35 GIs held an October 12th antiwar rally in sympathy with
the nationwide protests. The stockade was turned back over to the
authorities only after the m ilitary police were ordered to shoot to kill. A n
estimated 40-50 prisoners from the Navy, Marines, and Arm y held the
stockade in Da Nang, Vietnam for three days in August, protesting poor
condit ions and military authoritarianism; once cell-block was burned to
the ground in this eruption. Also in Vietnam during August, GIs revolted
at the Long Binh stockade, and a GI was killed by the military police and
another 59 were wounded. The most publicized case of collective
resistance wit hin stockades occurred in October when 27 inmates of the
Presidio stockade (San Francisco) mutinied in protest over the slaying of
a fellow prisoner.0 The trial of the “Presidio 27” brought massive criticism
upon the military due to the severe nat ure of the punishment meted out
to resisters. As a result of extreme pressure, the m ilitary reduced many
of the sentences.
Stockade rebellions increased after 1968 and brought with them
increased publicity over the less than adequate conditions under which
inmates were forced to live. More importantly, stockade rebellions
served to emphasize what a growing number of GIs were beginning to
realize: the military’s basic denial o f any kind of rights and freedoms for
enlisted individuals.
Although the above account of resistance in 1968 deals only with
a small number o f cases, it does illustrate that resistance was not only
taking on a collective nature but it also was no longer solely confined to
the war issue. More and more enlisted people were defining the military
per se as oppressive, and deciding to confront it rather than withdraw.
As l he self-generated protest increased, dissident GIs saw larger numbers
of civilian radicals and antiwar groups taking an interest in them and
willing to aid them in their struggle.

TH e FiNAl PERiod
In 1969 and the following years, the issue of constitutional rights
came to the forefront of the GI movement. The war, however, remained
the most appropriate vehicle for confronting the issue. This larger
concern had been precipitated by the m ilitary’s reaction to and handling
of antiwar dissenters.
The military inadvertently pricked the
consciousness of some hitherto uninvolved GIs and civilians by its
heavy-handed repression o f initial dissent. The dilemma confronting the
movement at that time was one of transforming what appeared to be a
growing body of partisan support into active support. In general,
enlisted personnel were aware that any gains made by the movement
would be in the form of “public goods,” benefits which would accrue to
all GIs regardless of whether or not they took an active role in the
movement. Although initially direct confrontation of military authority,
such as refusals of orders and distribution of “subversive” literature on
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base, functioned as the main tactic, less risky behavior, such as rap
sessions and political meetings in the barracks, were also employed with
the hope that these relatively safe actions would increasingly involve
larger numbers of GIs. Despite these efforts, the m ajority of the GIs
preferred to remain sympathetic bystanders.
In 1970, GI participation in antiwar demonstrations was
considerable. Although the possibility of punitive sanctions loomed
large, the 1969 directive on dissent issued by the Department o f Defense
made such participation legal if the demonstration was off the base in the
United States, and if GIs participating were off-duty and out of uniform.
Various GI papers stressed the legality of participation and many
advertised names and addresses o f lawyers willing to defend any GI
punished for participating. The largest nation-wide participation of GIs
was in May, 1970 in what the GIs termed “Armed Farces Day.” This
demonstration was held in conjunction with the tradition Armed Forces
Day celebrations. GIs at Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Bragg, Fort Lewis,
Fort Devens, and other bases turned out to protest the war and the
military. Estimates of the numbers involved ranged from 1,500 at Fort
Bragg and 500 at Fort Hood down to 20-30 at Fort Devens.7 Black
soldiers continued to step up their fight against racism. In July, 250
black GIs revolted at Fort Hood, burning two “Re-Up” offices and a BEQ
building. At Fort Carson, also during July, 200 black soldiers seized a
section of the base while fighting off the military police. In Heidelberg,
West Gennany, 1000 black and white GIs held a July rally against racism
in the army. While these demonstrations by black m ilitary personnel
were not the first signs of growing antiracist sentiment, the expanding
scope and intensity of this resistance in conjunction with the antiwar,
anti-military position of m any white enlisted people did present a
formidable threat to the brass... at least the military defined it as such.
By 1971, there were approximately 26 anti-military and antiwar
coffeehouses, along with an estimated 144 underground GI papers and
a nationwide network of GI counseling sendees.8 The estimate of 144
newspapers may seem unreasonable, but a significant number of these
papers were very short-lived due to financial problems, military
harassment, and staff turnovers. The papers themselves fell into two
general categories: 1) “base papers” which dealt primarily with the
act ivities on a part icular base and were generally confined to that specific
military installation; and, 2) “national papers” representing more of a
news sendee publication, which detailed resistance and court-martial
cases at bases all across the country and overseas. The national papers
were distributed all of the U.S. and abroad to GIs and interested civilians,
largely through subscriptions and clandestine distribution networks,
including to units in Vietnam. Through the GI press, activist GIs were
aware that their colleagues at other bases were engaged in similar acts
of resist ance, and they were constant ly informed of the responses ol the
military authorities. The papers continually published self-help items
for GIs, informing them of various groups and lawyers willing to defend
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them, as well as informing them about such things as conscientious
objection and rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The
establishment and proliferation of the GI press served to bridge some of
the structural limitations GIs faced in regard to communication and
mobility, and helped to foster a feeling a membership and interaction
between activist GIs and movement cell organizations.
In 1971 and 1972 resistance directed against the military and
the war continued. GIs joined civilians in demonstrations around the
country, as well as conducting their own protests on posts. In addition
to resistance and U.S. military installations, there were numerous
reports out of Vietnam detailing refusals to engage the enemy on the part
of some combat troops. While GI and antiwar civilian groups were quick
to exploit the different protests as indicative of the strength of the GI
movement, there remains some question as to whether these incidents
were indeed related to the GI movement orm ore a result of the immediate
situational contingencies of combat. While the GI movement may have
been, in part, a m otivating factor behind the sporadic instances of
combat refusal in Vietnam, it is equally true that the movement was
basically ineffectual in creating any type of massive resistance among
combat troops. Similar examples o f troop demoralization occurred in
Korea as that war was winding down.

H iE DiAlECTics of R e s is t a n c e
As was pointed out above, the initial phase of the GI movement
(1965-1967) was characterized by a number of individuals protesting the
war, with no real communication among themselves and probably not
even any knowledge of each other’s acts. These individual acts of
resistance arose in a period of “cultural drift” symbolized by the
beginnings of a serious questioning of the legitimacy and purpose of the
Vietnam war by many segments of the American public. This growing
sentiment combined with a Cold W ar ambivalence among many,
particularly liberals, to the increasing size and dominance of the military
establishment in Am erican society. It was also significant that many of
the initial acts of resistance by military personnel, especially the most
publicized ones, were earned out by officers. Their dissent was given
more credence by the public, and the severe sanctions by the military—
in an atmosphere which was becoming increasingly hostile to the war
effort and the military— created a number of heroes. In a climate of
opinion where civil liberties and the right to dissent were increasingly
brought to public attention through the civil rights movement and the
beginnings o f student dissent, the m ilitary’s response of rather harsh
sentencing did not go unnoticed. The m ilitary’s decision to severely
sanction some of its own kind (officers) for protesting a war which more
and more civilians were coming to question was seen by m any as a
repressive rather than a justified disciplinary measure.
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In 1968 antiwar sentim ent increased as did antiwar
confrontations. It was also the year in which the total number of active
duty enlisted personnel reached its peak for the Vietnam conflict and the
year in which draft inductions for the army hit the top level of 334,222.9
The military, particularly the A rm y, was confronted with a mass of young
people, many of whom were in the military against their will, required to
fight a war in which many of them did not believe. The fact that all of them
had been exposed to and some had participated in antiwar demonstrations
and they know were all grouped together on various military bases gave
rise to certain self-generated action among enlisted people. Resistance
look place as some GIs acted against the war explicitly, and, in so doing,
implicitly tested the degree to which enlisted personnel enjoy constitutional
rights. Confronted with a situation which they perceived to be a real
threat to discipline and morale, the military continued to respond in a
manner best described as panic. Their immediate response, typical of
a regime feeling itself threatened, consisted of swift and harsh punitive
action. As resistance reared its head beyond the individual acts of 19651967, the Pentagon ordered a hard-nosed position against dissenters.10
The expressed rationale for a policy o f harsh suppression hinged on the
military’s need for discipline and control, while the latent intention
continued to be a scare tactic designed to intimidate other GIs.
For activist GIs, the m ilitary’s policy of handling dissent not only
increased the sense of struggle but also provided the movement with
more publicity than they could generate themselves. The military,
already under attack for Vietnam, was now roundly criticized for its
handling of dissident GIs and its blatant denial of the constitutional
guarantees o f freedom of press, assembly, and speech. The handling of
political activists helped to raise some fundamental issues that perhaps
would not have surfaced had the military initially pursued a different
policy.
It was at this time (1968) that civilian activists started to view the
GI as a potential ally in the antiwar, anticapitalism struggle. Prior to
1968 those who accepted induction into the armed forces were written
off as potential radical partisans. Antiwar organizations and other
radical groups began to add GI names to their mailing lists, and
coffeehouses were set up near military bases by civilians with the
purpose of providing a place where GIs could congregate and vent their
hostilities. The coffeehouses were also an attempt on the part of the
largely middle-class antiwar movement to break down the barriers
between themselves and their working-class counterparts in the military.
Civilian groups provided GIs with legal defense as well. Quite cognizant
that court-martials would be readily forthcoming for radical GIs,
organizations such as the Am erican Civil Liberties Union, National
Emergency Civil Liberties Union, and the GI Civil Defense Committee
offered their support. These organizations generated considerable
publicity for the cases in which they were involved. Undoubtedly, more
GIs were willing to run the risk of dissent with the realization that a
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defense network was established to challenge any punitive action on the
part o f the military. In addition to some important legal victories, the
adverse publicity directed against the military and its system of justice
has led military authorities into a more rigorous scrutiny of both the case
they wish to prosecute and the types o f punishment they wish to dole out.
In response to growing dissent and mounting adverse publicity
for the military, Secretary of the Arm y Stanley Resor issued a
memorandum in May of 1969 titled “Guidance on Dissent.” The
statement instructed commanders to adopt a more relaxed attitude with
regard to GI coffeehouses, the GI press, and political resistance in
general. Too liberal for some, especially the House Arm ed Services
Committee, the guidelines were reissued in September, 1969. The
revised statement in effect wiped out the recommendations for tolerance
in the initial directive. The new directive de-emphasized constitutional
restraints on commanders and at the same time added to their repressive
options. Notably absent from the revised document was the phrase “to
impose only such minimum restraints as are necessary to enable the
Army to perform its m ission.” 11 The military found itself, or perhaps
placed itself, in an unenviable position. In attempting to short-circuit
what they considered to be a serious breakdown in discipline and
morale, the inadvertently spawned a growing body of criticism of the
military justice system and specifically of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
While the m ilitary’s inexperience with political resistance did
lead them to err and overreact on many occasions, they did learn from
their mistakes. In the years following 1969, they made greater use of
administrative discharges and in general pursued a somewhat more
tolerant position vis-a-vis dissent.

ThE GI M o v e m e n t : A

n

A

ssessm en t

In terms of its stated goals and objectives, which, aside from
ending the war, involved m ainly institutional structural reform, the GI
movement was, not surprisingly, far from successful. It is difficult to
believe that even the most die-hard GI organizers ever felt the movement
could produce major changes in an organization as firmly entrenched as
the military. The movement made a discernible, yet largely ineffective,
attempt at fostering subversion within the ranks. There are a number
of possible explanations for the m ovem ent’s failure to create an effective
challenge on a mass scale against the Vietnam-era military. Some of the
more glaring ones can be singled out here.
The GI movement was inextricably intertwined with the New Left.
In the course of its development, the organized element of the movement
found itself relying more and more on this sector of the civilian
population. While the outside support was necessary if the movement
was to transcend some of the limitations in political resourcesconfronting
it. the GI movement became to “civilianized,” particularly in its ideological
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orientation.
As the movement began to gather momentum and,
correspondingly, the civilian input loomed larger and larger, the middle
class ideological rhetoric of the New Left began to overshadow some of
the more pragmatic day-to-day concerns of the GIs themselves. The
feeling of helplessness and powerlessness that m any GIs felt could not
be adequately dealt with by sweeping references to “im perialism ” and the
“military industrial com plex.”
If one grants that an extremely inequitable Vietnam-era draft
resulted in a predominantly lower-middle and working-class military, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the middle-class emphasis that the
organized element of the movement adopted under New Left influence
lacked meaning for a significant number of GIs. As the movement
strayed from issues directly related to the immediate self-interest of GIs,
it increasingly reduced the possibility of mobilizing the discontent of
large numbers o f enlisted personnel. In a v e iy real sense, the movement
failed to integrate itself with the “ordinary” nonideological GI.
Another reason for the m ovement’s failure to mobilize massive
discontent stemmed from its own internal contradictions. Factionalism
developed over tactics. There were also disputes over the proper role that
civilian radicals should play in the GI movement. A m ajor point of
contention concerned those groups who, on the one hand, maintained
that civilians should provide support to GIs but leave the actual control
and operation of project to the GIs themselves (such as the Student
Mobilization Committee, and United States Servicemen's Fund), and
those groups who, on the other hand, wanted to function as a type of
vanguard party leading the struggle against the military (such as the
Socialist Workers Party/Young Socialist Alliance and the Youth Against
War and Fascism). The orientation of the former groups appeared to be
directed more toward democratizing the military, while that of the latter
seemed more concerned with creating a broader revolutionary youth
cohort. It was the latter who turned out to be more vociferous, and the
GI movement came to be identified with them.
Although the GI movement claims to have been a significant
factor in instigating troop dissent in Vietnam, there is little evidence to
support this contention. The sporadic cases of troops refusing to go into
combat, and acts such as fraggings appear to have been inspired by
factors more or less separate from the stateside GI movement. Rather
than viewing combat refusals as consequences of the GI movement, it
seems more reasonable to interpret both phenomena as products of the
anti-Vietnam war malaise affecting the larger society. As the war
continued, reports from Vietnam indicated that more and more GIs were
sharing the same disillusionment with the war as Am ericans at home
were experiencing.
The GI movement was also ineffective in dealing with racial
issues.12 Some of the organizations did have a multi-racial membership
base, but the black participants seemed to be token members. Black
soldiers began forming their own organizations in an effort to meet the
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needs of black service personnel. For the most part, black GIs were
waging a separate battle with military authorities. From the perspective
of black GIs, their battle was qualitatively different from the one being
conducted by the whites. Black soldiers discovered that the m ilitary was
a microcosm of Am erican society and that the problems confronting
blacks in the military were not significantly different from those which
faced them in the civilian world. Just as the New Left organizations failed
to bring about a desired coalition with blacks and other minorities in
civilian society, so the GI movement proved deficient in this realm as
well.

S ummary ANd C oncIusIon
The GI m ovement made a discernible, but largely ineffective
attempt to foster subversion within the ranks. It failed to mobilize the
discontent of the large bulk of GIs into a unified antiwar, anti-military
force. To be sure, part o f the failure stemmed from the fact that those
who were most radical in the 1960s were also those who enjoyed
deferments from military service. While a few entered the m ilitary with
the avowed purpose of organizing, most remained on the outside and
attempted to organize GIs from that vantage point. This not only
engendered a certain degree of resentment on the part of GIs, but the
“outsiders” were unable, or perhaps unwilling, to grasp the concerns of
GIs. Though the movement had to rely on civilian support to get off the
ground, civilian groups appear to have co-opted the m ovement in an
attempt to exploit GI resistance for ideological purposes. The New Left
was never able to overcome its elitism. The same mistake had been made
in the abortive effort to radicalize workers. Even for GIs who were
sympat hetic to the GI m ovem ent’s aims, the lack of a clear-cut strategy
and program of action resulted in the overshadowing of the hoped for
gains by the very real risks involved in striving for them. In simple terms,
it was not worth it.
Although the movement faltered partially because of its own
internal contradictions, its inability to radicalize a large constituency of
GIs was, in the final analysis, testimony to the m ilitary’s system of social
control. The military went a long way in defusing dissent after it had
learned from its initial mistakes.1
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BREAkiNq RANks: Gl A n t Iw a r N e w s p a p e r s
ANd t He C u I t u r e of P r o t e s t
BARbARA L. TischlER

GIs: Caution, Reading this paper may be
hazardous to your Discipline, Morale, and
Loyalty.
— The Pawn (Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD)1
This publication is your property and cannot
legally be taken from you.
—Aboveground (Fort Carson, Colorado Springs,
CO)2

Popular works about the United States in the 1960s often
analyze the Vietnam war in terms o f the actions of Lyndon Johnson,
Melvin Laird, and W illiam Westmoreland juxtaposed to the protests of
Abbie Hoffman, Mark Rudd, and Bem adine Dohm . But such a “top
down” approach is unsatisfactory in analyzing the decentralized and
loosely structured opposition to United States m ilitary involvement in
Southeast Asia. The antiwar movement was not a single entity, but a
coalition of organizations on college campuses, in local communities,
and, increasingly after 1968, on military bases in the United States and
abroad. GI “alternative” or “underground” newspapers gave voice to
antiwar sentiment within the military along with calls for First Amendment
rights for soldiers and an end to racism and sex discrimination in the
United Stales.
'fhe idea of opposing the Vietnam war within the m ilitary took
shape as the civilian antiwar movement began to expound a broad
prot est agenda and as soldiers began to see themselves as occupying the
front ranks of a multi-faceted struggle against Am erican imperialism
abroad and injustice at home.3 Just as the civilian/student antiwar
movement considered the war as part of a wider pattern o f serious social
ills, there were voices in the military that articulated personal and
collective discontent, of which the war was one m ajor cause. Modeled
in m any cases after civilian underground papers that were easily
obtainable off base, GI antiwar newspapers were a sounding board for
expressions of resistance in an environment not known for its tolerance
of dissent.
Challenges to military authority that ranged, even in wartime,
from grumbling comments on latrine walls to draft riots and refusals to
fight, were not new in the 1960s and early 1970s. Am erican soldiers had
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long complained about the oppressive nature of the military bureaucracy
and the meaningless quality of its regulations, the degree to which
advancement was based less on merit than on favoritism, and the fact
that the institution saw no need to recognize or grant its citizens in
unifonn basic constitutional rights. But expressions of dissatisfaction
did not necessarily connote a spirit of resistance or rebellion. Prior to the
Vietnam war, GIs generally accepted the legitimacy of m ilitary authority
and the capacity of superiors to make a dissenter’s life unbearable.
Resistance and rebellion against policy in Vietnam and against
the military itself diverged sharply from dissent in Am erica’s wars earlier
in the twentieth century. The new military protest, which was small at
first, grew dramatically in its power and impact as the war dragged on.
Antiwar activists demanded that the various branches of the military
recognize its subordinate members as citizens with a constitutionally
guaranteed right to dissent from established policy. They demanded the
right to defy and modify regulations, and they insisted that soldiers as
workers had the right to bargain collectively with base commanders on
such issues as work assignments, recreational activities, and the right
to express opposition to the war.
Why did these soldiers presume that they had rights protected by
the First Amendment when their predecessors had resented but essentially
accepted the Uniform Code o f Military Justice? Clues can be found in
the nature of the war itself, the profile of the antiwar GI, and the
emergence of protest as a significant aspect of Am erican culture by the
late 1960s.
The fighting in Vietnam was part o f an undeclared “non-war”
against unseen enemies. It exacted a high cost in Am erican and
Vietnamese lives with few if any signs of victory. Even soldiers who
enlisted with the idea of saving the world from the “Communist m enace”
often became disillusioned because they were fighting a war they could
not win. The ranks of antiwar soldiers and veterans swelled after theTet
Offensive of January'' 1968, and many of the men and women who were
most vocal in opposing the war and demanding GI rights had recently
returned from service in Vietnam.
Many of the men drafted into military sendee came to the fighting
with overwhelmingly negative feelings about the war. As draftees, they
accept ed the mission in Vietnam with little enthusiasm and often sought
to evade rather than obey military rules. African-American and Latino
soldiers and those from poor families saw themselves as cannon fodder
with little to gain from the abstraction of a fight to preserve American
interests in Southeast Asia. With the end of student deferments in 1966,
some of the military’s lower ranks were populated by young men drawn
from the counter-culture itself. Those who could not avoid m ilitaiy
sendee and for whom obtaining conscientious objector status or evading
the draft were not realistic options now found themselves subjected to
a system of total military regulation. For young people who had recently
begun to question and challenge authority and to see this challenge as
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a legitimate exercise o f popular political will, the reality of military life ran
counter to their notions of the fundamental principles of Am erican
politics embodied in the Bill of Rights.
The GI protest m ovement comprised m any groups o f soldiers
who had come to mistrust both the m ilitary and government policy
makers. Some, who at first had no specific identification with the
antiwar movement or the counterculture, saw the w ar as unwinnable,
m any African-Am erican and Latino GIs felt that they had no stake in the
struggle, and many middle- and working-class young conscripts began
their military careers with strong opposition to the war. To some extent,
the GI antiwar movement mirrored the culture of protest and resistance
to government policy that developed on college campuses with the first
teach-ins and antiwar protests as early as 1965 and which permeated
the larger culture by the end of the decade.
Oppositional culture in the U.S. in the late 1960s can be
discussed in terms of both the challenges it posed to traditional authority
and the search that it demanded for a better community that would be
achieved through struggle with established ideas and social structures.
Am erica’s war in Southeast Asia became for many Am ericans and, most
particu larly for the men and women who rejected its basic premises even
as they were asked to fight it, a symbol of misguided policy and outright
betrayal. Protest against the politics of passivity that had made the war,
along with racism and sexism, possible, became central to the lives of
m any GIs and recently discharged veterans. The slogan “No More
Vietnam s” connoted resistance to what m any in the antiwar movement,
both in and outside of the military, saw as an imperialist venture by a
hierarchical and undemocratic government. In antiwar papers all over
the United States and in Germany, Japan, and the Philippines, citizen
soldiers criticized the war, not in isolation, but as part of a larger matrix
of social ills that was very much in need of radical change.
The presence of a military antiwar press underscores the extent
to which official pronouncements of victory, high military morale, or
“peace at hand” in Vietnam were less than candid assessments.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to quantify the extent of GI resistance from the
papers. Many GIs took part in antiwar demonstrations but did so out
of uniform and on their own time in order to stay within the regulations.
Circulation figures for unofficial GI newspapers are an unreliable
indicator of the extent of antiwar activism, as papers were often passed
from hand to hand when funds to print a large run could not be raised.
The GI antiwar press provides qualitative indicators of dissent within the
armed services, as many papers covered protests over conditions in
military jails, individual and large-scale refusals to fight, racism and
sexism in the military, the civilian antiwar movement, massacres and
other battlefield atrocities, the use of chemical weapons and defective
weapons in Vietnam, and attempts to censor or eliminate anti-military
papers. The antiwar press and the attempt to suppress it shows that
resist ance was a serious problem for the m ilitary brass, which infiltrated
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newspapers and off-base antiwar groups and harassed movement
leaders and participants.4
GI newspapers emerged in part to fill a gap in the mainstream
press coverage of news that GIs though was important. Until 1968, the
majority of Am erican newspapers accepted government assertions of the
validity of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and military assessments of the
extent to which we were “winning” the war. It was not until after the Tet
Offensive that reporters challenged the information that was fed to them
in the daily Saigon military military briefings that came to be known as
the Five O’clock Follies. Even as the mainstream press began to take
notice of the student/civilian antiwar movement, major city and small
town newspapers offered very little coverage of strong resistance to the
war within the anmed forces. Further, military papers such as Stars and
Stripes offered no outlet for expressions of protest. For example, when
The Airnored Sentinel the official post newspaper at Fort Hood, Texas,
carried an advertisement during the summer o f 1968 soliciting
contributions to a writing contest sponsored by the radical magazine
Ramparts and the Summer o f Support— a project launched by Rennie
Davis to raise funds for antiwar coffeehouses— all 12,000 copies o f the
issue were burned before any soldiers could see the ad. In some
localities, publishers whose papers were distributed on m ilitary bases
demurred from printing news that was potentially critical or damaging
to the brass/’ For many, the need for an alternative press was obvious.
The journalistic activity of antiwar GIs was consistent with the
long-standing historical use of the First Amendment to foster dissent.
American radicals, from J.A. Wayland, publisher of the early 20th
century m idwestem socialist newspaper The Appeal to Reason, to
contributors to the independent socialist journal Monthly Review
(published from the late 1940s to the present), have used the press to
articulate a Left political perspective. During the Vietnam war, hundreds
of underground or alternative publications produced by individuals,
college groups, and organizations that identified with the Left, gave voice
to disparate antiwar and counterculture viewpoints and aided in the
organization of a broad-based and decentralized antiwar coalition. The
antiwar press became an especially important part of the terrain of
military rights over which antiwar soldiers and the brass battled
frequently. In the early days of the movement, the antiwar GI or officer
was an anomaly isolated by the harassment he or she faced simply for
challenging prevailing military wisdom. Alternative newspapers provided
assurance that there were kindred antiwar spirits as they encouraged
the growing tide of protest against the military ethos as well as the war
itself.6
The editorial and reporting staffs of these off-base publications
were often transient, as writers and editors were shipped off to Vietnam
or discharged from the service, although, in a number of cases, staff
members were former military men and women who remained in the area
of their bases to organize the antiwar movement. Many papers received
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support from or were affiliated with other m ilitary and civilian antiwar
groups. These included the Am erican Servicem en’s Union, Concerned
Officers Movement (founded by jun ior grade officers from all services in
Washington, D.C. in early 1970), the GI Alliance (founded at Fort Lewis,
Washington in 1970), GIs United Against the W ar in Indochina (an
integrated antiwar group, founded in 1969 at Fort Jackson), Movement
for a Democratic Military (founded as a revolutionary organization by
Marines at Camp Pendleton, California in 1969 and later established at
other west coast bases), the United States Servicem en’s Fund (an
umbrella agency that funded newspapers and coffeehouses and provided
support ranging from antiwar films and speakers to legal counsel), and
Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Some papers developed ties to
revolutionary antiwar groups that provided theoretical guidance and
production help. Such an alliance, however, could present problems,
especially where tension existed between civilian radicals and antiwar
GIs who adopted an eclectic and practical approach to ending the war
rather than one based on a specific theory.7 In cases of a conflict between
preserving the authenticity o f an original contribution and presenting a
politically clear analysis, m any of the GI papers opted for the direct, often
unedited but authentic, voice of the soldier.
GI papers often challenged the notion that a good paper had to
be polished in style and appearance. Funds, generally raised by
subscriptions and occasional donations, were always in short supply,
making high-quality production difficult. In an effort to represent the
grassroots'GI perspective, editors frequently solicited articles, letters,
poetry, and cartoons, with no mention of any standard of journalistic
“quality." The “You write it, w e’ll print it” slogan appears often in these
publications that preserved the integrity of original contributions by
editing them as little as possible8. The practice of not “correcting”
contributions, even for gram m ar or spelling, was common. The idea that
GI antiwar papers presented the views of their readers as they were,
without censorship, modification, or the veneer o f professional editing or
typesetting was an article of faith with many editorial staffs that regarded
form as subordinate to content.
The non-professional, even anti-professional, image of m any of
the GI papers could be interpreted as a weakness rather than a strength
of grassroots publications operating with serious resource limitations.
Writing in the Columbia Journalism Review in 1970, critic Murray
Polner, who was one of the first mainstream journalists to recognize the
GI press, argued that the papers and the soldiers who produced them
were “amateurs, for now at least. Their content is uneven, their style
sometimes turgid, their humor simply not funny.” Polner evaluated the
appearance and tone of the GI papers in comparison to the mainstream
press, but even as he did so he recognized that the value o f these papers
lay not in their journalistic “quality,” but in the power of their message.
The writers, he noted, were “angrier than any other generation of
conscriptees” and they would continue to search for an outlet for their
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views “as long as the mass media pretend that military life is like a
television serial” and as long as the war and military injustice continued.9
When viewed not as professionally-produced newspapers designed to
capture advertising dollars and a large readership, but as expressions
of discontent and, in many cases, as organizing tools for the military
antiwar movement, the papers appear in a very different light. Some
include ponderous political statements, but m any provide personal
glimpses into the transformation of a generation of soldiers into protesters.
Cartoons and articles on the brass, “Armed Farces Day” activities, and
the “Lifer of the M onth” are sharply critical and often devastatingly
funny. Indeed, many of the papers that were the least sophisticated in
terms of appearance often contained analyses of the war and military life
that gave voice to the deepest anger and frustration of participants
themselves.
Contributors to GI antiwar papers often communicated with one
another through poetry. The work of Vietnam veteran poets has become
familiar in recent years as a result of the efforts of Jan Bariy, W.D.
Ehrhart, and others to find and publish their work, but the appearance
of poems amid stories of military harassment and massacres in Vietnam
in the late 1960s and early 70s was both anomalous and fitting. Soldierpoets looked for a voice and often found it outside of the slogans and
cliches of war and military life. Most of these works were unsigned and
as a group they fit the description that Ehrhart applied to the poems in
Winning Hearts and Minds (1972), the first anthology of Vietnam era
poems, which he characterized as “artless poems, lacking skill and
polish, but collectively they had the force of a wrecking ball.” 10 In their
directness and simplicity, these works communicated the GI response
to the hopelessness o f fighting in Vietnam without the artifice or
conventions of high art :
"Dig it,” they said,
and I dug.
“Shoot it," they said,
and I shot.
“Eat it," they said,
and I ate.
But then,
god dammit,
"Defend it," they said,
and I died.11

This poem appeared in one of the best-known GI papers, Fun, Tra vel and
Adventure, produced by soldiers at Fort Knox, Kentucky, from June of
1968 to 1972. The paper’s initials were quickly identified with the
popular coffehouse shows and the slogan, “Fuck the Army."
Occasionally, an editorial staff would articulate a position that
seemed to eschew specific political or antiwar content. Perhaps the
editors of A Four Year Bummer (fonnerly Harass the Brass ) at Chanute
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Comments on the stultifying effect of the military mindset appeared
often in the GI antiwar press. Chuck Mathias' cartoon com m entary
on m ilitary conformity appeared in many papers.
Air Force Base, Illinois, were being disingenuous or cautious when they
declared that the paper “does not necessarily have an anti-war slant—
it’s for GI’s, by GI’s, and therefore its stand is that of each writer. Most
of its writers, however, are anti-war in their philosophy, but we will print
all GI articles.” 12 Antiwar GIs occasionally claimed that their papers were
“objective” voices in the manner of the mainstream press rather than
ideologically clear statements against the military whose goal was to
organize widespread opposition. As the political analysis of some
contributors grew more sophisticated and as it became clear that the
mainstream press continued to report government and military
disinformation about the war, the GI antiwar press played an increasingly
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important role in refuting the official military line from a clearly antiwar
perspective.
The GI antiwar press helped to undermine traditional military
authority and discipline. Many papers were focal points for specific
antiwar organizing through their ties to coffeehouses and civilian
antiwar groups, most offered a forum for the expression of broader
critiques of Am erican society, and almost all provided an outlet for
expressions of frustration with military life and the denial of basic rights
of free speech and assembly to service personnel. The papers spoke
directly to draftees and short-time soldiers caught in the contradiction
of having to fight a professional soldier’s war without the commitment
of the long-term fighter. In scathing attacks on lifers and the brass, GI
antiwar newspapers highlighted deep division within the military.
From the first publication in Berkeley in June, 1967, o f The Bond,
a civilian antiwar paper that later came to be identified as the “voice of
the Am erican Servicemen’s Union,”13 to the withdrawal of American
troops from Vietnam in 1973, GI underground or alternative newspapers
were effective mechanisms for com munication within military
installations. In many instances, the papers also facilitated the sharing
of information and ideas among GIs from different bases and branches
of the service, as they reprinted articles, cartoons, letters, and poetry
from other antiwar papers. Many papers also printed lists of GI antiwar
publications, coffeehouses, and drop-in rap and counseling centers as
a direct response to m ilitary attempts to censor the papers and close
down “unofficial” gathering places for military personnel.
The disclosure in these papers of official harassment of antiwar
soldiers aided the organizing effort of the GI movement. An individual
soldier who was punished for unpopular, though not necessarily illegal,
protest could be ignored, but as the numbers of publicly antiwar soldiers
grew, their actions, as reported in the GI press, encouraged others to
express their resistance to American policy more openly. W henLt. Henry
H. Howe became the first serviceman to be prosecuted under Article 88
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1965 for carrying a sign that
read, “End Johnson’s Fascist Aggression against Vietnam ,” at a local
antiwar march in El Paso, few groups existed that could support him.
With no one to testify in his behalf or publicize his trial and the fact that
the Supreme Court had previously upheld a citizen’s right to criticize the
president, Howe received a sentence of a year’s hard labor followed by a
dishonorable discharge. When black Marines George Daniels and
William Harvey spoke out publicly against the war and racism in their
branch of the service in the wake of ghetto disturbances in many cities
in the summer of 1967, they were arrested, tried, and sentenced to long
jail terms.
By 1969, growing opposition to the war improved the situation
somewhat for antiwar soldiers. The extensive coverage and public
protests over the Navy’s arrest of seaman apprentice Roger L. Priest for
publishing OM, The Liberation Newsletter (Washington, D.C.) helped to
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Antiwar commentators attaced the hypocrisy of veterans' groups
and others who insisted on continuing the war at whatever cost.
( The Ally No. 19, September 1969.)
keep the climate of resistance alive. Faced with fourteen charges,
including the encouragement of sedition and desertion, Priest declared
that “the admirals and generals are trying to silence dissension in the
ranks by any means. This is the only way to view the heavy-handed
at t empts to put out of commission the antiwar, anti-military newsletter
which I edit.” 14Priest received a bad conduct discharge but did not serve
time in a military jail, in part because his case had received considerable
public attention in the GI alternative press. Similarly, the response to
the repeated firebombing of a coffeehouse near Fort Knox and the
attacks on the Movement for a Democratic Military center in San Diego
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prompted more rather than less resistance to military authority. According
to A Four Year Bummer,
The organized GI Movement has grown in the last tew years
largely as the response o f servicemen and women to the brass’s
attempt to repress any and all dissent in the military. From
individual or isolated acts of resistance more and more GI's are
moving toward more organized forms and long-range goals.15

The protection of the first amendment rights to free speech and
a free press was a major issue in many GI antiwar papers. Clearly,
editors were vitally concerned with their right to publish unpopular
views in the military, but the issue transcended the desire for a free
military antiwar press to encompass a broad range of rights that enlisted
personnel began to demand as citizens. The first issue of Fun, Travel,
and Adventure identified the paper as “Published Underground— for and
by the GI’s at Fort Knox, Dedicated to Free Speech and the Struggle for
Our Rights.” 16 Such rights were not always spelled out clearly in the
papers, but military personnel had a clear understanding that they
wanted, for example:
•
•
•
•
•
•

freedom from h arassm en t for a tten d in g an tiw ar
demonstrations off base;
the right to produce, distribute, and possess antiwar
newspapers and other antiwar and anti-military documents;
the right to wear peace signs, long hair, African unity arm
bands;
an end to institutionalized military racism;
an end to sexism in the military;
the right to refuse an order to fight that a soldier considered
unlawful or immoral.

That this generation o f soldiers spoke in terms of rights that had
long been denied in the military as a m atter of course and as a way of
maintaining discipline in both war and peacetime reflects the extent to
which broader challenges to authority fueled opposition to American
policy in Southeast Asia. Soldiers could not have presumed to struggle
for their rights as citizens without indications that they would find
support in the culture of protest that influenced Am erican political life
after the mid-1960s.
The vast majority of lhe GI antiwar papers included in their
masthead this assertion: “This is your personal property. It cannot
legally be taken away from you.” The right to possess a single copy of an
unofficial military paper was protected by Department of Defense
Directive 1325.6. TheDepartment’scommunique, “Guidance on Dissent,”
issued on May 27, 1969, allowed the publication of such papers under
certain conditions:
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Unless such a newspaper contains language, the utterance of
which is punishable under Federal law (e.g. 20 USC sec. 2387 or
the UCMJ [Uniform Code o f Military Justice]), authors of an
“underground newspaper” may not be disciplined for mere
publication.

But the editors of Up Against the Bulkhead, and unofficial Navy paper
affiliated with the Movement for a Democratic Military and published,
first in Berkeley and later in San Francisco, recognized that Defense
Department regulations offered little protection against harassment on
individual bases. Readers were advised that “you can still be put on
report or cited with an Article 134 if the Brass feels like citing you. So
don’t kid yourselves. Although you may have many rights on paper, you
have none in practice.”17
While possession of an antiwar paper could be a problem for an
individual soldier, the distribution of the paper on base touched off
battles between base commanders and antiwar newspaper staffs.
Shipments often had to be smuggled on base, and officers could and did
confiscate bundles of papers before they reached their destinations.
Individual commanding officers had wide discretionary power to allow or
prohibit antiwar papers. Col. Harold G. Lund, the outgoing commander
of Selfridge Air Force Base in Michigan, wrote to The Broken Arrow that
Air Force regulations allowed commanders to exclude from their
installations “material they consider to be detrimental to the loyalty or
morale of their personnel.”18 The paper continued to publish articles and
letters critical of the military, including the reminder to readers that “if
you believe the brass and the straight press tell you the whole story,
you’re in for quite a shock.”19 In the fall of 1970, harassment of the paper
and GIs who distributed it prompted The Broken Arrow to print the text
of a petition to the new base commander in support of the paper’s right
to publish. The lone reflects an overriding emphasis on civil liberties:
WHEREAS the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
recognizes that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are
guaranteed to all citizens and
WHEREAS Air Force regulations recognize that members of the
United States Air Force are entitled to possess any written
materials for their personal use that they desire, and
WHEREAS AFR 35-15 states that “The service members [sic]
right of expression should be preserved to the maximum extent
possible," and that distribution of literature “may not be prohibited
solely on the grounds that the material is critical o f Government
policies or officials,”
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED personnel o f Selfridge AFB, Michigan,
petition Col. Kenneth I. Gunnarson, Base Commander, to grant
the request of The Broken Arrow for distribution rights pursuant
to Selfridge AFB Reg 5-1, which indicates that distribution may
be accomplished with “prior written approval.” Although we do
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not necessarily agree with all the views expressed in The Broken
Arrow, we feel that the right of free expression o f all points o f view
should be protected.20

Military protest also sometimes reflected revolutionary goals of
transforming the military and Am erican society that were part of a
broader New Left agenda. The Movement for a Democratic Military,
founded in 1969 by Marines from Camp Pendleton and sailors from the
San Diego Naval Complex, was especially active in spreading the antiwar
message in California. The interracial MDM, that referred to itself as a
“rainbow coalition,” published several papers21. A statement in Duck
Power, the paper of the San Diego MDM group, connected the servicemen’s
demand for rights and a larger worldwide “struggle for basic human
rights.” The MDM demands included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

The right to collective bargaining.
Constitutional rights for militaiy men and women.
Stop all militaiy censorship and intimidation.
Abolish mental and physical cruelty in m ilitaiy brigs.
Abolition o f the present court-martial system and
replacement with trial by jury of one’s peers.
Wage rate the same as the federal minimum wage.
Abolition o f the military class structure, an end to saluting
and officer privileges.
End all racism everywhere.
Free all political prisoners.
Stop the glorification o f war.
Abolish the draft.
Pull out o f Vietnam now.22

The positioning of the idea of withdrawing from Vietnam at the end of the
statement hardly detracts from its importance. Rather, it places the war
in a much broader context of military and social oppression that MDM
hoped to eradicate. For many groups on the Left, ending the Vietnam
conflict was a liberal issue in comparison to the more revolutionary goal
of transforming American society. For members of the anned forces
facing the prospect of combat in Southeast Asia, ending the war was a
critical issue. The MDM demands, framed as they were in broad social
and political terms, reflect a strong Left political influence on at least
some of the GI antiwar groups.
In 1969, and MDM spokesman, writing in Up Against the
Bulkhead, produced in the San Francisco Bay area, declared the
Movement to be:
dedicated to using every means at our disposal to bring about a
prompt end to the war in Vietnam, the exploitation o f our
brothers and sisters abroad, and the repression—both physical
and economic—of those in our own land.
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We feel that by remaining silent, the serviceman has contributed
to the denial of this deep-founded right o f him self and o f people
everywhere to live free from intimidation and oppression. We
have been silent for a long time. We will be silent no longer.23

In a style reminiscent of Abbie Hoffman and the Yippies, a few
antiwar military groups combined serious political ideas with anti
military proposals that were humorous or fantastic. The Movement to
Off the Military presented its demands in April of 1971, in AH Ready on
(he L e ft published at Camp Pendleton:
1.

The right to free and open purchase o f marijuana in the
mess halls and P.X.
2. The right of Black, Brown, Yellow, and Red GIs to form their
own armies.
3. The abolition o f uniforms.
4. The right to wear hair any length but not less than three
inches. (Persons with shorter hair should be busted for
indecent exposure.)
5. Community control o f officers and staff N.C.O. clubs so they
could be used as ethnic studies centers, free schools, etc.
6. A descending pay scale where E -ls would receive $3,000 a
month and 0-1 Os would get $143 a month.
7. Compulsory retirement at 25 years old.
8. Government credit cards instead o f military IDs.
9. Stockades turned into rehabilitation centers for lifers and
officers.
10. We demand that 50% o f all military personnel at all ranks
be women.
11. We demand peace.
12. We demand the President of the U.S. be replaced with a
statue.24

Whether the various antiwar organizations in the m ilitary inspired
serious political discussion, informal rap sessions, or a humorous
evocation of what military life might look like with the troops in
command, they were powerful vehicles for com m unicating a
counterculture voice. There was energy in the m ilitary to demand
change, and some papers reiterated Joe Hill’s “Don’t mourn, organize!”
dictum to their readers, even those who might be considering desertion
as an act o f protest: “If you’re that pissed off at the m ilitary and you ’re
thinking of deserting, write to us instead. You couldn’t be in a better
mood and position than you are right now to do something about the
Military-Industrial com plex.”25
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B U c k G Is ANd j Ue A n t Iw a r M o v e m e n t
Articles on military discrimination and the denial of basic rights
often went hand in hand with exposes and analyses of military racism,
and black soldiers were an important component of the GI antiwar
movement. Blackcasualties numbered about 13% of the total and, while
this figure was only slightly larger than the percentages of AfricanAmericans in the population at large, these young men numbered close
to half the infantry population, the “grunts” whose only training was in
combat and whose job was disproportionately risky. The significance of
using less-educated minority men on the front lines was not lost on black
soldiers who defied military authority in many ways, from the “dap”
handshake and Afro hairstyle to refusing to fight. For minor infractions
of milit ary discipline, black soldiers were called up on Art icle 15 charges
more frequently than their white counterparts, and blacks received a
majority of the less-than-honorable discharges during the Vietnam
war.26 Articles and letters on racism in the military and in American
society appeared often in the GI press, and black soldiers often connected
their oppression in the military to the struggle for Black Power.
To regard African-American soldiers who opposed the war simply
as a part of the larger antiwar movement in which white students,
civilians, and military personnel played m ajor roles would be to
oversimplify that movement and present an incomplete picture o f black
resistance and rebellion. Black soldiers responded not only to the
Vietnam war, but also to rising demands in the late 1960s for Black
Power. Their motivation to protest was often driven more by racism than
by the war itself. Like many civilian activists, black soldiers launched
their own protests and formed their own organizations. In many cases,
they also published newspapers that articulated their own demands in
their own style.27
Revelations of the hostility of black soldiers to the military and
the war were not confined to the unofficial GI press. Indeed, as the war
dragged on, mainstream newspapers began to cover dissent in the
military in general, with a particular focus on the problems of black
soldiers, whose emerging nationalist consciousness prompted a critique
of the “white m an’s war.” In April of 1969, the New York Times quoted
the Defense Department’s director for civil rights, who characterized the
problem of racial unrest in Vietnam as “serious and comparable to the
potential for racial discord within the United States.”28 Similar articles
in other major newspapers focused on black discontent and offered
various opinions on the clenched fist salute, the dap handshake and the
display o f the Black Power Hag, sometimes in the context of an escape
from the war through drugs or an assertion of cultural independence.
But in articles like “Army is No Arm y at All... Discipline’s Gone
to Hell,” from the 23 May 1971 Philadelphia Bulletin, the writer concluded
that, in spite of peace signs, heavy heroin and opium consumption.
Black Power salutes and loud rock music, “the job still gets done. The
ammo gets humped, the hill gets taken.” 29 From this type of coverage.
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The hierarchical structure of the military and the ultimate power of
money were portrayed in this Liberation News Service cartoon that
appeared in both the civilian and GI antiwar press. (Aboveground
1:7, March 1970).
the Am erican public was given the impression, as late as 1971 when
public opinion polls were revealing full-blown dissatisfaction with the
war, that all was well in Vietnam. Most mainstream press coverage of
black protest in Vietnam and in the m ilitary at home failed to relate the
struggle for equality and power to opposition to the war itself. The
antiwar press raised this issue frequently and powerfully with the
argument that m ilitary racism was part of the larger fabric of oppression
and that black opposition to the war was a step toward self-determination
and power.
In January of 1966, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee issued a formal statemenl in opposition to the war in
Vietnam. Coming on the heels of the murder of SNCC member Sammy
Younge, a college student and Navy veteran who had tried to use a “White
Only” bathroom in Alabama, the statement connected Younge’s murder
to the killing of Vietnamese peasants, arguing that both attacks were
against people “seeking to secure the rights guaranteed them by law.”
SNCC articulated its opposition to the draft as well as to the war. Stokely
Carmichael even declared that blacks who fight for the rights o f others
while possessing no rights themselves at home were little more than
m ercenaries.30 Although black respondents to public opinion polls
indicated an early support for Lyndon Johnson’s conduct of the war, the
extensive use of ground troops and the escalation of the fighting
diminished that support considerably by 1967. On April 4 of that year,
Martin Luther King, Jr. publicly broke with the Johnson administration
and announced his opposition to the war in a speech in New York City’s
Riverside Church, in whicch he urged African-Am ericans to protest the
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war, calling the United States government "the greatest purveyor of
violence in the world today.’
Until the Vietnam war, the military had been an accepted and
sometimes desirable route out of rural poverty or the urban ghetto for
young black men. Frederick Douglass had even declared in the m id -19th
century that, with his uniform and musket, “there is no power on earth
which can deny that he [the black soldier) has earned the right to
citizenship in the United States.”31 But reality was not so happy as
Douglass’ pronouncement. The career black soldier was often able to
make accommodations to a military establishment that used his skills,
paid him almost a minimum wage, and gave him a pension after twenty
years, and the black draftee, like his white counterpart, simply hoped to
survive his hitch with a minimum of difficulty. But Vietnam was a
different war, and the black men who were drafted and black women who
enlisted were sensitive to military injustice and often began to think
about the relationship of the war they were being asked to fight to their
own struggles for personal and collective liberation.
The first soldiers who gained national publicity for their refusal
to fight in Vietnam took their stand, not only against the war, but against
racism, whether it was directed at blacks in the United States or
Vietnamese in their own country. The Fort Hood Three— Dennis Mora,
David Samas, and James Johnson, declared in June of 1966 that they
would refuse orders to fight in Vietnam. Johnson, a black soldier, linked
his struggle to that of the Vietnamese people:
Now there is a direct relationship between the peace movement
and the civil rights movement. The South Vietnamese are
fighting for representation, like we ourselves.... Therefore the
Negro in Vietnam is just helping to defeat what his black brother
is fighting for in the United States. When the Negro soldier
returns, he still will not be able to ride in Mississippi or walk
down a certain street in Alabama. There will still be proportionately
twice as many Negroes as whites in Vietnam. Those Negroes that
die for their country still cannot be assured of a burial place that
their family feels is suitable for them. His children will still
receive and inferior education and he will still live in a ghetto.
Although he bears the brunt of the war, he will receive no
benefits.... We can gain absolutely nothing in Vietnam.32

It was in this context of opposition to the war by advocates of black
power, a weakening of popular support for the war, and the public
refusal to fight in Vietnam by a black soldier for explicitly political
reasons that black resistance grew within the military. Reports ol black
soldiers being disciplined for minor infractions of dress codes and
standards of military “attitude” were accompanied by coverage of serious
trouble in military stockades over the conditions in which prisoners were
held. Riots involving black GIs in the summer of 1968 at military prisons
in Da Nang and Long Binh were part of a growing pattern o f resistance
to the war and the military that had specifically racial overtones.
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Harassment of black military personnel for political and antiwar
activities was reported in the GI antiwar press because such cases were
useful in rallying GIs to the defense of a particular comrade and of
organizing the larger antiwar movement. In August of 1970, Cliff
Manskar, a black Marine who was known to be a member of the
Movement for a Democratic Military at Camp Pendleton, was arrested for
assault. The specific charge was that Manskar had threatened three
military police officers who attempted to remove the black unity band
that he was wearing on his wrist.
Writers for A ll Ready on the Left, an antiwar paper that leveled
particularly sharp critiques at the military brass, argued that M anskar’s
“crime” had been to distribute copies of Black Unity in the local
community of Oceanbottom and that the city police had turned him over
to military authorities who then charged him with disobeying a “legal
order” to remove his unity band and with assault when the MPs forced
t he issue. Describing the fact that many enlisted men came to Manskar’s
defense in the early days of his trial, All Ready on the Left connected the
case to military racism and the larger question of resistance:
Why do the piggies fear Cliff? Is it because GIs rallied to his
defense, eagerly testifying on his behalf in the opening days of his
trial? These people realize that the lifer may come down hard on
them because of their insolence. Still, they testify. Is it because
Cliff relates to all people and is well-liked by everyone who has
come in touch with him (except a certain few who sport bars and
rockers)? Is it because C liff refuses to accept a deal from the pigs,
shunningaUD in order to expose lifer oppression?... Pigs realize
their days have become numbered. With people like C liff around,
those days of power are dwindling even more rapidly. It is hard
to relate ju st how much Cliff means to the GI movement in our
country. Maybe it is sufficient to simply say that we love this
beautiful brother who has dedicated his life to his people in order
to help them to determine their own destiny. And that’s good for
all of us.

Manskar’s trial ended with a ruling by the m ilitaiyju dge that the original
order to remove the unity band had been illegal. In addition to
concluding one Marine’s chapter in the military justice system, this
ruling also clarified that, in the future, other GIs could not be harassed
for some o f the sartorial trappings o f Black Power.33
Billy Dean Smith, an Arm y private, was the first soldier to be
brought before a courts martial for fragging two white officers in
Vietnam. Smith, who had enlisted from the Watts neighborhood in Los
Angeles in 1967, was open about his hatred of the military. Marked with
the reputation of having a “bad attitude,” he was often charged with
minor rules infractions and was in the process of being dishonorably
discharged when the braggings occurred. Because of Sm ith’s notorious
views and the fact that he was arrested with a live grenade in his pocket,
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he was charged with murder. His case aroused indignation in the GI
antiwar press, which generally viewed it as a frame-up of a troublesome
black soldier. All Ready on the Left compared Smith’s case to that of L t.
W illiam Calley:
Calley is the convicted murderer of at least 22 Vietnamese but
is only on restriction, and may well be pardoned by old Dicky.
Billy on the other hand is only suspected o f murder, but you can
bet he is in solitary confinement in some stockade. And
considering that he is a black enlisted man accused o f killing two
white officers, you can guess how fair a trial he’ll get. Let's hear
it for American justice, right on right on right off!34

Sm ith’s trial did not take place until 1972, when he was acquitted on the
murder charge but found guilty of assault. In a statement reprinted in
the Lewis McChord Free Press, Smith described him self as, “a candid
black, outspoken individual. I had stated time and time again that I
realized that the war in Indo-China was unjust and racially motivated,
and most o f all that I strictly hated all who had high regard for the
habitual butchery of the Vietnamese people. ” The paper went on to argue
that Sm ith’s guilt or innocence was less important, especially given the
particularly flimsy nature of the evidence against him, than “the Arm y’s
blatant attempt to smash the resistance o f GI’s, and to intimidate those
who are unafraid to stand up.” The article ended with a poem, “Mr. YesSir,” that Smith had composed from his prison cell:
Hey! Brothers, listen to what I have to say.
You say you want equal opportunity each and every day.
Well, how’re you going to get this if you’re not willing to fight
And stand up for what you believe in because you know it’s
right....
He drafts you into the army, where you are strong and brave,
But if you happen to be Black, you wind up being a slave.
He sends you cross the waters to fight the Viet Cong,
But if you think on who caused the trouble, you’ll find out that
he’s the the one.
He’ll put you in the stockade, because you’ll learn the truth.
Now ifyou ’re not willing to do his dirt, for you he’ll have no use.35

Occasionally, statements from outside the military in support of
resisting soldiers appeared in the GI antiwar papers. From her prison
cell, Angela Davis wrote in “Love, Strength, and Solidarity” to members
of the armed forces, in a letter printed in July of 1972 in OffulTimes, from
Offut Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska, the headquarters of the
Strategic A ir Command:
In recent years, the people in this country have learned a great
deal from prisoners and from men and women in the military.
The long concealed brutalities woven into the normal routine of
prison life have been laid bare. Prisons have been exposed as

58 V ietnam G eneration
central tools o f maintaining racism.... From those who have
experienced it first-hand, people have learned how the military
is used to maim and kill people in Indochina who are desperately
trying to be free.... Through their functions, both the prisons and
the military touch almost eveiy section o f the people in this
country who have no power— Black people, Chicanos, Puerto
Ricans, Native Americans, working people, and the poor. It is
only natural that in both of these structures, many o f the ills
which afflict American society as a whole will be reflected.... The
stockades and prisons are full of beautiful, committed, strong,
struggling people. Their beauty, their commitment, theirstrength
are a threat to the interests of the rich, to racism, to wars which
sacrifice human lives for profit and power.36

One issue that helped to place military racism in a familiar
context was the increasingly frequent deployment of troops in ghetto
neighborhoods to control civil disturbances. Many of the major military
antiwar groups included planks in their platform positions that decried
the use of troops in American cities. For black soldiers, this use of troops
was an example of how, as workers in the military, they would be ordered
to attack their own people. Recalling earlier uses of troops against
strikers, Shakedown, a paper published at FortDix, New Jersey, argued
that it was important for soldiers
to understand what riot training is really aimed at, since we all
will be subjected to mandatory training and in some cases will
be called to “pacify” areas here at home. Vietnam, Berkeley,
Newark, and Columbia University are all recent examples o f the
armed power o f the state in action against the people.... The most
vicious use of armed power by the state has been against people
of color—at first to annihilate the Indians and to take their land,
later to preserve and protect the slave system, and today to
control the ghettoes [sic ] of our country.37

The particular problems of harassment and military racism
received attention in GI antiwar papers, most of whose staff members
were white. Expressions of solidarity with black service people included
exposes of the abuses of local and military police authorities. In addition,
articles on the struggle for racial equality appeared often. On the second
anniversary of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s murder, Aerospaced reprinted
its version of “ 10 Commandments on Vietnam ,” that it attributed to the
slain civil rights leader:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Thou shalt not believe in military victory.
Thou shalt not believe in a political victory.
Thou shalt not believe that the Vietnamese love us.
Thou shalt not believe that the Saigon Government has
the support o f the people.
Thou shalt not believe that the majority of the South
Vietnamese look upon the Viet Cong as terrorists.
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7.
8.
9.
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Thou shall not believe the figures o f killed enemy or of
killed Amerikkans.
Thou shalt not believe that the generals know best.
Thou shalt not believe that the enemy victory means
Communism.
Thou shalt not believe that the world supports the United
States.
Thou shalt not kill.38

Aerospaced and other papers helped to keep military racism in the
forefront o f the GI antiwar movement.
Occasionally, the antiwar press brought a light touch to the fight
against racism. W hen the Beatle Bailey cartoons, a regular feature of
daily newspapers throughout the country and in the military, began to
include Lt. Flap, a bearded black officer who asked questions like, “How
come there’s no blacks in this honkie outfit?” the Pacific Stars and
Stripes, an official Arm y paper, pulled the strip, arguing that “Negro
soldiers aren’t like that. Besides, the Arm y regulations wouldn’t allow
a soldier to grow a goatee.” The Ally, published in Berkeley, suggested
that Flap’s facial hair had nothing at all to do with his disappearance
from the Arm y’s voice of record: “Flap might have been a ‘bad’ example:
he takes no shit. And then there’s the fact that all those white lifer
sergeants have to call him ‘Sir!”'39
When they appeared in the mainstream press, reports of
disaffection and racial violence in the military were often accompanied
by assurances that the problems were being investigated, that hot lines
and counseling services were being put in place for black soldiers, and
that the situation was under control. A ’Bout Face, a “Black GI Publication
of USB, Unsatisfied Black Soldiers,” based in Mannheim and Heidelberg,
Germany, offered a differing perspective:
It is the policy o f this paper to expose the racist-military clique
for what they are. Down through the years black GIs have never
had a voice to speak their true opinions. To that we say ‘no
more.’... As the struggle intensifies there will be stronger
repressive measures, again we say ‘no matter how hard you try
you can’t stop us now.’... We see ourselves as the vanguard of
the revolutionary struggle....
— Editor-in-chief
A down brother40

Black soldiers were not alone in seeing their struggle against
military authority and against the war as part of a broader pattern of
resistance to oppression. Women in the armed forces began to speak out
in the GI antiwar press, just as they were beginning to articulate an
understanding of their oppression in the broader culture. In the press,
articles on women’s issues discussed gender stereotyping, harassment,
sexuality, abortion, and the right of women to express independent
views.
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W o m e n ' s V oices iN t He G l A

ntI w a r

P a pe r s

It was in the context o f a culture of protest that women's voices
began to be heard within the GI antiwar movement through the
alternative press. Their letters and articles reveal a growing awareness
of wom en’s oppression in the larger culture, dissatisfaction with the
treatment of women in the enlisted ranks, and a sense of futility with
regard to their ability to bring about an end to the war.41 Antiwar activists
who organized women on or near military bases realized that enlisted
women and military wives who may have opposed the war did not “see
themselves in a direct relationship to the war effort as guys do.... no one
seems to see herself as able to do anything to stop it.”41a
Women who were dissatisfied with military life could not help
being ambivalent about their newly found urge to speak out. They were,
after all, volunteers, who entered the servie with the expectation that the
military would do something for them and would, at the same time, value
(heir contributions. They did not call themselves “feminists.” GI
women’s narratives collected in recent years reflect this ambivalence as
they reveal a strong nurturing, care giving impulse. According to Renny
Christopher, who has analyzed oral histories of both male and female
veterans:
Women often felt that they were supporters o f the men, and not
participants in their own right. Women in the military often felt
that what they were doing was not as important as what the men
were doing, and that in addition to their own jobs they also had
the responsibility of acting as mother, sister, and girlfriend to
male soldiers. Having absorbed the gender role stereotypes of
the larger American society, these women expeted to submerge
their own needs, and to take care of the men, whose role as
combat soldiers was valued more highly than that o f nurses o f
‘support’ personnel.4111

Despite a sense of powerlessness and an absence of ontrol over their
lives, many women began to speak out in the GI alternative papers that
were available to them about the conditions of military life, institutionalized
sexism, and what they, like their counterparts in an emerging feminist
movement in the larger culture, saw as the obj etifiation of women. They
did so in a language and style that lacked theoretical clarity and
intellectual posish, but their views mirrored those of women in the civil
rights and antiwar movement and, increasingly, in Am erican society as
a whole.4lc
One important subtext of the GI papers is the close personal
bonding of men who come to depend on eacch other for support, either
in combat or in opposition to the military. In military training, an
important aspet of this bonding proess is ahieved through thehigh value
plaed on “m ale” aggression and the fear of being labeled a woman. Mark
Gerzon has argued that the fear of man's:
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'Peace...

As opposition to the war intesified, cartoonists drew sharp
distinctions between antiwar GIs and civilian supporters of the
fighting. {The Ally, No. 27, June 1970.)

feminine side, the 'anirna’ in Jungian terms, seems inextriably
involved in triggering our apaity for destrutiveness. It is as if war
provides men with a periodi exorism of the aniina— a ritual
leansing and purification o f masculinity. The anima is banished
from the Soldier's consiousness because it disturbs, in Emma
Jung's words, “a man's established ideal image o f himself.”4ld

The male soldiers who rejeted the war and who, in m any ases, struggled
to distane themselves from the most destructive aspects o f the “m ale”
ethos of the military, nonetheless often developed other bonds that
excluded women. The cultivation of ritual handshakes that emulated
those of black GIs, calling each other “brother,” and speech peppered
with expletives and m ilitaiy jargon were all part of a style that can still
be observed in antiwar veterans nearly twenty years after the end of the
fighting. Military women often used the vernacular of the men simply to
“get along” in a male environment and to communicate their political and
cultural concerns. While they struggled on the job to survive among “the
guys,” they wrote in the GI newspapers of their frustrations and anxieties
as women.
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To read the mainstream press during the war is to get a mixed
picture of women serving in Vietnam. The female GIs, so often referred
to as “girls,” are portrayed as serious and dedicated soldiers, some of
whom had volunteered for wartime service because their husbands were
also serving in Vietnam. But however heavily committed the women
themselves may have been as they began their tours of duty in Vietnam,
the press often spoke of them as ornaments whose presence made life
more “bearable” for male soldiers. Under the headline “41 WACs Are
First to Serve in Vietnam: 3,000 GIs in Area Suddenly Spruce Up,” UPI
ran a story in January of 1967 that described life in Vietnam for a group
of clerk-typists in terms of the male soldiers who surrounded them:
Alter their arrival this month, the WACs appeared on the parade
ground for a command formation. When the GIs marched onto
the field, there was chaos as more than a few got out of step while
watching the girls.... After the girls’ arrival, one company of GIs
which had been exercising each evening in dirty fatigue uniforms
and T-shirts suddenly appeared in sharp-looking track
uniforms.... [One soldier commented] “Take that first sergeant
for instance.".... “First sergeants are supposed to be mean and
nasty. But she’s the cutest one in the bunch.”42

A few months later, the Philadelphia Bulletin printed an article about the
20,000 service women under the title, “Our ‘Soldiers in Skirts’ are Going
O ff to W ar,” that focused on the patriotism o f the women and their
eagerness to serve in Vietnam. The women, one of whom was described
as “a petite, pretty brunette with short cropped hair,” and another as
“head of the nation’s lady Leathernecks,” were all volunteers. Most of
those interviewed were officers.43
The GI antiwar press gave voice to another group of women,
mainly enlisted personnel who, while they also began as volunteers and
may have been self-described “flag wavers,” now felt a sense of
disillusionment at the reality of their military lives. Angered at being
treated simply as adjuncts to the male military ethos and increasingly
aware of the harassment they faced both as soldiers and as women, the
female GIs who expressed their discontent in the antiwar newspapers
demanded to be taken seriously. Many women expressed particular
disillusionment because they had been promised educational, travel,
and other benefits for enlisting. They asserted that the recruiting pitch
aimed at women was a lie and that military women were far from “Gung
Ho” about the war.
Often, male writers supported the wom en’s cause, as in the
following excerpt from AFB, the American Servicemen’s Union paper at
Chanute Air Force base in Illinois:
The WAFs stationed at Chanute are continually oppressed and
discriminated against by the brass. They are referred to, and
treated in, materialistic ways, as decorations for the “dreary”
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offices o f the brass, and a release for the airmen on Friday night.
The brass refer to WAFs as prostitutes and sex objects, and
cannot seem to think o f women as normal human beings capable
of experiencing emotion and frustration just as you and I feel it
as men.

The author also pointed to the absence of recreational facilities for
women, a hostile atmosphere for women at the pool halls and recreational
clubs provided for servicemen, movies shown on base that showed
women as “the main character’s playthings, or sex toys,” and unrealistic
curfews and regulations that prohibited women from being out o f the
barracks after dark without a male escort. With a sharper and more
radical analytical perspective than most papers, AFB argued that
military sexism had its roots in “the capitalist economy o f this country”
and that unequal treatment “dehumanizes both men and women.” AFB
too the position in its pages that “anything that divides people serves only
the pigs, whether it’s racism or male chauvinism or intersquadron
rivalry.”'14
Many of the letters and articles written by women and supportive
men stressed that women were treated as inferior soldiers because of
pervasive sexism in all branches of the service from the top down.
Women complained particularly of sexual harassment and an inability
to gain promotions. One medical technician, Spec. 4, wrote to Fragging
Action about the special problems of being a m ilitary woman, citing
frequent weight checks, the absence of weapons training in basic
training because, “as the story goes, one very hip sister threatened to do
in her C.O.,” and the difficulty of attaining higher rank: “Well, where do
the promotions come in? The hard part about being a woman in the
green machine is if you don’t kiss the right ass or fuck the right people,
forget about any more rank.”45
Some papers described more than usual harassment of military
women. At SAC headquarters at Offut A ir Force Base, Offul Times
reported that a WAF unit that failed a general inspection was assigned
a variety o f unusual duties:
Working with little, if any, supplies, our sisters at war have been
cleaning in places never touched by civilian janitors. Stripping
wax off the floors on their hands and knees until early hours of
the morning; scraping paint off windows with razor blades;
cleaning vents that haven’t been cleaned in a number of years;
dusting the inside of BX candy machines; painting over furniture
marks on walls; and cleaning stairways with toothbrushes, are
only a few examples of the outrageous “duties” that our sisters
in (he WAF squadron have been doing.

The article ended with the assertion that no Air Force enlisted person
should have to put up with the excesses o f “military discipline” that the
women were enduring. The writer suggested that individual GIs could
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file a grievance under Article 138 of the UCMJ, advice that appeared in
many antiwar papers as a way to deal with harassing officers or
sergeants.
The maj ority of expressions of wom en’s discontent in the antiwar
papers transcended simple complaints about specific grievances, although
these were often reported in the alternative papers and nowhere else.
“WAF Harassment [sic ] 3” and other similar articles linked the demeaning
treatment of women to the more gen^*ic oppression of soldiers in all
branches of the service. Military women complained, not only o f unequal
treatment in the military, but o f an equality of oppression to which they
and their male counterparts were subjected. Writers urged their
colleagues, men and women, to file charges against their immediate
superiors under Article 138 or, failing this, to contact their member of
Congress for a redress of their grievances. Local antiwar projects and
coffeehouses increasingly began to offer an opportunity for women to
discuss their problems.46
Women in the enlisted ranks were more involved than officers in
the emerging critique of the war and resistance to military policy and
regualtions. Enlisted women, wives of service personnel, and civilian
antiwar oganizers often marched in demonstrations, held consciousnessraising grou ps off base, and took part in other symbolic acts o f resistance.
Women at Fort Bragg, North Carolina organized a small group to study
American history, which they defined as “worker's history, third world
history, and women's history.” The Fort Bragg women also instituted
courses in such “essential” skills as emergency first aid, basic auto
mechanics, self-defense, and carpentry.46a
Women's groups in the military were especially fragile and often
did not survive for more than a few months. Enlisted women who spoke
publicly on women's issues, like male GIs who opposed the war, were
subject to harrassment and frequent transfers, a technique used
effectively by military brass to rid a unit of outspoken soldiers. Like
participants in the new women's groups in the civilian population,
military women who met to dscuss their problems often had no common
political perspective. These groups often disintegrated not over common
complaints but over strategic and tactical debates over how to organize
women and for what purpose.
In addition, military women were haunted by the issue of
lesbianism. Homosexuality was cause for less-than-honorable discharges,
and many gay women feared being too outspoken on political issues.
According to USSF women organizers, gay women
don't relate to Fl'A politics because the army is basically
pretty good for them and our relationship to them was much
more essentially political: we talked about class, the war,
women. The problem... is that they are not in a position to
move politically— they don't want to get kicked out of the
army.46b
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Women who were not gay feared charges and innuendo that they could
neither accept nor refute. It was not surprising that wom en in the
military were often wary of organizing ingroups. Instead, m any used the
existing GI antiwar press to express their grievances and correct the
record on the issue of what life was really like for them in the service.
Like black soldiers and those who openly expressed antiwar and
anti-military views, women who gave voice to their grievances often
experienced surveillance, restrictions, undesirable job assignments,
excessive charges filed against them for m inor infractions, and other
fonns of harassment. Women who distributed Broken Arrow at Selfridge
AFB in Michigan were questioned by the FBI as well as by military
authorities. WACs at Fort Bragg were questioned and intimidated by
base authorities in an effort to encourage them to “name names” in order
to substantiate “charges” of drug use, homosexuality, or subversive
activity. One WAC wrote that the tactics of dragging people who were to
be questioned off their jobs in public and threatening them with
dishonorable discharge was working:
WAC company has got us WACs so uptight and paranoid about
being reported to the CID as gay, that we avoid sitting together
in the dining room or on buses. It gets pretty lonely here when
you can’t even be close friends with other WACs for fear of being
labeled gay. Don’t let them scare you from relating to your WAC
sisters.47

Women began to find a voice in the military, ju st as they were beginning
to express themselves as individuals and as an oppressed group in the
larger culture. But they faced major cultural obstacles in the male
military culture in which women served men. Helping Hand, the antiwar
paper at Mountain Home AFB in Idaho, described lectures on sex that
were presented to new recru its. The easy availability of oral contraceptives,
without a medical examination or warnings as to possible side effects
and dangers, and the fact that a pregnancy could be “handled with
discretion by the Air Force” received attention in this article. The author
wondered why the Air Force was not more candid about its “true”
purpose for recruiting women:
If WAFs are on this or any other base entirely for the purpose of
servicing GIs, then there should be some kind o f warning that
recruiters gwe to potential WAFs. Each girl who is thinking of
joining the service with intent of serving her country should
know that the recruiter she is talking to is really a pimp for the
United States Air Force. The eighteen year old girl, fresh out of
high school and patriotically motivated should be made awar e of
how the military is planning to use her.48
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From time to time, the GI antiwar papers printed articles on
individual acts of resistance by women, such as the refusal of a WAF at
Travis AFB to accept a transfer to the Philippines because of her
opposition to this country’s presence and investment in Third World
countries.49 They also printed attacks on sexism in advertising and on
the newly-emerging issue of legalized abortion.50 These contributions
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helped to raise the consciousness of military women and their male
counterparts to issues of sexism in Am erican and the relationship of that
fonn o f oppression to others.

CONClusiON
Resistance to the m ilita ry ethos and demands for a more
democratic organization, along with protests against military racism
and sexism, helped to broaden the base of the GI antiwar movement.
Military personnel who began to read the papers because of a specific
gripe or grievance were exposed to a broad range of issues that
demanded engagement. The use of the papers as a forum for antiwar
views made it possible for military personnel to connect— as their
counterparts in the civilian and student antiwar movement were doing—
their own oppression with that of many others in the United States and
throughout the world.
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One of the least known but most important chapters in the
history of Am erica’s encounter with Vietnam was the internal rebellion
that wracked the U.S. military. From the Long Binh ja il in Vietnam, to
Travis Air Force Base in California, to aircraft carriers in the South China
Sea, the armed forces faced widespread resistance and unrest.
Throughout the military morale and discipline sank to record lows.
Antiwar committee and underground newspapers appeared everywhere.1
Unauthorized absence rates reached unprecedented levels: in the Arm y
in 1971 there were seventeen AW OLs and seven desertions for every one
hundred soldiers.2 Harsher forms of rebellion also occurred— drug
abuse, violent uprisings, refusal of orders, even attacks against superiors.
The cumulative result of this resistance within the ranks was a severe
breakdown in military effectiveness and combat capability. By 1969 the
Arm y had ceased to function as an effective fighting force and was rapidly
disintegrating. The armed forces had to be withdrawn from Indochina
for their very survival.
The strongest and most militant resisters were black GIs. O f all
the soldiers o f the Vietnam era, black and other minority GIs were
consistently the most active in their opposition to the war and military
injustice. Blacks faced greater oppression that whites, and they fought
back with greater detennination and anger. The rebellions that shook
American cities like Watts, Newark, and Detroit erupted at major
military installationsjust a few years later. The result was a military tom
by racial rebellion.
The militancy of black GIs was a reaction to the pervasiveness of
racial discrimination within the military. Racism has always existed in
the Am erican military as it has in the larger civilian society. In some
respects the milit ary is better than civilian life: in 1948, the anned forces
were desegregated before m any civilian agencies, and military sendee is
one of the few avenues o f potential advancement available for blacks. In
other respects, though, the military is worse: the arbitrary nature of
command authority can mean a miserable existence for those who seme
under prejudiced commanders. Studies conducted during the Vietnam
era confinn that institutionalized discrimination was widespread,
especially in the military justice system. One of the most thorough
studies was the Department of defense’s own four-volume Report o f the
Task Force on the Administration o f Military Justice, issued in December
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1972. According to the Pentagon report, “No command or installation...
is entirely free from the effects of systematic discrimination against
minority servicemen.”3 The Congressional Black Caucus also conducted
a study of discrimination within the military in 1972 and came up with
similar findings. The Caucus’ report concluded that “racism has
become institutionalized at all levels of the m ilitary.”4
Job assignment is a primary concern for black GIs, and the
Pentagon and Black Caucus reports confirmed what the soldiers already
knew: they were disproportionately assigned to low-skill and dead-end
positions, especially in combat and service jobs. In 1971, according to
the Black Caucus study, black servicemen represented 12.1 percent of
all enlisted people, but they constituted 16.3 percent of those in combat,
and 19.6 percent of those in service and supply positions.5 By contrast
they held only 4.9 percent of jobs in electronics specialties. In an Army
study of dissenters in 1971, 31% of blacks interviewed were assigned to
combat, compared to only 18% of the whites.6 Blacks were also
discrim inated against in m ilitary promotions.
Blacks were
disproportionately assigned to the low est ranks and were
underrepresented at the highest grades.
This pattern was most
pronounced in the Officer Corps. In 1974, blacks constituted 16 percent
of all military personnel, but only 2.8 percent of officers.7
The system of military justice is notoriously discriminatory. The
Department of Defense Task Force found that “a greater number of black
enlisted men received non-judicial punishment [25 percent] than their
proportionate number [12 percent].”8 Likewise in General and Special
courts-martial studied by the Task Force, 23.4 percent of blacks and
only 16.9 percent of whites received a punitive discharge as part of their
sentence.9 The incidence of less-than-honorable discharges shows the
same pattern. In 1971 less-than-honorable discharges were issued to
one of every seven black GIs, compared to only one of every fourteen
whites.10 Blacks were twice as likely as whites to receive a bad discharge.
While the struggle against racism and injustice was a major
concern for black GIs, they, like most other soldiers, were also motivated
by opposition to the war. The Army study of dissenters noted above
confirms that ending the war was the number one priority for the
majority of GI resisters. When asked to give the reason for their
participation in dissent activities, the soldiers interviewed cited the
"Vietnam War" 58 percent of the time. The other major reason, “The Way
the Army Treats the Individual,” was cited 38 percent of the tim e.11 For
black and other minority GIs, opposition to the war had a special
meaning. Many blacks asked why they should risk death to defend
freedom in Vietnam when they were denied basic rights back home. Why
should they fight Asians in a distant land when they could be struggling
against discrimination and racism in their own society? Such critical
thinking received encouragement from the example of Cassius Clay
[Muhammed Ali] and other draft resisters, and the antiwar speeches of
Martin Luther King. Jr. A popular documentary movie of the time was
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titled No Vietnamese Ever Called Me Nigger. The teachings of Malcolm
X and his radical critique of the war also had influence at several m ajor
bases. Andrew Pulley, a leader of GIs United Against the War at Fort
Jackson, South Carolina, reports that he and other soldiers were
initiated into the GI movement by listening to tapes of Malcolm X in the
barracks.12
For black GIs, opposition to military authority was often expressed
in cultural symbols. Throughout the military blacks gathered in
informal study groups and cultural clubs to listen to music, to study and
rap together, and to promote black pride and consciousness. Many of
these groups became centers o f resistance activity as the connections
between the war and racism spurred growing numbers of GIs into action.
Often they would join together in collective defiance of the military. I
remember from my own experience at Fort Bliss, Texas, for example, that
“the brothers” roomed together in the same part of the barracks and
engaged in behavior that blatantly challenged regulations. Many of the
troops had huge Afro haircuts that far exceeded allowable standards. A
group of ten or more of the brothers adorned with beads or African
jew elry would strut conspicuously across the quad between the barracks
carrying “power sticks” (African walking sticks with a carved fist at the
top). Their Army caps perched atop oversized Afros, m any wearing
sneakers rather than combat boots, most with their shirts unbloused
and unbuttoned, they were an affront to the military dress code. But the
brothers were left alone. The company sergeants and commanders
already had more than enough trouble dealing with the current level of
dissent , and they did not want to cause more trouble by challenging the
blacks.
One controversial cultural expression of the time was the “dap”
or “power greeting”— an elaborate series o f hand slapping and finger
popping that could sometimes take a minute or more to perform .13 An
innocuous enough greeting by itself, it sometimes became the center of
conflict when prejudiced commanders or NCOs took offense and issued
instructions banning it. In response, some blacks would develop an even
more elaborate and time-consuming form o f the dap, which they
invariably chose to perform in m ess hall lines, where it would cause the
greatest disruption. Such manifestations of solidarity occurred frequently
throughout the military and were an important assertion of social
identity for black GIs.
To bet ter appreciate the extent of the GI resistance movement, let
us consult again the Army study of dissent. Conducted in 1970 and
1971 by the Research Analysis Corporation, a Virginia-based think tank
that frequently served Arm y needs, the two volume report depicts a GI
movement even more widespread than those of us involved at the time
thought possible. The Arm y’s researchers interviewed hundreds of
soldiers at major Arm y bases in the continental United States to
determine the extent of participation in resistance activities and GI
attitudes toward the military. The survey found that one out of every four
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enlisted soldiers had participated in “dissident” activities, defined as
attendance at a coffee house, publication of a GI newspaper, participation
in a demonstration, etc. The study found that an equal percentage of
soldiers engaged in acts of “disobedience,” which was defined as
insubordination, refusing orders, sabotaging equipment, etc. This
dist inction between dissent and disobedience is helpful for understanding
the full range of GI resistance activities. By combining these two
categories of opposition, the Research Analysis Corporation found that
a startling 47 percent of the soldiers interviewed engaged in some form
of dissent or disobedience, with 32 percent involved in such activities
more than once. If frequent drug use is added as another form of
resistance, the combined percentage of soldiers involved in rebellious
behavior comes to an incredible 55 percent. The Arm y’s own study thus
shows that half of its soldiers during the 1970-1971 period were engaged
in resistance activity— a truly astounding level of disaffection within the
ranks.14
The development of the GI movement followed the evolution of
the war itself. Soldier resistance appeared first in the Arm y and Marine
Corps, which bore the brunt of the fighting in the early years of the war.
As the Army and Marine Corps were withdrawn and the burden of
continuing the war fell to the Navy and Air Force, the GI movement took
hold in these services, and by 1970 the locus of revolt had shifted more
to the Navy and Air Force.
During the first phase of the GI movement, black Marines and
soldiers staged numerous rebellions at stateside bases. These were
usually prison uprisings sparked by mistreatment and oppressive
conditions. At Fort Bragg, on July 23, 1968, black and white GIs seized
control of the stockade to protest the beating of a black inmate. The
rebels held the stockade for forty-eight hours before surrendering to
armed troops from the 82nd Airborne.15 Similar rebellions occurred at
several Army bases in 1969— on May 13 at Fort Carson, on June 5 at Fort
Dix, and on three separate occasions at Fort Riley. Nonviolent protests
and boycotts were also led by blacks that year at Fort Ord and Fort
Jackson.
Major rebellions also occurred in the Marine Corps. The oppressive
brig at Camp Pendleton, California— described in an influential article as
“Andersonville by the Sea”— was the site of several violent incidents.16
After a series of protests during 1969, the prison exploded in bitterness
and frustration. On the night of September 14, hundreds o f prisoners
broke out of their barracks, setting fires and smashing nearly everything
in sight. When the rebellion was finally suppressed by tear gas-firing
Military Police (MPs), the entire prison was a sham bles.17 An even more
severe and tragic uprising occurred on July 20, 1969, at Camp Lejeune.
A dispute over a racial incident at an enlisted m en’s club turned into a
huge brawl that spread over the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines barracks
area. The fighting left fourteen injured and one Marine dead.18
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GI resistance was even more widespread among the more than
200,000 Am erican soldiers stationed in W est Germany. Black GIs
organized study groups and rap clubs at nearly every m ajor U.S. base in
Germany. Am ong the more active groups were Unsatisfied Black
Soldiers from the Mannheim-Heidelberg area, the Black Action Group in
the Stuttgart region, and the Black Dissent Group from Smiley barracks
at Karlsruhe. In 1970 these groups joined together at a remarkable “Call
for Justice” assembly at the University of Heidelberg. Nearly 1,000 active
duty soldiers, most of them black, gathered on July 4 to issue their own
declaration of independence, demanding an end to the war, a withdrawal
of U.S. interests from southern Africa, the elimination o f discriminatory
practices in military justice and a guarantee to equal opportunity for
black and other minority GIs.19
While black and white GI groups often worked in isolation from
one another, black-white unity sometimes emerged with potent effect.
An example occurred at Nellingen, West Germany, in the summer and
fall of 1970. The arrival of a zealous new commander and an increase
in complaints about harassment and racial discrimination created a
virtual war within the base. A Molotov cocktail was exploded outside the
company orderly room, several fire bombings occurred on the base, and
there were increasing incidents of sabotage. As the harassment of the
troops and the number of racial incidents increased, the soldiers
threatened to blow up the base. On the evening of September 21,
approximately one hundred black and white GIs broke a curfew and
marched through the base shouting “Revolution!” and “Join us!” to fellow
GIs. The men returned to their barracks, but only after the Provost
Marshal pledged that no reprisals would be carried out. Similar acts of
defiance occurred at numerous bases, notjust in Germany but throughout
the military.20
The cumulative result of this mounting wave of resistance was a
severe crisis for U.S. ground forces. Already reeling from the heavy
combat losses and huge manpower commitments of the Vietnam war,
the Army faced a “terrible nightmare,” in the words of author Shelby
Stanton.21 Practically every unit in the Arm y had been stripped of
manpower for Vietnam and faced severe internal turmoil. Stanton
writes:
By that year [1968] in Europe only 39 percent of the 465
reporting units had a personnel readiness equal to their
deliberately diminished assigned capability.... Even more chilling
was the secret December 31,1968 pronouncement by the United
State Army in Europe that none of its major units had met their
operational training readiness conditions for the second straight
year.22

Within the United States the situation was even worse:
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In June of 1968 the Joint Chiefs o f Staff were forced to flunk every
division and brigade on the continent with the lowest grading
possible in all categories— including personnel training and
logistics, with the exception o f the 82nd Airborne Division which
had a brigade in Vietnam.23

Within Vietnam the morale and disciplinary crisis was the most
severe of all and sapped the Arm y’s ability to fight. The most extreme and
tragic manifestation of the collapse of the Arm y was fragging, an attack
against a sergeant or commander with a fragmentation grenade. According
to the Arm y’s own statistics there were 551 fragging incidents in the
years 1969-1972, resulting in 86 deaths and over 700 injuries. Eighty
percent of the victims in these incidents were officers and NCOs.24 These
statistics do not tell the full story o f the internal rebellion within the
Army, since they do not include shootings with fiream is, which were also
common. By 1969 the Anny was at war with itself. Gung-ho officers
eager to push their men into battle were an endangered species and often
became the victims of assault by their own men. Shelby Stanton
confirms what had been a widely circulated rumor at the time: following
the bloody ten day battle for Hamburger Hill in May 1969, soldiers put
a notice in an underground newspaper offering a $10,000 reward for
fragging the officers in charge.25
The ultimate impact of the spreading internal breakdown was
that soldiers increasingly refused to fight. By 1969 combat refusals and
mutinies occurred with shocking frequency. One example during 1969
involved A Company of the First Battalion/506th Regiment at Camp
Evans near the A Shau Valley. After a night of racial tensions that almost
resulted in a shoot-out between black and white soldiers, fifteen black
soldiers refused to report for combat patrol the next day.26 Numerous
such incidents occurred throughout Vietnam. During research for
Soldier’s Revolt, we were able to identify ten major incidents of combat
refusal. Stanton’s study, drawing upon official Arm y unit archives,
shows that the “ugly stain o f combat disobedience” had reached epidemic
proportions. In the elite First Cavalry Division alone, according to
Stanton, there were thirty-five incidents of refusal to fight during 1970,
some involving entire units.27
One of the most severe rebellions of the Vietnam era occurred in
1968 among black inmates at the Long Binh jail, known to the troops as
LBJ. As was common throughout the military at the time, LEkJ was
oppressive and overcrowded, and many of the prisoners were black.
Tensions and violence within the jail steadily rose until it exploded at the
end ofAugust in a rebellion that left much of the stockade destroyed and
resulted in injuries to 63 soldiers, including 23 who required
hospitalization. One GI, Pvt. Edward Haskett of St. Petersburg, Florida,
was killed in the uprising. Afterwards, nearly 200 blacks banded
together and staged a work strike. A small group barricaded themselves
within the stockade and continued to hold out for more than a month.28
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A similar rebellion occurred two weeks earlier at the Marine brig
in Da Nang. The prisoners seized control o f the central compound area
and held out against armed guards for twenty hours. When commanders
tried to remove some of the inmates a few days later, violence erupted
again and a force of 120 riot-equipped MPs was required to restore order.
Eight soldiers were injured in the incident, and the cell block was heavily
damaged by fire.29
As elsewhere in the military, blacks in Vietnam formed solidarity
grou ps and rap clubs that often became the centers of political resistance.
One such group, the so-called “Black Liberation Front of the Armed
Forces,” was lead by Eddie Burney, a Black Panther Party supporter
stationed at the 4th Transportation Command in Long Binh. In the
spring o f 1971, Burney and other blacks staged a demonstration at Long
Minh to commemorate the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Chanting
“Free Angela Davis!” and “Free the Brothers in LBJ!” forty GIs participated
in the action.30 Similar groups appeared at other camps in Vietnam, as
black GIs banded together to oppose the w ar and defend themselves
against harassment and discrimination. Their resistance activities had
an enormous impact on the Am erican m ilitary and played a crucial role
in speeding the end o f the war.
As noted earlier, the GI movement spread from the Arm y and
Marine Corps to the Air Force and Navy as the latter services assumed
the principal burden of continuing the Am erican war effort. The
rebellion that nearly crippled the Arm y and Marine Corps began to
disrupt operations in the Air Force and Navy as well. By 1972, resistance
had reached the point where B-52 crews were refusing to fly and the
Navy’s aircraft carriers were crippled by sabotage and internal rebellion.
As in the Army and Marine Corps, black servicemen played a
leading role in the GI movement within the Air Force. Faced wilh the
usual injustices— unequal job assignment, a disproportionate number
of disciplinary punishments, slow promotions—black airmen joined
together to defend their interests. As elsewhere in the military, they
formed discussion groups or cultural organizations. At the end of 1970,
A ir Force Times admitted the existence of twenty-five such groups, many
of them actively engaged in local struggles against injustice.31 One such
group, affiliated with the Am erican Servicemen’s Union, was the Black
Discussion Group, active during 1971 at Plattsburgh Air Force Base in
New York. Another was Concerned Black Airmen, centered at Chanute
A ir Force Base in Illinois. In 1971, the Chanute group held an on-base
service on Armed Forces Day, May 17, dedicated to the memory ol
Malcolm X. In August, after months of worsening racial tensions on the
base and growing black frustration, Chanute erupted into violence.
During a three-day period, the base exchange, theater, and gas station
were damaged and several airmen were injured. A few weeks later eighty
men participated in a demonstration and picket line outside a high level
meeting of the Air Training Command, to press home their demands for
equal treatment.32
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There were other uprisings and militant actions at air bases
during the war, but the largest and most dramatic occurred at Travis Air
Force Base in May, 1971. Travis was a crucial center for the Am erican
war effort, and the primary embarkation point for flights to Indochina.
From May 22 through May 25, this important California base was
crippled by perhaps the largest mass rebellion in the history of the Air
Force. The roots of the conflict lay in command repression, rampant
discrimination against black airmen, and a general crisis in morale
resulting from the increasing unpopularity of the war. The rebellion
began with a fracas at the local enlisted m en’s club, and quickly
broadened into a generalized uprising throughout the base. Fighting
apparently began on Saturday afternoon between black enlistees and
the base security police. Following the incident, the minority barracks
area was cordoned off and a number of black airmen were arrested.
Anger and resentment continued to mount and on Monday evening the
base erupted in violence as more than two hundred enlisted people,
some whites included, attempted to free the imprisoned blacks and were
met by a force of three hundred MPs and nearly eighty civilian officers
called in from surrounding communities. A major brawl ensued that
involved some six hundred airmen. The officers’ club was burned,
several dozen people were injured, and 135 GIs (most of them black) were
arrested. Fighting continued into the next day; armed guards patrolled
the base and all incoming traffic was searched at the gate.33 For a few
days, Travis was in a virtual state of siege, with base activities disrupted
and nearly all attention devoted to restoring order.
In the wake of the 1971 Travis revolt, the Pentagon hurriedly
dispatched special race relations advisors to the base in an attempt to
prevent further violence. Throughout the Air Force (and in other services
as well), racial harmony programs were established, including “human
relations” councils and so-called equal opportunity officers, as a means
of stemming the growing black rebellion. The new policies had little
impact on the actual conditions of service and were designed mainly to
channel grievances into controllable outlets. These programs did
nothing to alter the systemic discrimination and injustice within the
military, and they did not even address the problem of the continuing
war in Indochina.
The GI movement in the Air Force continued to grow right up
until the end of direct U.S. involvement in the war in 1973. By 1972,
there were more than thirty active GI organizing projects and underground
newspapers within the Air Force, not counting the substantial number
of black discussion groups. With each new wave o f bombing by the Nixon
administration, protests and demonstrations erupted at bases throughout
the world. During the massive escalation of bombing in response to the
1972 Easter offensive, demonstrations and rallies occurred at dozens of
air bases throughout the world— including Westover, Mountain Home,
Kirtland, McGuire, Offutt, Travis and March Air Force Bases in the
United States, andYokota, Misawa, and C larkA irF orce Bases in Asia.34
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The rising tide of antiwar resistance ultimately began to disrupt
bombing operations and reached even the predominantly white officer
pilots. Morale among airmen and crew members at the combat bases in
Thailand and Guam steadily plummeted in 1972, as evidenced by rising
heroin use and increasing incidents of “fodding” or “foreign object
damage”— a phrase used to describe the unknown source o f damage to
aircraft. In December, two pilots stationed in Thailand (Captains Dwight
D. Evans and Michael Heck) refused to fly further combat missions.35 In
the spring of 1973, four B-52 crewmen stationed at Guam joined in a
federal court suit filed in New York by Congresswoman Elizabeth
Holtzman, challenging the constitutionality of the continued bombing.36
Shortly thereafter the Pentagon cut back on bombing missions, and a
few months later Congress finally cut off funding and brought to an end
the most intensive bombing campaign in the history of warfare.
Black resistance in the Navy also increased dramatically as its
giant aircraft carrier task groups assumed increased responsibility for
carrying on the air war. The Navy had traditionally been the most racist
of the military services. It was the last to desegregate, and it has had a
long tradition of exploiting Filipinos as servants and cooks. In 1971,
fewer than five percent of the Navy’s sailors were black, and the
percentage of blacks among officers was less than one percent. The
expanding manpower needs of the Vietnam war, though, forced the Navy
to open its doors to an increasing number of black recruits. While the
number of blacks grew, the discriminatory traditions of the past remained.
The result was widespread resistance and political dissent, with black
sailors playing a leading role in the GI movement within the Navy.
By 1970 underground newspapers and protest actions began to
appear at m ajor naval bases and even aboard ships. One of the earliest
manifestations of this development was the Movement for a Democratic
Military (MDM), a network of loosely connected radical groups that
appeared at San Diego, Long Beach, and Alameda in California, and at
the Navy’s Great Lakes Naval Training Center near Chicago. The Great
Lakes MDM chapter included a considerable number of black sailors,
and in July, 1970, blacks and whites staged a series of protest marches
and demonstrations in an attempt to free four WAVES they felt were
unjustly imprisoned in the base brig.37
As the pace of Naval air operations off the Indochina coast
intensified in 1971 and 1972, the level of antiwar opposition also grew.
As aircraft carriers left their California ports for combat missions in the
South China Sea, they were greeted not by the traditional cheering
crowds, but with protest demonstrations and political opposition. In
October, 1971, sailors and antiwar civilians in San Diego organized an
informal election to decide whether the U.S.S. Constitution should sail for
Vietnam. Fifty-four thousand San Diegans voted in an unofficial
referendum, including 6,900 active duty servicemen and women. Eightytwo percent of the civilians and 73 percent of the servicepeople voted to
keep the Connie home.38 The ship eventually departed for Indochina, but
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it sailed under a cloud of dissent. A similar movement, initiated entirely
by active duty sailors, emerged at the same time aboard the carrier U.S.S.
Coral Sea at Alameda. Twelve hundred sailors— one fourth of the entire
crew— signed a petition opposing the war in Indochina and urging that
the ship stay home.39 A similar below decks movement emerged in
opposition to the sailing o f the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk a few months later.
When each of these ships sailed, a small group of black and white sailors
on board declared that they could not in conscience participate in the
war and publicly refused to go.
The Nixon administration’s response to the Easter offensive in
1972 placed even greater pressures on an already heavily committed
Navy. During the rest o f that year as many as four carrier task groups
(out of a total of fourteen) were on combat station in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Normal fleet operations were completely disrupted, as practically the
entire Pacific fleet was thrown into the fray. For the already overworked
crew members involved, the escalation created great hardships. With
opposition to the war spreading rapidly, morale plummeted. While many
sailors expressed their opposition through acts of political dissent, many
others resorted to more extreme measures of disobedience and
obstruction.
Perhaps the most shocking manifestation of the disintegration of
morale within the Navy in 1972 was the growing prevalence of internal
sabotage. In its 1973 report on Navy disciplinary problems, the House
Armed Sendees Committee disclosed what it termed “an alarming
frequency of successful acts of sabotage and apparent sabotage on a
wide variety of ships and stations.” 40 The Committee reported “literally
hundreds of instances of damage to Naval property wherein sabotage is
suspected.”41 The most dramatic and important o f these internal acts of
disruption occurred in July, 1972, when within the space of ju st three
weeks, two of the Navy’s aircraft carriers were put out of commission by
attacks from within. On July 10, 1972, a massive fire broke out aboard
the U.S.S. Forrestalin Norfolk. The blaze caused seven million dollars in
damage and was described as the largest single act of sabotage in Naval
history. The carrier’s deployment was delayed by more than two
months.42 Three weeks later another act of sabotage crippled the carrier
U.S.S. Ranger as it was about to depart from Alameda for Indochina. A
paint scraper and two twelve-inch bolts were inserted into the ship’s
reduction gears, causing nearly one million dollars in damage and
forcing a three-and-a-half month delay in operations for extensive
repairs.43
The sabotaging of the Ranger and Forrestal set the stage for one
of the most violent internal uprisings in the history of the Navy— the
rebellion aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. In October, 1972, after a
grueling eight months at sea and constant bombing missions in the Gulf
of Tonkin, the huge ship pulled into Subic Bay in the Philippines for a
rest stop before a scheduled return home. Unexpectedly, the crew was
informed that rather than sailing home, they had to return to combat
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operations in the South China Sea. According to the report on the
incident by the House Armed Services Committee, “this rescheduling
apparently was due to the incidents of sabotage aboard her sister ships
U.S.S. Ranger and U.S.S. Forrestal.”44 With two of the Navy’s principal
carriers out of commission due to sabotage, the Kilty Hawk was forced
to cancel its return home. With tensions already high among crew
members due to declining morale and rising racial tensions, the order to
return to Vietnam was the spark that touched off violence. On the night
before the ship’s departure, serious fighting erupted at the Subic Bay
enlisted men’s club. On the evening of October 12, as the ship arrived
at Yankee Station off the coast of Indochina, the ship’s intelligence
investigator exacerbated tensions by calling in only black sailors for
questioning about the brawl at Subic. Outraged at what they considered
unfair treatment, over one hundred blacks gathered for a meeting on the
ship’s aft mess deck at approximately 8pm. The armed Marine detachment
aboard the earner was summoned to suppress the meeting, and an
explosive situation quickly developed. The Executive Officer (XO),
Commander Benjamin Cloud (a black man), entered the area and
attempted to restore calm by ordering the blacks and Marines to
separate ends of the ship. Moments later, however, Captain Marland
Townsends, the Commanding Officer (CO), arrived and issued conflicting
orders. As confusion spread, the blacks and armed Marines encountered
each other unexpectedly on the hanger deck and a bitter clash erupted.
The fighting spread rapidly throughout the ship, with bands o f blacks
and whites marauding through the decks and attacking each other with
fists, chains, wrenches, and pipes. For hours the ship seethed with
violent conflict and confusion. At one point the XO believed that the CO
had been injured or killed, and made an announcement over the public
address system ordering the rebels and armed Marines to separate
locations. The Commander, still on the hanger deck and distressed at
the X O ’s announcement, gave different orders over the address system.
Finally, at about 2:30am at a meeting in the forecastle, the black sailors
agreed to lay down their chains and other weapons and disperse. A total
of forty-seven men, most of them black, were treated for injuries that
night. Three had to be evacuated to shore hospitals. All twenty-five
sailors arrested for the incident were black.45
A few weeks later, another major rebellion— this time nonviolent—
occurred aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Constellation in San Diego.
Described by the New York Times as “the first mass mutiny in the history
of the U.S. Navy,”45 the rebellion aboard the Constellation grew out of the
effort s of an onboard organization known as The Black Fraction to resist
repression and discrimination against black crew members. Throughout
Oct ober, 1972, the black sailors organized committ ees among themselves,
elected representatives and demanded investigations into the ship’s
records of non-judicial punishment. A s the organization grew in
strength, the ship’s commanders singled out fifteen members as agitators
and ordered that six o f them be given immediate less-than-honorable
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discharges. Rumors began to circulate that as many as two hundred
blacks would receive bad discharges. In response, more than one
hundred sailors—mostly black, but including a few whites— staged a sitin in the aft mess deck on November 3, 1972. The sailors continued their
protest action throughout the day and into the next morning, refusing
a direct order to report for muster. To avert violence and another Kitty
Hawk incident, the ship’s captain decided to return to North Island in
San Diego and put the dissident group ashore as a “beach detachment.”
More than 130 men, most of them black, went ashore. A few days later,
on November 8th, the commander ordered the men to return to the
Constellation. The sailors refused and instead mustered in their own
formation on the pier, in effect staging a dockside strike. A total of 122
crewmen were involved in the action. Despite their direct refusal of an
order, the rebels received light treatment. Commanders were apparently
eager to prevent, at all costs, further violence or uprisings. A number of
the rebels were quietly discharged, but most were simply reassigned to
shore duty.47
In the wake of the Kitiy Hawk and the Constellation incidents,
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, called together eighty
leading admirals and Marine Corps generals for an emergency meeting
at the Pentagon in order to address the problem of race relations. The
assembled commanders were urged to be more sensitive to the growing
number of blacks within the military and to give greater attention to the
human relations councils and other reforms recently introduced by the
Pentagon.4” In some places commanders sponsored educational programs
on black history and culture, and sensitivity sessions and discussion
groups were allowed. As noted earlier, these attempts at reform did
nothing to redress the structural injustices and systematic discrimination
encountered by blacks within the military. Moreover, as long as the war
in Vietnam continued and American troops remained in Indochina, the
GI movement and the black rebellion within the military continued. Only
in 1973, as the direct U.S. combat role finally came to an end, did
tensions within the ranks begin to ease and military life slowly return to
normal.
As A n erican forces completed their withdrawal from Indochina
and the military shifted to the all-volunteer force, hundreds of thousands
of Vietnam-era GIs were discharged en masse. Manpower levels in the
military dropped sharply from a high of 3.5 million in 1968 to 2.3 million
in 1972. In some cases, an “early out” release program allowed enlisted
people to return home months ahead of schedule. Many of the black
resisters in the Navy were released under this program in 1972; the same
strategy was used to rid the Arm y of soldier activists the year before. The
longest and most divisive war in American history was at last over, and
the GIs who resisted it were sent home. Military commanders breathed
a collective sigh of relief and began the arduous task of rebuilding their
shattered services and creating a new all-volunteer force.
Although little known or understood, the GI resistance movement
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in which blacks played a leading role was an important part of the
Vietnam war experience. Never before in m odern history had the
Am erican armed forced faced such widespread internal revolt. Hundreds
of thousands of soldiers, marines, airmen and sailors dissented and
disobeyed military commanders, often at grave personal risk, to speak
out for peace and justice. Their struggle had a m ajor impact in forcing
the Am erican m ilitary to finally end the war in Vietnam.
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I wasn’t getting out, I knew I was there— this guy ju st got killed,
and I’m just going, “Shoo! Man, this is wrong! I can’t live with
this.” And so my life, and what happened to us, seemed kind of
insignificant, considering what had just happened. We were
mindless o f our own mortality, or anything else—our safety. I
mean we were scared to death, ‘cause we knew something was
gonna happen, but we didn’t know exactly what.

1968 was a year of death in America. Anyone who lived through
it as an adult will remember the back-to-back assassinations of the
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. in April, and Senator Robert F.
Kennedy in June— two men whose respective crusades, for racial
equality and civic justice, had converged fairly near the end of their lives
in heartfelt pleas to end the war in Vietnam. King’s decision to speak out
against the war had occurred a year earlier; Kennedy’s challenge to the
official Democratic Party support of the war did not occur until after the
Party’s leader. President Lyndon Baines Johnson, had withdrawn from
the 1968 Presidential race, making way for Kennedy to mount his own
campaign. The decision of Johnson to withdraw, as well as that of
Kennedy to run on a peace platform, were both motivated in large part
by the sudden swift increase in American combat deaths in Vietnam
during th eT et Offensive. Alm ost 15,000 GIs died in 1968, the majority
filed in the period from February through April.
1968 was also the year Am erica’s cities, from Washington, D.C.
to Chicago to Los Angeles, went up in the flames of race riots; and many
overzealous mayors instituted “shoot on sight” orders against the
(mostly black) rioters. It was the year when a Democratic National
Convent ion in Chicago brought thousands o f antiwar protesters, led by
a few old-time pacifists, a few SDS radicals, and Abbie Hoffm an’s brand
new Yippies (Youth International Party), into bloody confrontation with
the Chicago police. But, as Mayor Daley later boasted, though plenty of
heads, ribs, and reporters’ cameras were bashed, “No one was killed.”
1968 was the year that Richard “Rusty” Bunch was shot to death
in the Presidio stockade in San Francisco— though it is doubtful whether
more than a handful of people still remember his name. But the news
of his death, and the subsequent protest, gave a critical boost to the
burgeoning GI movement.
* An excerpt from Home to War:
Movement.

A Histonj o f the Vietnam Veterans
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Rusty Bunch was nineteen years old when he was killed on
October 11, 1968. And though he died on the Presidio, one of the oldest
military bases on the North American continent, he was a casualty of the
Vietnam war as surely as the more than 58,000 men named on the
Memorial Wall in Washington, D.C.
Bunch was a short, skinny, sandy-haired kid from Moraine,
Ohio, who looked scarcely old enough to be out on his first date. His
parents were both poorTennessee Baptists who had migrated to Ohio for
the steady work, and they did their best to give their son a happy
childhood. He was outgoing, played Little League baseball, bowled, and
learned to ride a motorcycle as soon as he was old enough. In 1967, at
seventeen, he asked his father to sign him into the U.S. Army, and his
father complied— though the old man, a World W ar II vet, felt as if he were
signing his son’s “death warrant.”
Later, in the Presidio stockade, Rusty claimed to have done a tour
in Vietnam, but by that time he was so prone to delusory fantasies that
his word could no longer be trusted. The next sure glimpse we have of
him is in the spring of 1968, when he showed up among the flock of
AW OL GIs who were living on the streets of San Francisco’s Haight
district and camping out in Golden Gate Park. He had taken a headlong
plunge into the hippie drug culture, and, in the lingo of the day, had had
his “circuits fried” on LSD. He went around in a purple satin shirt and
filthy blue jeans, holding two-way conversations with him self and
boasting that he could walk through walls and communicate with
Martians.
Like most AWOLs, Bunch eventually went home, but his parents
couldn’t get him to make sense and finally shipped him down to relatives
in LaFollette, Tennessee, hoping “the drugs would wear off.” When he
got no better, they started calling VA hospitals, all of which declined to
help. Instead, officials at the VA phoned the police, who arrested Bunch
and delivered him to the stockade at Fort Meade, Maryland. Authorities
at Fort Meade determined that Bunch needed psychiatric care, but
before he could receive it he was transferred to Sixth Army jurisdiction
in California, and landed in the Presidio SPD (the Special Processing
Detachment barracks for military personnel who have committed minor
offenses). Once again he went AWOL, but this time voluntarily turned
himself in on September 15. The Arm y’s response was to place him in
the stockade, the repository for serious criminals and repeat offenders.
Anybody with an ounce of sense would have had Bunch admitted
to the nearest Army hospital— in this case, Letterman General right on
the Presidio. He bumped into walls, screamed throughout the night,
made incomprehensible notes in a tattered math book, talked gibberish
about warlocks and Hying saucers, and continually implored his fellow
inmates to recommend “easy” ways for him to commit suicide.
The stockade guards thought Bunch’s condition was a joke, and
they routinely withheld his medicine just for the kick of watching him
twitch and beg for it.1 For the other prisoners it was painful to watch
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Bunch’s constant nervous agitation, and one o f them, Ricky Dodd, kept
trying to get word to the authorities that Bunch should be removed and
given medical treatment.2
That September, the Presidio stockade reached its peak of
overcrowding. Close to 140 prisoners were forced to inhabit a reconverted
bank building and annex that were intended to hold no more than sixtyseven.3 Many of them had to sleep on the messhall tables, and that was
the least ol the inconveniences. The toilets backed up, excrement floated
in the shower stalls, and there was hardly ever enough food to go
around.'1
A lot ol factors contributed to this egregious situation. The fierce
combat in Nam pushed more and more GIs to run before the almost
inevitable assignment to a combat zone; at the same time, the
counterculture, with itsvisions offree love, endless highs, and “strawberry
fields forever,” was nourishing as never before. Furthermore, the big riot
at LBJ (Long Binli Jail) in Vietnam had taken place in August, and after
the devastation oft he prison there, many of the detainees were transferred
to other stockades, including the one at the Presidio/’ Antiwar protests
were polarizing the country, at the same time as a large number of
embittered Vietnam veterans were returning to the States, setting tlie
stage for a very tense confrontation. The relationship between the
guards, many of whom were Vietnam veterans, and the prisoners, many
of whom openly opposed the war, was exceedingly hostile. No wonder
that between June and October, 1968, there were over two dozen suicide
attempts among the Presidio stockade prisoners, who used such methods
as hanging themselves, cutting their wrists and arms, and drinking lye/
The brass discounted these attempts as “suicide gestures,” intended to
gain attention and not actually to take one’s life— despite the fact that the
man who had hung himself, Ricky Dodd, was pronounced dead on
arrival at Letterman Hospital and only revived with much effort.7
On Wednesday, October 9, Bunch talked with another prisoner,
Billy Hayes, about the fact that if this country did not love him, he would
just as soon do what it wanted him to, that is, die.8 Hayes was one of
McNamara’s 100,000— a group of GIs with low int elligence and aptitude
scores whom the Secretary of Defense had decided to draft, ostensibly
to help them gain job skills, but chiefly so that the President would not
have to further antagonize opponents of his war policy by calling up the
reserves (before the end of the war, the 100,000 swelled to over 300,000).
Bunch must have figured Hayes would be sympathetic because Hayes
had already tried and failed to commit suicide by drinking Head and
Shoulders™ shampoo. Hayes told Bunch that the surest way for him to
die would be to tell a guard he was running away and then take off, giving
the guard a good chance to take aim and shoot him. They both laughed.9
On Friday morning, October 11, four prisoners, including Bunch,
were marched out on a work detail by a Mexican-American guard, a Nam
vet. The guard had only a few months to go before discharge, and he
knew that several guards had already faced court-martial lor letting
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prisoners escape. During a break. Bunch began taunting the guard,
asking if he would promise to shoot him if Bunch ran. As they left a
barracks where they had gone for water, Bunch veered away from the
other prisoners. The guard later claimed he had broken into a “dead
run,”10 though by other accounts Bunch was merely “jogging” or even
doing just a fast w alk.11 The guard claimed that he yelled “H all!” twice.
The other prisoners did not recall hearing him yell anything before he
sighted the shotgun on Bunch’s back and pulled the trigger.12 The
shotgun was loaded with double-ought buckshot, large pellets that are
capable of killing a man even at a fair distance. The recommended
procedure was for guards to shoot at the ground j ust behind the escaping
prisoner— the pellets will then glance up and catch the fugitive in the legs
and buttocks, effectively stopping him. The guard’s gun, which he had
neglected to check, fired several inches higher than the sights indicated,
and the blast came within inches of blowing Bunch’s head off. It made
a grapefruit-sized hole in his back and chest, and he died in a matter of
m om ents.13
Word of the shooting hit the otherprisoners like an electricaljolt,
and their reactions ran the gamut from anger and outrage to terror that
they would be the next victim of the guards’ sadism. Among those who
reacted most strongly was a twenty one year-old AW OL GI named Keith
Mather, whose story would become entangled with Bunch’s for the next
twenty years.
Mather was raised in a rather traditional Baptist family in San
Bruno, California, just south of San Francisco. The most powerful
influence in his life, however, was not the Bible, but his loving and
sensitive mother, who often told him of her horror while riding troop
trains during World War II and seeing the endless carnage of the war—
soldiers in wheelchairs, on crutches and stretchers, and so forth.
A handsome and high-spirited youngster, Mather got in trouble
almost without trying. He’d been suspended from eighth grade for
calling the school bus driver a “motherfucker,” and subsequently telling
the science teacher to fuck himself when he gave Keith a hard time over
the bus incident. As a result of such troubles, including a car theft bust,
Mather didn’t graduate high school until he was almost twenty years old,
in 1966. He tried San Mateo Junior College for fourm onths, but couldn’t
keep his grades up. On September 17, 1967, he was inducted into the
United States Arm y in Oakland.14
In many ways Mather was a typical Fifties punk with greased
blondish hair and pegged pants, but with one major difference: he knew
for certain that he could never take another human life. When he arrived
at Fort Lewis, Washington, for basic training, he was given a form asking
his attitudes toward war: on it, he wrote that he would never consent to
fight in Vietnam. His language was so strong that the CID (Criminal
Defense Division of the Army) sent an agent to question him as to
whether he would disobey a direct order to embark for Vietnam. Mather
told the agent he would deal with such an order when it came. In the
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meantime, he set about finding ways to keep the military from completing
his occupational training.
It did not take much effort, for he unintentionally caught
pneumonia and then, while recovering, was forced to stand in line in the
rain and caught it a second time. When Mather finally recuperated he
was slotted for A IT (Advanced Infantry Training), the next step before
liftoff to Southeast Asia. At first he tried handling the Army just as he
had the unfriendly world of authority at school; but when he flipped off
his top sergeant he got a good beating and found "you have to get up the
next morning and do the same thing everybody else does.” Eventually,
he says, “I had been harassed and fucked with to a point where I figured
it was conceivable that I could actually kill people— they had done it, they
had succeeded, which really pissed me off. I felt like I had been ripped
off.” 15
At Christmas, Mather went home on leave, and proceeded to get
stoned out of his mind on acid, pot, and a variety of other drugs with his
boyhood friends. In one of those quintessential Sixties countercultural
pads, complete with Indian rugs, crystal chandelier, and hookah on the
floor, he experienced what— next to Bunch’s death— would be the most
powerful revelation of his life. He suddenly felt a horrible weight of
depression, and it occurred to him that the reason for it was that none
of the others in that room were in the Army, none of them had to face the
same life-or-death pressures that he would be subject to in a m atter of
weeks. And ju st as quickly Mather decided that he would stop worrying,
because he simply would not go to Vietnam, no m atter what they did to
him, and he felt enormous relief.
Mather returned late to Fort Lewis, with an earring in one ear, a
non-issue knitted tie, no brass insignias (he’d given them away at the
party), black socks with little red crests on the side, and his pockets
stuffed with marijuana. Fourteen people in his unit had done roughly
the same thing, and the Arm y put them all together in the same
“troublemakers' barracks,” which enabled them to band together and
plot against the military. “That was my first camaraderie I really liked
in the military, being able to identify with other people who were
experiencing the same thing,” Mather recalls. “It gave us more strength
to go on, to continue to fight, because we could all discuss it, and we were
becoming very subversive.” 15
Convicted at a special court-martial, Mather received a three
month suspended sent ence and one-third reduction of wages, then was
recycled right back into AIT, into a company where the men were already
wearing jungle boots. The unit was full of guys with trick knees, bad
backs, heart murmurs, and one guy who had even been drafted by
mistake, since he had a wife and two kids, was carrying a full academic
load at college, and had a nervous debility besides— but all of these guys
(some of whom Mather witnessed crying in their bunks at night) were so
buried in military paperwork that their grievances would not be redressed
for months, if ever. Mather thus decided to take things into his own
hands.
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On a lovely Northwest spring day in March, he put on his civilian
clothes under his military clothes, went on sick call, and boarded a bus
for town, where he jettisoned the uniform in a garbage can and hailed a
cab for Seattle. With money wired from his girlfriend, he got a plane to
San Francisco the same night. This time he stayed away only a few
weeks, because his father convinced him to turn him self in, and they Hew
him back to Fort Lewis in chains. Almost immediately he got in trouble
again by trying to keep the authorities from getting hold of a letter from
his girlfriend containing LSD.
Keith had heard rumors that the Arm y was dealing with reluctant
warriors like him self by simply sticking them on a plane bound for Nam,
where they could get “on-the-job training.” Within a few days, he got a
bus straight down to San Francisco, and commenced living on the
streets and from house to house for about four months. Concerned that
the FBI would not stop hassling his parents and friends, he went to the
office of the War Resisters League, a pacifist organization dating from
just after World War I, for suggestions as to how he might turn him self
in. He was now wanted for desertion, a far more serious crime than
AW OL (AWOL implies that a soldier still intends to return to the military;
desertion means that he has turned his back on it for good).17
The War Resisters League had been involved in the earliest
antiwar protests from about 1963 on, and unlike most of the GIs, who
had all they could do to get just a little information on the workings of
l he military in their immediate vicinity (while embroiled in a daily battle
for survival with military discipline), the W RL was cognizant of the larger
picture of GI resistance that was beginning to emerge at U.S. military
bases worldwide. As early as June, 1966, three GIs (a black, a Puerto
Rican, and an Italian) at Fort Hood in Killeen, Texas, had refused orders
for Vietnam on the grounds that the war itself was undeclared and
therefore unconstitutional. Despite sentences of up to five years at hard
labor (of which they served two), and the Supreme Court’s refusal—with
a notable dissent by Justice William O. Douglas— to hear their case, the
notoriety of the Fort Hood 3 encouraged the growing wave of refusal that
followed, including such celebrated cases as those of Howard Levy and
Louis Font.18 More recently, in Southern California, there had been
several instances of sailors and Marines taking sanctuary in churches
in order to keep from being sent to Southeast A sia.19 Even though
military police could arrest an errant GI in a church just as well as
anywhere else, the image of war resisters being dragged from churches
had undeniable power as a symbol to sway people whose views on the
war were still middle-of-the-road.20
According to Keith Mather, the idea for the “Nine for Peace”
emerged by chance. The W RL was in touch with seven other men— four
from the Anny, two from the Navy, and one Marine— who were in similar
situations and looking for a way to surrender and yet to guarantee that
they would not be immediately shipped off to war. A minister, the
Reverend Philip Farnham, offered them the use of his church, Howard
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Presbyterian, in the Haight district. A former union organizer in the
copper smelters in Seattle, and later a leader in the leftist group No
Business As Usual, Fam ham wasn’t your garden-variety do-gooding
man ol the cloth, but he helped put the eight servicemen in touch with
a more traditional religious antiwar group called Clergy and Laity
Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV, later ju st CALC), which had been
formed in 1965 by Father Daniel Berrigan, S.J., and the Reverend
William Sloane Coffin. Together they hatched the plan for the eight men
to show up, each chained to a clergyman, at Howard Presbyterian
Church, where they would take Communion publicly and issue a
statement of their beliefs to the media. Hearing of the demonstration, Air
Force Sergeant Oliver Hirsch asked to join them at the eleventh hour.
Because of logistical delays they were not able to make their appearance
on the Fourth of July, but when they finally took their stand a few days
later, the impact could hardly have been greater.21
The military viewed the demonstration as a m ajor threat, but it
is well to remember that the young men taking part in it were scarcely
more than kids. Mather recalls that he was hard put to decide whether
he should do the demo or forget it and go see a concert by the rock band
Cream. In the end, Mather’s sense o f responsibility to other GIs tipped
the balance in favor o f going public. Once again, the feeling for others
that he had learned from his mother came into play, as well as the
obligation he felt to “try to educate and to help the movement from
inside.”22
For protection, each of the Nine, with the minister he was chained
to, rode to the church separately. When they arrived, each made his own
statem ent. In front of numerous press people, they spoke out against the
war in Vietnam, formally resigned from the military, and claimed
sanctuary there. Mather stated that he was making a personal decision
of conscience and encouraged others to do the same.
After the news conference hit the papers and TV stations
throughout the area, a bomb threat forced them to move to St. Andrew’s
Presbyterian Church in Marin City. This time m ilitary police from all four
armed services were waiting to arrest them; though, perhaps because of
the presence o f two hundred supporters, they allowed them to drink their
Communion wine. In one of the rare shows of solidarity between the
black and white protest movements, a large contingent of Black Panthers
showed up to offer their militant protection for the demonstrators, but
the demonstrators had sworn a nonviolent pact and declined the aid of
the Panthers’ m uscle.23
On the videos that exist of the event, Mather looks like a
Springsteen-style young tough, in denim shirt and sideburns, cigarette
hanging from his lips, with a deeply serious expression as he holds forth
to the press about how “a majority of the men in the service were opposed
[to the war], but really didn’t know how to voice their opinion.” 24 Then
they all held up their chains “to symbolize the bonds between men, which
you can’t escape no matter what you do.” The symbolism was lost on the
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military, whose enforcers brought out their chain-cutters and shunted
the Nine, sans ministerial guard, off to the appropriate jails. According
to Mather, “it was pretty emotional, one o f the most emotional things I’ve
ever been through. We knew we were all gonna go to jail. They were
gonna do to us what they wanted to do to us. They always had.”25
Mather was bound for the Arm y stockade at the Presidio, where
he met Richard Bunch and a number of other increasingly intransigent
malcontents. From the moment he got there, Mather set him self on a
course of noncooperation, figuring that if he refused to work, the Arm y
would have to get another man to do his duties, and that would keep
another body from going to Nam. But each time Mather refused a direct
order to work, he would accrue one more charge against him, so he
decided simply to take off his uniform and go about in a blanket. A
soldier cannot be ordered to work while he is out o f uniform, and they
could only order him once to put on his uniform, which they did. And
they locked him up in solitary confinement, where he didn’t see the light
of day for nearly a month26.
Nonetheless, things were happening that made Mather take
heart. The press continued to give them highly sympathetic coverage.27
A group of ministers from CALCAV began a 24-hour vigil outside the
gates to protest the fact that many of the prisoners, like Mather, were
being denied the right to meet with their chosen pastors. Several of the
best lawyers in San Francisco, such as Terrence Hallinan and Howard
De Nike, volunteered their services to the Nine. Mather faced a general
court-martial on a bevy o f charges— desertion, refusing a direct order,
conspiracy, disloyal statements, subversion. There commenced a
waiting game between Mather and the Army, since they wouldn’t courtmartial him without his uniform on, and for the time being he was
satisfied to accept the peace of solitary confinement, which allowed him,
perhaps for the first time, to really think about his life and what he
wanted to do with it.28
By his own admission, Mather knew almost nothing of the GI
movement per se, though occasionally word filtered through to him of
significant events— for example, in August, 1968, 43 black GIs at Fort
Hood refused to be sent to Chicago to do riot duty in anticipation of
trouble at the Democratic National Convention, and, in their eyes, to be
used most likely against black ghetto rioters. Such incidents, and
stories of troops in Vietnam refusing to go into battle, made Mather feel
less alone, but the major transformation inside him had much more to
do with a strengthening of his own integrity and the larger commitment
to humanity that grew out of that. In Mather’s words: “You see yourself
differently when you’re up in your own face in prison.” What Mather saw
was that when a man confronts injustice, “the only real choices” are to
take positive action against it or to “feel like you’re compromising your
own being.” And once Mather had figured out “what really matters and
what doesn’t,” he put his unifonn back on and decided to get the worst
over with, so he could start living his life again.29
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And the next thing he knew, Richard Bunch was shot to death.
At the mutiny trials that followed, the Arm y sought to prove that
the Presidio 27 were conspirators who deliberately and calculatedly
sought to “override the lawful authority” o f the United States Arm y.30 In
truth, the so-called mutiny grew out o f a join t exercise of conscience, all
the more remarkable for the extreme confusion and duress under which
it occurred.
Within hours of Bunch’s death, all hell broke loose in the
stockade. Cans full o f piss were thrown on guards, wires were pulled out
of the walls, toilets were stopped up and flushed until water backed up
out of every pipe. The prisoners all vowed not to go outside the fences
until given some reassurance that they too would not be shot.31
The next day, October 12, there was a peace march o f over 15,000
people in San Francisco, led by some 500 active-duty GIs and Vietnam
veterans. Having had advance warning of the GIs and Vets March for
Peace, the Presidio brass denied weekend passes to any soldiers known
to be opposed to the war. One such soldier, a Vietnam vet named Richard
Lee Gentile, participated in the march anyway. Another participant was
Randy Rowland, the twenty one-year-old son of an Air Force colonel, who
was willing to serve as a medic outside of combat. When he was ordered
to Vietnam, he sought help from the Central Committee for Conscient ious
Objectors (CCCO) in San Francisco, and eventually went AWOL. While
working on his CO application, he learned that the Arm y was harassing
his wife in order to learn his whereabouts, so he went to attorney
Terrence Hallinan for help, and together they worked out a plan for
Rowland to turn him self in publicly at the Presidio after the peace
march.32
Despite his voluntary return, Rowland was charged with desertion.
The night of October 12, both he and Richard Gentile, who also returned
voluntarily, were thrown into the Presidio stockade, where they were
caught up in the fear and frenzy following Bunch’s shooting.
Rowland immediately sought out Mather; and all Saturday night
both o f them, along with some other of the more radicalized young men,
began going around the stockade “getting people talking” about how they
shou Id respond to the insufferable cruelty and terror that now enveloped
them. The key to the whole situation that developed is that these
prisoners had been pushed beyond anything a human being should
rightfully be forced to endure, and they saw no way out other than direct
action. There was only one lawful grievance mechanism available to the
prisoners, the filing o f a DD 510 form, and thus far all such complaints
had been systemat ically ignored. “We knew the penalty for mutiny was
death, but in a wildly elated way we didn’t care,” Rowland wrote later.
“We were going up against the motherfuckers, we were taking our
stand.”33
Mather’s and Rowland’s efforts were bolstered by the energy and
courage of a prisoner named W alter Pawlowski, him self a paradigm o f t he
way the Arm y at this period was pushing soldiers into rebellion. A

74 V ietnam Generation
straight-A student, Pawlowski had to drop out of college lor lack ol
tuition, and when he enlisted in the Arm y he was promised a non
infantry assignment. Finding him self in AIT, he became so angry that
he got violent with another soldier over a pool game. He was so upset over
his own aggression that he asked to see a psychiatrist, but the Arm y
offered him a chaplain instead. Pawlowski decided to become his own
counselor and headed down to San Francisco with a bag of marijuana.
After a short stint of living in the Haight, he went on the road to Mexico
and Canada, then was finally arrested back in Florida.
The local police remanded him to the Arm y at Fort Stewart,
Georgia, where Pawlowski got so tired o f make-work details (like picking
up pine cones for twelve hours a day) that he took off once more for San
Francisco. Arrested in Utah, he was sent on to the Presidio and, despite
the relative pettiness of his offenses, was put into the stockade. There
Pawlowski served as a model prisoner for several months, but he was
biding his time, waiting for a chance to escape. After a bungled attempt,
he was no longer allowed outside the stockade on work details. From
that point on, he began an unrelieved campaign of resistance, refusing
to wear his uniform and going on a twenty-six-day fast in isolation in the
“box,” a six-by-four-foot cell painted black. Originally the Fort Stewart
officials had intended to discharge Pawlowski as “undesirable”— a
discretionary method for the Army to get rid of unsuitable soldiers— but
now the Presidio authorities decided to court-martial him on two counts
of desertion plus one count of “disobeying a lawful command” to put on
his uniform.34
By Sunday morning the 13th, Mather, Rowland, Pawlowski, and
a few others had succeeded in rousing almost all the prisoners to a
fevered pitch of opposition. T eriy Hallinan showed up that day to meet
with Pawlowski, but was effectively prevented from speaking with the
entire group. That night there was a packed meeting upstairs in Cell
Block 4. Grievances were discussed and Pawlowski wrote them down,
and a consensus was achieved to demand a thorough investigation of
Bunch’s “murder.” The black brothers, united among themselves,
complained against the blatant racism of the guards, but in the end
decided to opt out of any demonstration because they “figured they’d get
punished worst.” Eventually a plan took shape for a sit-down strike, to
begin the next morning at 7:30am when the first name was called at roll
call.35 Mather proposed that they all break ranks and sit in a circle in
the grass nearest the fence, so media cameras could film them— and
thus keep the guards from any brutal overreaction— and that they sing
“We Shall Overcome” to signify their nonviolence, as in a civil rights
protest. Later Mather went over to the other stockade building, where
a second group was meeting, but much to his chagrin he found that this
second group had voted down the idea of a mass protest.36
Through the phone call o f an informer, the command at the
Presidio got advance word of the demo, but did nothing to prevent it,
other than to keep away the media. That morning, Monday the 14th of
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October, when the first name was called, everyone was supposed to
answer “Here!” in unison. But only a few m en yelled “Here!” and none
started to move out of formation. So Mather pushed aside the guy in
front of him and headed for the grassy area, and twenty six others,
including two Vietnam vets, joined him. Sergeant Thom as Woodring,
almost universally hated among the prisoners for his brutality and
bigotry, chased after them screaming that they were committing a
mutiny. No one took him seriously (he was drunk much o f the tim e), but
they were, one and all, by M ather’s account, terrified of the m ilitary’s
retribution. In fact, their fears seemed to be substantiated when, in a few
minutes, they were surrounded by both a line of firemen with hoses at
the ready, and a tactical squad of soldiers with gas masks and rifles.37
What had pushed twenty seven prisoners to such a reckless
stand? Mather answers for himself: “I wasn’t getting out, I knew I was
there— this guy ju st got killed, and I’m going, ‘Shoo! Man, this is wrong!
1 can’t live with this’ And so m y life, and what happened to us, seemed
kind of insignificant, considering what had ju st happened. We were
mindless o f our own mortality, or anything else— our safety. I mean we
were scared to death, ‘cause we knew something was gonna happen, but
we didn’t know exactly what.”38
Another of the twenty seven, Danny Seals, explained, “Something
was ju st drawing me out there. It was like walking down the street and
seeing someone getting beat up. You just couldn’t look the other way.
It was something that I had to do.”39
Pawlowski explained, “People were finally getting together and
accomplishing something. For me it was a moment of liberation. W e’d
been so impotent, so uptight. Now we weren’t ju st going along with
everything, we were resisting."40
The 27 chanted “Freedom! We want freedom !” and sang a variety
of songs— “We Shall Not Be Moved,” ‘T h is Land Is Your Land,” “America,
the Beautiful”— not so much to make any political statement, according
to Mather, as to “keep our souls warm .” They also Hashed the two-finger
“V ” peace symbol at CID photographers who were busy recording their
action as evidence against them. W hen Captain Robert Lamont (the
stockade commander) arrived, Pawlowski read him the m en’s list of
demands. Lamont, stunned, could say nothing. Finally, in response to
Pawlowski’s taunt, “May we have a reply, sir?” Lamont read them Article
94, “the mutiny act,” out of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
The 27 ju st sang louder to drown him out. Lamont retaliated by reading
the article again over a loudspeaker atop an MP sedan, and then gave the
men a direct order to return to their cells. Most of them returned
voluntarily, though Mather, Rowland, Pawlowski, and a few others had
to be carried.41
The charge o f m utiny refers to the action of two or more soldiers
who act in concert to overthrow the m ilitary’s power structure and its
ability to exercise control over enlisted men. It was a ridiculous charge
for Lamont to have brought. Captain Jesse C. Jones, head of the police
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detail that had been called to the demonstration, said he would simply
have listened to the m en’s complaints, asked for a representative to come
to his office, and dispersed the rest. But the Army, in the person o f Sixth
Arm y Commander General Stanley R. Larsen, insisted on following
Lamont’s poor judgem ent through a series of outrageously unfair trials
well into 1969. Later Larsen reputedly explained, “We thought the
revolution was starting, and we were trying to crush it.”42
Tales of the Presidio 27 hit the presses almost immediately, and
for months they made front-page headlines, both in the United States
and around the world. (Mather even claims there were prominent news
stories in China.) The Presidio 27 became a phenomenon on so m any
levels that it warranted a book—and got a fine one— The Unlawful
Concert, by Fred Gardner, a key activist in the GI movement.
First and foremost, it was a personal tragedy for almost all of the
men involved. The first man to be tried, and the first to be convicted,
Nesrey Sood, received a sentence of fifteen years at hard labor in Fort
Leavenworth Military Prison. He had had only one day left in the military
when he decided to join the demonstration. With three children to
support, Sood should never have been drafted. His anger over that led
to so much drinking and fighting that the Arm y finally agreed to give him
an unsuitability discharge, but before it was processed he heard that his
children were being neglected and rushed from Washington to San
Francisco to check on them. He was picked up for being AW OL and put
into the Presidio stockade on October 12. On Monday he was scheduled
to be taken back to Fort Lewis to receive his discharge, but that morning
he felt compelled to protest with the others. Then, on top of everything,
while he was awaiting trial for mutiny, the Arm y failed to give him a
summons to a custody hearing in Oakland, and as a result he lost
custody of his three-year-old daughter Darryl.43
The next two men to be tried, Louis Osczepinski and Larry Reidel,
received fourteen and sixteen-year sentences respectively.
Further adding to the injustice, the Arm y refused to try the 27
individually, but grouped them into various irrational clusters of
defendants, which made a systematic defense impossible.44
Some men did not wait for the Army to take their life away. Before
Keith Mather came to trial for mutiny, he was court-martialed and
convicted on his previous charges, and sentenced to four years at
Leavenworth. Pawlowski, who by this time had become a friend and
mentor to Mather, was also tried on his previous charges in the interim,
and sentenced to two years at Leavenworth. They were both certain that
as “leaders” the Army was certain to make examples of them— and
though the death penalty had been ruled out (it is usually applicable to
mutiny only during a declared war) they both might well receive life in
prison. Both of them took the opportunity o f a minimal guard on
Christmas Eve to escape and, helped by the “underground railroad” of
antiwar people, they made it safely together to Vancouver, Canada, a few
days later.
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The decision to leave was not as easy as it might seem, for Mather
felt a great responsibility to the m en he had convinced to demonstrate
with him. But he was “freaked out by the possibility of having to spend
the rest of m y life in prison.” Moreover, he had serious doubts about his
ability to survive in jail. Enormous hatred was directed toward the 27:
the stockade doctor actually prescribed “paint thinner” for Mather, when
he developed a high fever, “for that yellow stripe down your back.” Even
so, through twelve years of hard living in Canada, he was often
tormented by guilt—to the point where he had to willfully put his entire
past life out o f his mind. And yet, his past still pursued him. In 1980,
he returned with his wife and family to live in H alf Moon Bay in California,
near where he’d grown up, but a lost wallet led to the Arm y laying hands
on him again, in late 1984, and putting him in prison in Fort Riley,
Kansas, until Congressional pressure on the Secretary o f the Army
effected his early release.45
What may have made all this suffering worthwhile for these men
was the knowledge that their action was a pivotal event in the fashioning
of the GI movement, and eventually in the ending of the war itself. By
late 1968, underground antiwar GI papers were springing up near
military bases around the country, and almost all of them seized on the
Presidio 27 as a rallying point. Furthermore, those 27 showed the rest
of the peace movement, as well as the whole nation, that, in Mather’s
words, “the soldiers that are fighting the war are not doing it because
they want to, but because they’re forced to. And they shouldn’t be looked
on as the enemy [by antiwar people], because here were soldiers fighting
against the war, and putting their lives on the line in a different way, in
a different war— the war against the war. It flew in the face of everything
the military stands for.”46
Hal Muskat, who began his activism in the U.S. Arm y in Europe
in the late Sixties and is a leading veteran activist to this day (and whose
lobbying in Washington helped gain Mather’s release in 1985), states the
case even more forcefully: “The Presidio 27 was the best thing that ever
happened to the GI movement— it put us on the front page. It made
civilians realize that there were antiwar GIs within the military. Which
is very important. Because the civilian antiwar m ovement was mostly
middle-class, and we were working-class. So it was able to provide a
bridge, and it was very significant, probably one of the most significant
trials and cases, for that reason.”47
Proof o f that bridge came in early 1969 with tens of thousands of
war protestors marching from the Civic Center in San Francisco to the
gates of the Presidio, trying to break into the base to free the 27. Though
they were repulsed, images o f the melee—which looked like the ragtag
mob attempting to storm the Bastille— were cast on picture tubes all
across Am erica.48
The shakeup within the Arm y was equally profound. Some
observers felt that the roots of the whole debacle lay in the Sixth Arm y
Com mander’s professional failures vis-a-vis the war in Vietnam. In
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1966, General Larsen (right-hand man to General William Westmoreland)
advocated an extension of the war into Cambodia, in direct opposition
to the current policy of the State Department. Larsen’s claim that the
Cambodians were harboring six North Vietnamese regiments nearly
precipitated a hostile confrontation between Cambodia and the United
States, and Westmoreland quickly dissociated him self from his erstwhile
friend. Larsen was transferred back to the States soon thereafter. It may
well be that by ramrodding the first mutiny charges through the
American military court in 78 years, he felt he was alleviating the shame
he had helped bring on the faltering Am erican military.49
In any case, the public furor over the unconscionable severity of
the first three sentences caused the Secretary of the Army, Stanley
Resor, to cut them down to two years apiece even before the other men
went to trial. A number of Congressmen— including Senator Alan
Cranston of California and Charles Goodell of New York— demanded an
investigation of conditions at the Presidio stockade, and almost at once
the place was cleaned up and refurbished, and the number of prisoners
set at a permanent ceiling of 103. Resor also established a Special
Civilian Committee for the Study of the U.S. Army Confinement System.50
The long series of trials— even though convictions became fewer
and sentences progressively lighter— did lasting harm to the image of the
military, and that alone upset Congressmen like John E. Moss of
Sacramento, Jeffrey Cohelan o f Berkeley, Don Edwards of San Jose,
Allard Lowenstein and William Fitts Ryan of New York, and William S.
Moorehead of Pittsburgh, who all put their protests into the Congressional
Record. The trials added to the reputation of Terrence Hallinan as a
headstrong crusader for justice, and they made the reputation of a young
captain and JAG (Judge Advocate General’s Corps) lawyer named
Brendan Sullivan, who would come into the public spotlight again
twenty years later as Colonel Oliver North’s defense counsel at the
Contra-gate hearings. The guard who did the shooting was adjudged to
have committed “justifiable homicide,” fined a dollar (the price o f the
shell he “wasted”) and transferred to a base nearer his home. But in the
end, the meaning of the Presidio 27 cannot be evaluated merely in terms
of its effects on individual m en’s lives or even on the role of the military.51
After having their lives blown off course by a rocket blast as
traumatic as any launched by the Viet Cong, the men involved have
mostly managed to survive and put new lives together. In late 1988 there
was a reunion of some of them, at which “conspirator” John Colip
remarked, “I don’t think too much about all the things they did to us, I
think about all we did to them. You know what I remember best about
those times? We were incorrigible!” Randy Rowland stressed the positive
effect of the ordeal even more forcefully: “We were mainly working class
youth, politicized by what was going on in the world, with our view of
America-the-Unbeautiful clarified by the war, the military, and the
brutality and outright torture we experienced behind bars. They tried to
break us, but the only break was with them
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The military, o f course, has survived too— as it has for the past
five thousand years— minus the draft and many of the Mickey Mouse
disciplinary demands that landed the m ajority of the prisoners in the
Presidio stockade.
The thing that was being b o m partly at that impromptu sit-in at
Am erica’s oldest existing military installation was a rare and precious
glimpse of the postwar future. In the words of Keith Mather, what the
Presidio 27 had earned for the movement was “dignity” and “credibility.”52
And those two intangible yet real qualities, which the war in Vietnam was
rapidly draining from Am erican life, opened wide the door between what
had been rigid and unfeeling in this so-called land of the free, and a
future of limitlessly renewable humanity, where virtually anything
seemed possible, including the abolition of war and recognition o f one
m an’s right to say that for now and for always he did not wish or intend
to harm another.
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A M a t t e r of C o n s c ie n c e : R e s is t a n c e WlThiN
ThE C.S. MiliTARy D u r I nq ThE V I e t n a m W a r
Bill ShoRT
WillA SEldENbERQ
In 1982 when the Vietnam veterans Memorial was dedicated in
Washington, D.C., it was the beginning o f the nation’s retrospection
about the war and its aftermath. But eight years and hundreds of books,
articles, films and TV programs later, the GI resistance movement during
the war has been consistently ignored. Frustrated by this glaring
omission, we embarked on a project to tell the story of resistance. A
Matter o f Conscience: Resistance Within the U.S. Military During the
Vietnam War, a series of portraits and oral histories of vets who resisted
against the war while still on active duty, has been exhibited at various
locations throughout the country for the past two years.
Our interviews with resistance veterans reveal common social,
moral and historical threads and provide a context for understanding
why some GIs felt compelled to dissent. Additionally, the oral histories
illustrate why the war was so divisive and troubling to m any Americans.
Resistance took m any forms. It included individual acts and
group efforts. It was carried out by persons who enlisted, as well as by
persons who were drafted. Resistance to the war and to military
authority developed at installations in the United States, and in units
stationed in Vietnam and Europe. Resistance included desertion,
AW OLS (absent without official leave), the refusal o f direct orders,
fraggings (the use o f fragmentation grenades by low ranking soldiers to
intimidate or murder officers), sabotage, the publication of underground
newspapers, demonstrations and passive noncompliance with the war
effort. In this article we present the stories of individual resisters: those
who ated in isolation without the advantage of an immediate support
group. This was p a rtic u la rly true for s e r v ic e personnel stationed “in
country,” in Vietnam, where Amerians were cut off from the antiwar
movement back home..
Individual resistance developed from a deep moral conscience,
usually in absence of political sophistication but with a well-defined
sense of right and wrong. Most of the vets we interviewed indicated they
learned a strong moral code from their parents: a sense of fair play and
duty, respect for others and for private property, honesty—values
reinforced by school, church, and scouting. John Tuma was an Army
interrogator who almost lost his life for refusing to torture Viet Cong
prisoners:
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I remember I used to think what would my parents have done.
The way I was brought up, what would be the right thing to do,
not the right thing to do from the Army point of view, but from
my own family, and my own community’s morality. I consciously
thought about that and came to the conclusion there were things
1 had been raised not to do, things I wouldn’t, couldn’t do.

These ideals were taken at face value, despite the contradictions
of the 1950s: a time of segregation and racism, intolerance for religions
other than Christianity, fervent anti-communist witch hunts, and
overwrought nationalism manifesting itself as nuclear imperialism. In
addition, as a result of “winning” World War II, the United States
populace developed a chauvinist attitude toward the rest of the world.
Young people were instilled with the idea that the role of the United
States was that of policeman and protector without thought for other
cultures. As former Marine Steven Fournier said:
1had volunteered to go, I wanted to be there. I thought it was the
right thing that we should go and protect democracy there. I
believed in the Domino Theory, I believed that Cardinal Spellman
was right when he said “Kill a Commie for Christ.” 1 really truly
believed, I mean it was the cause. I was a young man, I’d been
brought up in a Navy family. I was very proud of having become
a Marine and fighting for my country.

By the time young men came of draft age, their sense of duty
toward the United States was well-formed. Their personal values
reflected the cultural norm of the early Sixties, with their roots in the
Fifties. What was thought to be a new sense of duty and service to
country was described by a young dynamic President John F. Kennedy
when he said, “ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you
can do for your country.” The weight of family service to “God and
country” lived in the stories fathers and uncles told about World W ar II
and Korea. The young man of the Sixties saw Vietnam as “his” war, a
chance to gloriously serve his country just as male members of his family
had done.
Of course, the fact that the Vietnamese were an Asian people, as
were the Japanese and Koreans, was not lost on these young GIs. As
Marine veteran Paul Atwood told us,
the Vietnamese were essentially in my mind the equivalent of
Japs, and there was no question but that we could handle them.
My father had handled them, of course I would go over and
handle them in the same way and come back in one piece.

Intrigued by the imagined war exploits of their fathers and uncles
(since many veterans said their male relatives were often silent about the
realities and horrors of World War II), and with romanticized, even
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mysterious images fostered by John Wayne movies, it is not surprising
then that m any of these young men enlisted in the military, and because
they went in believing so wholeheartedly in the “cause,” their
disillusionment was even more profound. Steve Spund, the son of a
Jewish Polish immigrant, was a Marine who refused to go to Vietnam:
I’d grown up seeing the U.S. defend itself against the Nazis and
Japanese, watching John Wayne movies and felt very patriotic.
Maybe I’d seen one too many Marine movies, but I felt, and it was
supported by my father’s patriotism, that what we were doing
had to be right. Here there were Marines coming back from
Vietnam saying what we were doing was wrong. It really
shattered, totally contradicted eveiything I believed in about the
U.S.

Upon entering the service, pressure to conform to the norm and
not question authority was strongly reinforced by the military system of
training. Drill sergeants and the system replaced parents and other
authority figures young men and women had known as civilians. The
military system isolated the new trainees from the civilian world, forcing
them to focus their attention upon the immediate functions and needs
of the military, and turning them into obedient soldiers willing to
unquestionably die for their country. Placed in the strange and often
hostile environment of boot camp, trainees banded together for their own
emotional survival against an immediate common enemy: the drill
sergeant. A sense of camaraderie and single identity began to form
among the young trainees and they began working together as a unit.
Paul Atwood recalls:
The first process at Parris Island was to strip away your identity
and reduce you to identical cogs in a machine, insofar as that
was possible. So, literally we were stripped naked, we had our
hair zapped right off. We were just shells o f human beings. And
the senior drill instructor walked up and down and said in a
terrifying voice, “There are no niggers in this platoon, there are
no spies, there are no wops, there are no kikes, there are no poor
white whatever, there are none o f those. You are all fucking
maggots and maggots you will remain until you’ve earned the
right to call yourself United States Marines." That had an effect
on me.

An irony of U.S. military training is the animosity felt by the
trainee for the system versus the loyalty toward the country which the
system serves. The GIs saw in the drill sergeant an immediate enemy
who made daily life miserable. The drill sergeant saw this bonding as the
prime reason for military training. In the end, both the trainee and the
drill sergeant submerged their mutual hostility in the realization that the
training was all for a common good: fighting a greater enemy (in this case
the Vietnamese communists).
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For those not already skeptical and mistrustful when they
entered the service, disaffection and disillusionment with the military
and the war often began during training. For others it came after they
were assigned to their duty stations, whether in Vietnam or elsewhere.
Dave Cline, a combat veteran and winner of the Purple Heart, recalls:
In training they gave you basically two things: you were going
over there to help the people of South Vietnam fight against
communist aggression, or you were going over to kill commies.
My background made me definitely be against the idea that I’m
going over to kill commies, so I sort o f latched onto we were there
to help people. But when I got to Vietnam it really didn’t take me
but about one day in-countiy to realize that all the helping people
wasn’t true. The first thing they tell you is you can’t trust any
of them, they're gooks, they’re not human beings, they’re all your
enemy.

Despite the intense indoctrination of boot camp, many young
soldiers eventually questioned the necessity and morality of American
policy in Vietnam. Faced with the dilemma o f “servie to ountry” (which
meant serving in the military), or following their consciences, they ame
to oppose the war, and often took the chance of severing ties with family
members and friends back home. Antiwar soldiers risked the hostility
of their fellow soldiers and the harsh reaction of the military, an
authoritarian social institution which often regarded dissent as “unAm ericcan,” cowardly and potentially life-threatening to combat units.
The military punishment of dissident soldiers included extra work,
transfers (often to dangerous areas of the war zone), constant harassment,
courts-martial (often for dubious infractions), dishonorable discharges
and imprisonment. Some resisters claim they were beaten and tortured
by military authorities and that attempts were made on their lives.
When they got out of the military, some resistance veterans threw
themselves into the antiwar movement, others remained silent about
their military background, fearing retribution, and only in recent years
have they begun to speak out about their experience. The veterans
whose stories are presented here were profoundly changed and radicalized
by their experiences as dissenting soldiers, and to this day, many former
GI resisters remain committed and active in political, social justice and
community causes.
A Matter o f Conscience is an ongoing project. We are still looking
for resisters to interview, information about acts of resistance, and
archival materials, such as GI newspapers and photographs. Persons
interested in the exhibit are invited to contact us.

A M atter

of

C onscience 85

Former Navy Nurse Susan Schnall holds her court martial documents,
including one of the posters she dropped from an airplane onto the
deck of the U.S.S. Enterprise.

86 V ietnam Generation
S usan S c Hna U,

11

D e c e iv e r 1988

My father was killed during the second World War, in 1945 on
Guam in the Pacific. He died a hero: they landed on the beachhead, he
went back a number of times, even though he was wounded, to save the
men under his command. It practically destroyed my mother when he
was killed. She terribly resented the military for taking him. That’s the
image of war and the military I grew up with and because o f that I had
a very personal involvement against war and against suffering.
When I went for my Navy physical I wore a peace necklace and
I remember the doctor asking me why I was wearing it. I said, because
I’m against war. The recruiter told me if I were ever in Vietnam and there
was a Vietnamese soldier who needed to be taken care of, I could take
care of that person. So there was not supposed to be any problem against
war. My rationalization for going into the Navy was to undo the damage
the United States was doing abroad. These young kids were sent
overseas and shot up; they needed good care, and that’s what I was going
to do. But there was a point at which it was obvious that I had to do
something about the war, that I was no longer patching up people to feel
better, but that I was promoting the war machine.
In 19681heard about the GI and Veterans March for Peace in San
Francisco for October 12th. I went to the meetings, and got posters and
leaflets and put them up on base at the Oaknoll Naval Hospital, where
I was stationed. We put posters up in the middle of the night and within
an hour they were all down. I remembered hearing about B-52 bombers
dropping leaflets on the Vietnamese, urging them to defect. I thought if
the United States can do that in Vietnam, then why can’t I do it here. We
had a friend who was a pilot, and my husband and a Vietnam vet and
I loaded up the airplane with those leaflets promoting the peace march.
We loaded up the plane and the press was called to expect us over
various areas in the San Francisco Bay area. We made a couple of trial
runs; one didn’t turn out so well. At a couple of thousand feet up, we
opened the door to the airplane to let the leaflets out and the plane
dropped about a thousand feet! So we reloaded the plane and went back.
We hit the Presidio, Oaknoll Naval Hospital, Treasure Island, Yerba
Buena Island, the deck of the U.S.S. Enterprise. Then we landed and held
a press conference and I said, “I did it.” They asked me to go back in the
airplane and get out again, so they’d have good footage. And they had
an interview. They used all of the footage at my court martial— evidence
I really was guilty.
That was Thursday and the March for Peace was on Saturday. I
wore my uniform in the demonstration that I was told specifically not to
do. A general Navy regulation stated you can’t wear your uniform when
you’re speaking religious, partisan, political views publicly. I though, if
General Westmoreland can wear his uniform before Congress asking for
money for Vietnam, I can wear mine as a member of the Armed Forces
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speaking out against the war. I had as much right to freedom o f speech
as he does. I gave a speech and I knew when I got up to the microphones,
one of these belongs to the Navy. But it didn’t make a difference.

C lA R E N C E F iT C h , 28 AuqusT 1988
My father was in the military in World War II, and even though
he was in a segregated army, it was very much a part of his life
experience. Being a veteran wasn’t something that was looked down on,
it was one o f the few things black m en had that they could hold up as
being honorable, as being accepted, as being proof that you had just as
much right to anything that was going to be given out, even though you
didn’t get it all the time. That’s why a lot of the hostility and resentment
came, because they didn’t get their just due. But they did get some
things out o f it. My father went to m echanics’ school on the GI bill. The
house my mother lives in right now was bought on the GI bill. We
probably would not have been able to do it without the GI bill. My father
talked about his personal experiences in the war all the time. I could tell
you where he was stationed because he told us a thousand times. He
made us sit down and listen to the stories, but he didn’t really elaborate
on the negatives and the racism.
As a black GI in Vietnam in 1967 things were changing. Things
going on in the States affected our behavior there. Some of the same
black consciousness, the whole black power movement, was taking
place there too. We were growing Afros, expressing ourselves through
ritualistic handshakes, black power handshakes, African beads, hanging
around in cliques, trying to eat up as much o f the black music as we
could get our hands on. We kind of segregated ourselves; we didn’t want
to integrate into what we considered the white m an’s war. For the first
time I was looking at the enemy, not so much as the enemy, but as
another minority, brown people. The North Vietnamese reminded us of
it too.
People started really trying to educate themselves about how the
war started, where the war was going. We read a lot of the books,
CoTifessions o f Nat Turner, Soul on Ice, all of the black publications,
Ebony, Jet, as much as we could see because we wanted to be a part of
it. There was some nights we had twenty, thirty, fifty brothers hanging
out. When we went into a mess hall we ate together in certain parts oi
the mess hall. They were trying to make us get haircuts, cut those Afros
off, and people were going to jail to keep their hair. We tried to spend
almost all of our time together, the Bloods in Vietnam, we tried to have
all black hooches. The brass would try to prevent this, they would try
to assign us to integrated hooches and stuff like that.
When I was put in the brig, it was like another awareness.
Because the brig was like..., there were white Marines in the brig, but the
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Vietnam Veterans Against the War member Clarence Fitch holds his
war medals.
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overwhelming majority, was black, much like the jails were back in the
World. It ju st made you more bitter, more conscious, more hard, more
militant, gave you more of a reason for being what you were and to resist
and to fight, and make sure you educated yourself and educated others.
You laid down at night and there was ju st so much tension going
through you, with all the racial stuff, the war itself and we were so young.
But it felt like we were so much older. It felt like you had lived a long time.
That year in Vietnam was like twenty years, you saw so much and
witnessed so much.

JohN T u (V1A, 15 A uqust 1987
A( my first duty station in Vietnam, a military intelligence [Mil
detachment, I refused to work with South Vietnamese interpreters who
were using physical coercion in order to extract “the truth” from North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers. There were four or five ARVN [Army
of the Republic of Vietnam— the South] interpreters who were working
with the MI unit. And although I was language trained in Vietnamese,
it was standard operational procedure to have a Vietnamese interpreter
with Americans in order to make sure no nuances of the language
escaped anyone and maybe to check up on us.
The first person I was to interrogate was an NVA soldier who had
been brought in during Operation Iron Mountain. I started doing basic
debriefing of the individual and realized that the Vietnamese interpreter
was pulling and twisting on the m an’s ear lobe and had it stretched down
somewhere below his chin line. I told him to stop, and he did, only to start
again after a few moments. I stopped the questioning and requested
another Vietnamese interpreter and the same thing happened. I decided
to end the debriefing session. My next interrogation was of a suspected
Viet Cong from a small village on the Laotian border, who had been shot.
We had nothing to show he had ever been a Viet Cong and I classified him
as being civilian, possibly civilian defendant. The South Vietnamese I
was working with trying to debrief the fellow, kept pinching off his IV
tubes while we were talking. I told him several times to stop, but it was
totally out of my control. I tried using three other Vietnamese interpreters
after that and they also abused the prisoner; either cutting off his IV or
pulling and twisting on his ear lobe or twisting a handful of flesh from
his side in order to create pain. I refused to work with them. As a result,
I was transferred out of the MI detachment.
I was later asked to interpret at the evacuation of a refugee camp
and was sent in unarmed to an area with several South Vietnamese from
the Province Recon Unit. I felt something was wrong, very, veiy wrong.
I was told we were looking for a woman and some children who were
supposed to be on the farthest edge of the village. We got to the village
edge and they told me it was ju st a little further. We went through the
tree line, and still further. I realized they were acting very nervous and
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John Tuma risked death by protesting the torture of Vietnamese
prisoners.
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suspicious. They ran forward to a small ravine and I started running
back. When 1got to the edge of the village I heard gunfire behind me. The
lire was directed at me; they were not supposed to bring me back alive.
Earlier I had reported the use of a “birdcage” (a cage constructed of
barbed wire wrapped around a captive and then hung in a tree) in a
Vietnamese compound and they were forced to take it down. Shortly
after this incident my hooch was fragged with a percussion grenade.
I was threatened with court-martial several times, but I always
thought about what would my parents have done. What would be the
right thing to do, not from the Arm y’s point of view, but from my family’s
and my community’s. I consciously thought about that and came to the
conclusion there were things I had been raised not to do and couldn’t and
wouldn’t do.

P a u I A T W O od, 10 D e c e i v e r 1986
I was bom immediately after the Second World War. I always
think I was b om in the shadow of the bomb, and there was never a time
in my childhood when I thought that men didn’t go to war. My father was
a perfect example of a m odem day warrior, and I thought he never looked
better than he did when he was in his uniform. Once I knew my father
had been in the Marine Corps, I always knew that I was going to go in the
Marine Corps some day.
When I was a kid my father kept these medals and ribbons and
other Marine Corps paraphernalia in a little cigar box that he had tucked
away in the back com er of his dresser. My brothers and I used to visit
that little cigar box as though it were a shrine, in which these magic
talismans were. I never tired of going there and opening the cover,
tingling with anticipation, looking once again. I guess I saw them as
badges of courage and of honor, and there was never a time in my
childhood that I doubted whether I would m yself wear these emblems
and earn these badges.
After I refused to go to Vietnam, I wanted only to get rid of them,
to forget about them, forget what they had once meant to me. I was angry
at the time because, at least in that period of my life, I felt that every
symbol I once valued as a symbol of something good and decent, was not
in my mind a symbol of its opposite. And I think I want ed to be rid of the
ties that still bound me to my father; I have to say that I wanted to be rid
of his disapproval.
It’s only been in the last five years or so that I’ve been able to pick
these things up. You know, it’s funny that I even have some of them. I
threw virtually everything I had away, but there were some things I kept.
But I never looked at them until five years ago. It’s funny, I began going
to that little corner of my own life, one by one pulling out some things;
I guess a kind of talisman again. To pick, for instance, this globe and
anchor; to pick that up was like picking up something radioactive. I
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Former Marine Corpsman Paul Atwood holds his father's World War
Two medals and a photograph o f his father.
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didn’t know what it meant to me. I know that it still meant something
deep, but I was afraid of it because, even now looking at it, I get that old
sense o f patriotism. There’s nothing wrong with love of country, but I get
afraid of where that feeling leads; into a mindless, unquestioning,
uncritical acceptance of policy by governmental leaders that got us
involved in Vietnam in the first place.
Without exception, the people I knew who had gone to Vietnam
felt they were doing something honorable. But m any people would say
to me it was the most fucked up thing they have ever done in their lives
and wish they could get it out of their sleep, their nightmares. And in that
sense, I felt I had made the right decision. I knew from listening to them
that I would have been— if I survived at all— a complete basket case. I
also felt convinced that m y analysis of the war was correct; that it was
not a self-serving one to justify m y own behavior, but it was real. A more
fucked up war couldn’t be imagined. And it was clear to me that the
Vietnam veteran was being scapegoated for the war, that collectively the
United States had called upon vets to go and do something and then had
turned its back on them afterwards.

S t ev e SpUNtJ,

1 4

Jan u a ry

1 9 8 9

I told my family I was on thirty day leave. But after thirty days
were up, my father became suspicious and knew something was wrong.
A short time after the thirty day period, I was awakened by the police. My
father had called the police and reported me.
They took me to this compound at the Brooklyn Navy Yard with
barbed wire fence, j agged glass on top of the high walls and one main door
in the front with Marine guards at the door. They asked me if I would
consent to going back. I said sure. I probably would have said anything
to get out o f the Marine barracks at that point. So, remarkably enough,
they gave me a bus ticket and told me to go back to North Carolina. I
didn’t go back, I went home to m y parent’s house, hoping for more time
to think of something. It wasn’t too long later before my father turned
me in again. This time the MPs came.
They took me to the Naval Brig and I started to get worked over
by the Marine guards. You’d be stripped o f all your clothing, they take
your unmentionables and put them through the bars and hit them or
stretch them or choke you until you’re white or out of air. They usually
tried to do things that would not leave bruises or blood. They called you
the lowest thing on earth, but not ju st terms that they might use in boot
camp to break you down, this was o f a personal nature to them, ‘cause
usually these Marine guards had done at least one tour ol duty and
they’d seen a lot of their buddies die. And you were the worst thing on
earth.
Two o f these guards told me this was my last weekend, that they
were going to kill me. I checked around with other prisoners and quite
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Former Marine Corpsman Steve Spund holds his discharge papers
and wears a peace button and a ribbon from a New York City Vietnam
veterans parade.
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a few o f them told me that they hung a few Marines and made it look like
suicide. I couldn’t believe at first that anyone would do that to another
American, or another Marine, but they assured me it was so, and at that
point, I wasn’t going to take any chances. I started to believe that they’d
sooner see me dead at their hands than free at mine.
I was faced with another tough choice. One was going back to
North Carolina and then to Vietnam, or take my own life. I decided that
was the right thing to do. They took us to the PX to get a shave kit and
all that other kind of stuff. They were supposed to take out the blades
from the shave kits, but the guards were busy and I took the moment to
put a package of blades in my pockets. There was one Marine guard that
wasn’t crazy like these other two and I told him if he could to get in touch
with the chaplain or the rabbi, that I wanted last rites. He came back and
said they were both unavailable and for a while I felt that this was it, I
was going to do it, ‘cause the next day the other guards were coming back
on duty. Unexpectedly a visiting psychiatrist heard what I was up to. He
came in and saw my condition and knew I was going to do it. He sent
me to St. Albans Hospital in Queens, for observation in the psychiatric
ward.
I received a general discharge with honorable conditions at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard. I thought it was strange, not only to be back there
again, but the sergeant asked me— and he was serious— if I would like
to enlist again. I don’t remember the vulgarity I used, but I’m sure I let
him know that I wasn’t interested.

G

req

P

ayto n

, n A

uqust 1 9 8 8

I was in a supply unit in Vietnam located in Long Binh. We went
out on the field depot and I worked a location deck. What they told us
was, is if we come in and do the right thing in the beginning, that we’re
doing the menial jobs now and as other groups come in they will get the
job s and we will get a better situation. So I accepted that for words. So
in the beginning we had a lot of dirty jobs: burning feces, cleaning out
urine pits and all kind o f different things. But what I began to notice is
that a lot of white recruits were coming in and they weren’t getting the
same assignments I was getting. It seemed like we was always pulling
up the short end of the stick.
One time the first sergeant was talking about these gooks or
something, and I replied, “Yea, the gook is the same thing as a nigger.”
It was like a light went off, it was a real revelation. I was naive about a
lot o f things. I had to develop a racist attitude. I never was raised with
that. The first sergeant told me I was a smart nigger, that’s ju st what he
said.
One incident that really opened my eyes was with a white GI
named Muncey, from Kentucky. He was really a typical super artificial
macho guy. A group of Vietnamese kids came up to our truck as we were
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In Vietnam, Greg Payton concluded that a "gook is the same thing
as a nigger."
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coming back from guard duty. We had food and stuff and we’d feed the
people out in the field. We had leftover food, bushels of apples and
oranges and stuff. These kids came up to the truck begging and you
could see it in their faces, these kids had that I’m hungry, feed me, kind
of look. So Muncey says look at these gook kids and he took a bite out
of an apple and threw it in the dirt and about four or five kids dove on
it. It was just like when you drop a piece o f bread in the fish tank. It just
really set me off. I damn near threw him out of the truck and it was still
moving. I was brought up on charges for that.
I had three courts-martial and I went to the stockade and it was
all these black people, all these brothers. That blew my mind. After I’d
been in the stockade about two months, I made it to minimum-security
and I had a work detail. I used to bring in kerosene to burn the feces w ith.
Some guys got together and said they were going to have a riot in the
stockade. They asked me to bring in an extra can of kerosene every other
day so they couldn’t see build-up. So I did. It started in minimumsecurity but they went to maximum-security and broke the locks and let
everybody out. They picked 12:00 because that’s when the guards
change and most of them were eating in the mess hall. They broke the
gate, broke the lock, let everybody out of maximum-security, and started
burning the hooches and what not. There was a lot o f chaos. A lot of
people got hurt and I imagine some people got killed. I remember seeing
white guys, in particular, and guards getting beat up with bunk
adapters. If you were white you were in trouble, whether you was a good
guy or a bad guy.
I’ve never been as violent as I was in Vietnam. There was a lot of
rage; it just began to build and build. I did so many things that were
unnecessary and hurt some people and it really wasn’t their fault. But
I had to take it out somewhere, I had to vent this anger in some way.
Today I work on not becoming violent, I’m scared of violence.

Bill

S h O R T , 50 A uqust 1987

I served with the Blue Spaders 1 BN 26 INF First Infantly
Division, otherwise known as the “Bloody Red One” from February,
1969, to July, 1969. I was an infantry platoon sergeant with Mike
platoon in Alpha Company. My “tour of duty” was cut short by my own
volition.
My unit patrolled the Michelin rubber plantation, operating in
company strength by day and splitting up into platoon size ambushes
for the night. We usually spent three to five days doing this before we
rested in a fire support base for a couple of days. Whenever we made
contact or blew an ambush the body count came next. I would never view
the bodies, I was afraid to. I didn’t want to know what I was doing. So
when the guys would say, “Hey Sarge, we got to check out the dead
gooks," I always made up some excuse. I knew it was my responsibility
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Former platoon sergeant Bill Short holds his court-martial
documents, CIB (Combat Infantrymen's Badge) and a peace symbol
attahed to a string rosary he wore in Vietnam.
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as platoon sergeant to be on top of all situations, but somehow the body
count was something I had no desire to be part of. After a firefight I felt
drained and empty, it seemed pointless, our battles were never decisive
and tomorrow always came with the welcome of surviving one day only
to have to face another. The last thing I wanted to do was count bloody
body parts so we could compete with the Second of the Twenty-Eight, the
Black Lions, our sister battalion, for first place in the division. I carried
my weapon and fired many rounds through it, but I always felt protected
against taking another life because twenty or eighty other guys fired too.
For years after the war, when people would ask the inevitable question,
did you kill anyone, I always answered I don’t know: but in reality I did.
On one company size operation we broke for a rest at midday. My
RTO [radio telephone operator], because he had a feeling, put his
claymore mine out, something we only did for ambush. Halfway through
our lunch all hell broke loose. Barney blew his claymore, and after a
three hour firefight things were calm again. The attack came from three
Viet Cong, two of which we got. W hen the body count came I went for
the first time to see the remains. Both VC had been killed by the blast
from one of our grenades, and as I approached the first thing I noticed
was a piece of bone protruding from the hand o f one of the bodies. It
seemed to glow white hot, I thought it was the brightest thing I had ever
seen. The next thing 1 noticed was how heavy the body seemed to my
eyes. It looked as if it were glued to the ground. One o f the new NCOs
[non-commissioned officers], a staff sergeant and second timer, decided
we should booby trap the bodies and he asked for my help. We rolled
them over and pulled the secondary pins on two grenades, leaving the
primary detonation lever in place. Each grenade was placed, lever side
up and under the rib cage beneath the dead men. Later that night, while
positioned in a company size am bush, I heard the grenades go off. I knew
the comrades of the men we had killed had come to claim the bodies and
quite possibly had gotten something extra to go with their grief. I knew
I was responsible for taking human life. Two months later I refused to
go out on any more combat missions.

H o W A R d L e v y , 15 Janu ary 1989
I was part of a plan whereby doctors could defer being called into
the A m iy to allow them to finish whatever specialty training they were
doing. I really didn’t want to go into the military, it just seemed that since
they were drafting young doctors, I was going to go whether I liked it or
not, so I might as well go on my terms. At the time I made the
commitment, the war in Vietnam was just a little blip. As the war began
to escalate, and my time to go, which was ‘65, began to draw near, my
opinion about the war changed drastically. By now there was no
cjuestion where I was coming from with regard to Vietnam. The only
question was, what the hell do I do about it? I went into the Arm y figuring
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number one, I’ll buy time. Number two, I worked it out so I would be sent
down South, where I figured I could at least do some civil rights stuff that
I’d been wanting to do anyhow. And number three, I figured I’ll draw the
line somewhere. I knew where that was going to be— when they ordered
me to go to Vietnam.
I was stationed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, where I ran a
clinic, and every night and on weekends, I would go to the town of
Prosperity to work with an organization that was registering blacks to
vote. At some point the Arm y assigned some Green Beret guys to me and
I was supposed to train them in some aspect of dermatology. I did that
for a number of months, which really allowed me to get to know them.
The more I got to know them, the more upsetting some of their stories
became. I reached a point when I ju st said, “Look, I’ve figured this out
and I can’t train you guys anymore.” I said, “I don’t really want you in
the clinic, so let’s not make a big fuss about it, but I want you to leave.”
And they did. Each month a new guy would come and I’d give him the
same schpiel. That went on for a number of months.
By the time charges were brought against me, I only had another
two or three months in the Army. It turns out from the trial testimony,
military intelligence knew of my activities within days, maybe hours of
me arriving in Prosperity. But actually they had been tracing me from
my days when I was involved in some Socialist Worker Party stuff, before
I went in the Army. My CO [Commanding Officer] was only going to give
me a slap on the wrist until they threw the intelligence report on his desk,
which detailed the fact that I was a fucking Communist. That’s basically
what it said. He then decided it was going to be court martial.
We tried to put the war on trial, but the military court said the
truth is no defense. Another defense we used was medical ethics, saying
the real objection to training the Green Berets is they were using
medicine as just another propaganda tool. If you had a bunch of kids
in a poor village in Vietnam, and you gave them a shot of penicillin and
cured them of their impetigo and suddenly they looked much healthier
and didn’t have ugly skin things all over their goddamn body, you would
probably make some friends in town. That strikes me as illegitimate
because it can be taken away as easily as it can be given. That’s not a
basis for doing medicine.
I was sentenced to three years in prison. The only shock was it
wasn’t nine.

S

teve

F o u r n i e r , 17 A uqust 1987

I volunteered to go to Vietnam. I wanted to be there, I thought it
was the right thing, that we should go and protect democracy. I believed
in the Domino Theory and that Cardinal Spellman was right when he
said, “Kill a Commie for Christ.” My mother and father were both in the
Navy during World W ar II and there was a lot of pride in m ilitary service
in my family. I was proud of being a marine and fighting for my country.

Ini
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Steve Fournier holds his USMC boot camp book and his Vietnam war
photo album.
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My first night at Dong Ha I can remember being really excited
looking out over the DMZ and seeing artillery fire start to walk in toward
our positions, and saying, “This is wonderful, I’m really here, this is real
war.” The guy next to me, who had three more days left in-country, was
lying on the bottom of the trench begging, “God not now, just three more
days, God not now!” I looked at him and thought, “That’s a m arine?” The
next thing I knew a round blew up one o f the outposts and some guys
were wounded. I saw, for the first time, the effects of war.
After three months I was hit by friendly artillery fire, medevacked
to Guam for recovery and shipped back to Vietnam two months later. I
went on a mine sweep through Con Thien that was a real living hell; it
had been defoliated, napalmed, burned and constantly shelled by both
sides. The death and destruction were nothing I ever could have
imagined. That was the beginning of my new look at the war. I witnessed
Vietnamese torturing other Vietnamese, marines cutting ears and
penises of enemy bodies and displaying them proudly. I even saw an
eight-year-old boy shot in the leg for saying, “Fuck you marine,” and an
eighty-year-old woman beaten by a marine with his rifle butt.
One night during a firefight I dragged in the body of a North
Vietnamese lieutenant. I thought I heard him moaning, but when I
reached him I found he was dead. I searched his body; he had a scapular
medal around his neck and a holy card pinned inside his shirt. The holy
card looked very much like the one I had from Catholic school when I was
growing up. There was a picture of himself and a young woman with a
priest in front of a Cathedral, evidently in Hanoi where he was married.
He was obviously a Catholic like myself, and I thought, my God, Catholics
are involved.
Alter being wounded a second time, I was sent to recuperate at
Chelsea Naval Hospital where I was bom . With only two weeks to go
before being retired from the Marines, I went to a demonstration at
Boston Common. For about an hour I listened, and then I finally got up
the nerve, walked to the microphone area and with my Marine haircut
said, “Look, I’m just back from Vietnam and I’d like to say something.”
There was a bit of hesitation, then I was introduced as a marine just
returned from the war. The place got very, very quiet. I said, “I just
wanted to tell you that m yself and some other marines have been calling
you people back here in the World a lot of lousy names and claiming that
we’d like to do some terrible things to you and w ell.... I want to apologize.
I think you’re doing something wonderful for America and I’m proud to
be here with you today.” I got a wonderful ovation. I felt like, God, I’m
home, I’m finally home.

S t e a I in q HubcAps:
K e y n o t e SpEEch
DEliVEREd AT t L|E COHERENCE ON YoUTh,
MiliTARiSM ANd ALTERNATIVES,
ChicAqo, > June 1988
W .D . EH r Lia r t

Only a few weeks ago, a student where I teach approached me to
ask if I would talk to him about the Marine Corps. Seventeen years old,
he is ju st finishing his junior year of high school. He’s already made up
his mind that he doesn’t want to be an enlisted man; he’s going to college
first, and then he’ll become an officer. His dilemma is whether to join the
Reserve Officers Training Corps during college, or wait and go through
Officer Candidate School after graduation. He wanted to know what I
thought.
I asked him why he wants to go into the military at all. He had
several answers; to make his resume seem more attractive when he
finally goes looking for a job in the fields o f law enforcement or
communications; to challenge him self and to gain experience and
discipline; to learn hand-to-hand self-defense and to become an expert
in the use of firearms. I asked him why he wants to jo in the Marines.
“Because they’re the best,” he replied, ‘T h a t’s what I want; the best.”
I tried to give him a brief history lesson on the uses of U.S. armed
forces in the post-World W ar Two era, touching upon such things as the
stalemate o f Korea, the quagmire of Vietnam, the invasion of the
Dominican Republic, the invasion of Grenada, the fiasco in Lebanon,
and the attack on the U.S.S. Stark. “Can you give me a good reason why
those 265 Marines died in Beirut?” I asked, “Can you give me a good
reason for the deaths of those 37 sailors in the Persian Gulf?”
He couldn’t. I doubt that he’d ever though about such questions
before. I doubt that he’ll ever think about them again. Instead he replied
that if he joined ROTC, his college education would be paid for; he could
invest the money he would have spent on college and be able to buy his
own home a decade sooner than most of his peers.
“What if you don’t live that long?” I asked. But the question was
meaningless. I’ve seldom met a teenager who could imagine him self or
herself dead, who could conceive of a world without him or her in it. And
it is next to impossible to expect a teenager to understand the connect ions
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between obscure and distant foreign policy decisions and his or her
immediate wants and needs. And taking aim on another human being
in combat, let alone killing unarmed middle-aged women or burning
some peasant’s entire worldly goods, are unfathomable abstractions to
those lor whom death and m isery are confined to newspaper headlines
and television adventure shows.
Even as we spoke, our conversation reminded me of a similar
conversation I had had with an ex-Marine English teacher of mine fully
22 years ago. I didn’t pay any attention to that man, and it was clear early
on that this boy wasn’t going to pay any attention to me. It was all very
frustrating and depressing, but I can’t say that I was surprised.
Frustration and depression have become chronic conditions of my life.
I could tell you all sorts of horror stories. There was the entire
class of first- and second-year college students I had in 1977, none of
whom had ever heard of Dean Rusk, much less who he was or what he
had been a part of. There was the girl I taught in 1979 who, when
confronted with five Vietnam poems in a high school English class,
blurted out, “Do we have to read these, Bill? It’s so depressing.” There
was the boy who, in the midst of my 1982 history course on the Vietnam
war, asked me when I was going to tell them “the other side,” oblivious
to the fact that “the other side” is all he’s been hearing since the day he
was born. But I’m sure all of you have enough horror stories of your own.
I don’t know howyou deal with your horror stories, but I deal with
mine rather poorly. I can’t tell you the number of times in the past twenty
years that I’ve wanted to drink m yself to death or get a good-paying job
in a public relations firm or just crawl under a rock and let the world pass
me by. I’m so tired of paddling against the torrent that most days I wake
up not knowing how I can possibly pick up the paddle even one more
tim e.
If I could feel like I were getting somewhere, it wouldn’t be so bad.
But I look around the world we live in today, and I can’t make m yself
believe that it’s any better than the world around me when I was a 17year-old kid passionately intent upon enlisting in the Marines and
utterly oblivious to the irreversible consequences of m y decision.
It took a brutal war and a brutal homecoming and a brutal selfexamination coupled with a brutal study of history to force me to see the
world as I do now. I don’t know why I kept at it. I don’t know why I didn’t
end up dead of drugs or suicide, or locked away somewhere deep in the
wilderness o f the Pacific Northwest, or wrapped in the Am erican Hag,
parading down Wall Street, crying in my beer and imagining my days in
Vietnam as the noblest and most fulfilling experience of m y life. A lot of
Vietnam veterans did. I don’t know why, but I didn’t.
Instead, I came to the messianic and naive conviction that the
Vietnam war might end up being worth something good after all, that out
of the debacle could grow the seeds of a new understanding, not ju st for
me, but for my country. I believed it because I wanted to believe it,
because I didn’t know what else to believe.
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But the war dragged on and on and on. Most o f the once-vast
antiwar movement dried up and blew away like dead leaves in November
long before the war finally ground to an end nearly a decade after I had
fought there. Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon, but he wouldn’t
pardon those who’d resisted what had long since become Richard
Nixon’s war. Jimmy Carter offered resisters a deal that wasn’t much
better, and no deal at all for military deserters and veterans with “bad
paper discharges.” Ronald Reagan declared the Vietnam war a noble
cause, and the vast momentum of our collective national mythology has
worked hard and with great success to fix that assessment as the final
verdict of history.
It’s really much worse than that.
Nuclear stockpiles are
geometrically larger than they were even 15 years ago. Our government
has replaced the blood-price of American lives in Vietnam with the far
less politically costly dollar-price of low-intensity conflict all over Central
America. We are daily confronted with such absurdities as U.S.-backed
guerrillas attacking U.S.-owned oil refineries in Angola, U.S.-sponsored
rebels who think the Ayatollah Khomeini is the best invention since ice
cream, and U.S. recognition o f the genocidal Pol Pot regime as the
legitimate government of Cambodia. W e’ve got the same bunch of cloakand-dagger men who once equipped an army of Lao mercenaries by
selling heroin to American GIs in Saigon equipping an army of Nicaraguan
mercenaries by selling cocaine in the streets of our own cities.
Most disturbing of all is that the American people, most of them
at least, just sit there day after day and year after year and let it all
happen. How in the world are we going to get teenagers to understand
the world they live in when we can’t even get grown people to learn
enough or care enough or think enough to do it? And what really scares
me is that I find m yself more and more forgiving of my fellow citizens.
Fifteen years ago, I couldn’t even talk to such people without shouting.
Ten years ago I couldn’t understand why everyone wasn’t busily reading
WIN Magazine and The Nation and Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee.
But if the world hasn’t changed much in 20 years, I surely have.
The past eight years, in particular, have brought a personal “revolution”
about which I have deeply ambivalent feelings. In 1981, I got married.
In 1985, after two decades of living in barracks and dormitories, out of
the backs of cars and on other people’s living room sofas, or in rented
apartments, I bought a house. In 1986, my wife and I had a child. More
and more, my life has taken on the shapes and rhythms of so many
Americans for whom I one harbored nothing but contempt.
I’ve got responsibilities now. My wife and child deserve something
better than sleeping bags and canned sardines. I’ve got bills to pay, a
rotting back stair that needs to be fixed, a hamper perpetually full of dirty
clothes, and a widowed mother who’ll break her neck if she tries to
change her own storm windows. I’ve got a classroom full o f 15-year-olds
who’ll eat me alive the first day I come into school unprepared. I can’t
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even find the time to keep up with my own writing, let alone to go out and
change the world.
And I care. I’ve given most o f my adult life to the struggle that
brings us here tonight. I know what it means to be cannon fodder. But
you tell me where I’m supposed to get the time or the energy to read the
latest issue o f NACLA Report, or attend the next meeting of Pledge of
Resistance, or leaflet the reservists at Willow Grove Naval A ir Station.
It isn’t anger that I feel so much anymore, though I am certainly
angry, but rather a marrow-deep sadness heavy as cast iron. Henry
Kissinger gets $15,000 every time he opens his mouth. G. Gordon Liddy
stars on Miami Vice. Sylvester Stallone earns multi-millions refighting
a war in Hollywood that he desperately avoided in real life. An I end up
feeling guilty about the $200 I’ve been paid to come here and talk to
people who already think pretty much like me. Each year I move more
slowly, read less avidly, turn down more unpaid work, and believe less
passionately that anything I have ever done or ever will do will make one
damned bit of difference.
Even as I write this, my daughter has been crying inconsolably
for nearly an hour. Do I stop writing and try to comfort her, or do I let
my wife bear all the burden o f coping with a teething 18-month-old. At
least my wife understands what I’m doing. How do I explain to my
daughter that I don’t have time for her because I have to inspire a group
of people intent upon tilting at windmills? All she will know of this day
is that her father wasn’t there when she needed him. And each time I
choose to spend what little spare time I have in trying to make a better
world for my daughter, I am putting that much more distance between
m yself and m y child, losing that much more o f the precious little time I
have to give to her and to receive the blessing of her tears. And I want
more than ever ju st to put the world aside and live m y life in peace.
But of course, there’s the catch: whatever peace I might find by
ignoring the world around me is and always will be no more than an
illusion, a luxury of place and time and circumstance, a buy-now-paylater sort of proposition that may one day come back at me with a
vengeance too terrible to contemplate. How long before all those
thousands of nuclear weapons are finally triggered? What happens
when the rain forests are finally gone? What will I say to my students
when they come back and ask me, “W hy didn’t anyone tell us?” What
will I say to my daughter when she explains to me that she can get a
college education and learn valuable life skills if she enlists in the army?
That’s the trouble with knowledge: once you’ve learned something,
it's hard to unlearn it. Once you’ve seen the misery of others, it’s hard
to believe that such misery will never be yours, or your children’s or your
grandchildren’s. Once you’ve seen the world for what it is, it’s hard to
ignore it. And once you’ve seen the world for what it could be, it’s hard
to accept it for what it is.
This is what is known as being stuck between a rock and a hard
place. Nothing I do will make any difference, but to do nothing requires
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a kind of amnesia I have yet to discover a means of inducing. The
dilemma leaves me much of the time feeling like a failure at everything
I do. Certainly it requires only the most rudimentary powers of
observation to notice that I haven’t had much success at changing the
world. Meanwhile, I don’t spend enough time on my teaching, I don't
spend enough time on my writing, I don’t spend enough time with my
wife, and I don’t spend enough time with my daughter. Jack of all trades;
master of none.
But what else can I do? A rock and a hard place. So I bumble
along like a punchdrunk boxer too broken to win and too proud to go
down for the count. Some days are better than others. On my bad days,
I am somewhat less sociable than a Kodiak bear with a toothache. On
my bad days, those horror stories of mine hide in the shadows quietly
laughing at me, and there are shadows everywhere I look.
But I do have good days, too. And on those good days, I draw
strength and inspiration from people like Lou Ann Merkle, who conceived
and brought into being what has got to be the most remarkable comic
book in history, Real War Stories. People like Brian Willson, who lost his
legs but not his heart. People like Jan Barry, who single-handedly
created the first county-level peace commission in the United States.
People like Rick and Laura Quiggle, who are raising five children on a
blue-collar salary while refusing to accept the collective complacency of
the entire city of Erie. People like Martin Sheen, who donated the entire
proceeds from his part in the movie Ghandi to Sister Mother Teresa.
People like my own students, who recently collected an entire truckload
of clothing and school supplies for the children of Nicaragua. People like,
well, all of you. Ordinary people, ju st as tired and harried and over
extended as I am, who somehow find the courage and the will to do the
extraordinary. And to keep doing it in the face of certain failure.
That young student of mine will probably end up joining the
Marines, and I’m sorry I couldn’t figure out a way to be a bit more
persuasive with him. Maybe next time I’ll get it right. Or the time after
that. Every once in a while, I actually do get it right. There was the former
student of mine in 1983 who was all set to jo in ROTC in college, but
didn’t. “I kept thinking about things you’d said in class,” he told me, “I
just couldn’t make m yself sign the papers.” There was the phone call I
got in 1985 from a 22-year-old unemployed bricklayer from Brooklyn
who was just about to enlist in the Air Force when he read my book
Vietnam-Perkasie. He’d ju st called to say that he’d changed his mind
about enlisting. There was the woman from Texas who told me after
reading my book Marking Time in 1986, “I feel as if I’ve made a friend,
someone on this earth who has touched my soul and said what I’ve been
feeling for a long time.” And there was the letter I received in 1987 from
a 16-year-old high school boy in Seattle who said, “I guess you could say
I’m really trying to understand what went on during Vietnam and why.
I’ve been watching the Iran-Contra hearings, and it seems like one big
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mess. Anyway, Bill, you have sure changed m y perspective on a lot of
things and I’m really glad I’ve read your books.”
Things like that don’t happen as often as I would like them to
happen, but they do happen. And I’m sharing them with you not because
you need to hear them, but because I need to hear them. Too often, I am
too caught up in m y own weariness and frustration and self-pity to take
the time to consider the people for whom I have made a difference.
I no longer believe that I can change the world. I no longer believe
that even all o f us together are going to change the world. But I do believe
that we have to keep trying because if our voices fall silent, the only voices
left will be those of people like Elliot Abrams and Oliver North. I have
to keep trying because it is the only way I can live with myself, knowing
what I know. It is the only way I can live with my wife, who believes in
me more than I believe in myself. It is the only way I can live with my
daughter, who will inherit the world I give her.
I’ll tell you my darkest fantasy: when they drop the big bomb on
the oil refineries of South Philadelphia, I want to have time to take my
daughter in my arms and hold her tight and whisper into her ear, “Kid,
I’m sorry about this. I did the best I could.” That’s it. That’s all I ask for.
Looking around at the world through rational eyes, that’s all I reasonably
can ask for: the time to say it, and the knowledge that what I am saying
is true, that I did the best I could.
And who knows? Maybe I’m wrong. It wouldn’t be the first time.
Maybe it isn’t as bad as I think. Maybe we really can change the world.
I know one thing for sure: I certainly can’t do it without you. If you’re
willing to keep trying, so am I. What else are we going to do with
ourselves, anyway? Steal hubcaps?
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L i e u t e n a n t H A T fiE ld
L a r r y R ottm ann

Lieutenant Hatfield figured that he was a survivor—
One night a m ortar round shredded his m osquito
netting, but he escaped com pletely unscathed.
A couple m onths later, a single 50 cal. round
went right through the top of his steel pot
without touching a hair on his head.
Another time he stepped on a “Bouncing B etty”
but only the guys in front and back o f him
got hit.
Lieutenant Hatfield figured that he was a survivor—
But one evening he sent a reluctant patrol into
“Indian Country,” and they got badly ambushed.
A few weeks later, he wrote up an “Article 15”
on a trooper he found sleeping during guard duty.
And once, he ordered a private from Alabam a
to stop flying the Confederate flag over his bunker.
Lieutenant Hatfield figured that he was a survivor—
But he didn’t survive the high explosive
fragm entation grenade
rolled under his cot late one night by his
own men.
“He was a survivor, a Brave Soldier,” wrote the
colonel to Lieutenant Hatfield’s parents, “and he died
in a m anner you can be extrem ely proud of.”
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